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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
 James Dennis has spent almost twenty-four years 
unsuccessfully challenging his conviction for the murder of 
Chedell Williams.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
repeatedly affirmed Dennis’s first-degree murder conviction 
and sentence and denied his applications for post-conviction 
relief.  Thereafter, Dennis filed an application under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, and the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Dennis habeas 
corpus relief, concluding that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), with respect to three pieces of evidence suppressed 
by the Commonwealth.  The suppressed Brady material—a 
receipt corroborating Dennis’s alibi, an inconsistent statement 
by the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness, and documents 
indicating that another individual committed the murder —
effectively gutted the Commonwealth’s case against Dennis.  
The withholding of these pieces of evidence denied Dennis a 
fair trial in state court.  We will therefore affirm the District 
Court’s grant of habeas relief based on his Brady claims.  
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I. Background 
 A. Factual Background  
 On October 22, 1991, Chedell Williams and Zahra 
Howard, students at Olney High School, climbed the steps of 
the Fern Rock SEPTA station, located in North Philadelphia.  
Two men approached the girls and demanded “give me your 
fucking earrings.”  App. 465.  The girls fled down the steps; 
Howard ran to a nearby fruit vendor’s stand and Williams ran 
into the intersection at Tenth and Nedro Streets.  The men 
followed Williams.  The perpetrators tore Williams’s gold 
earrings from her earlobes.  One of the men grabbed her, held 
a silver handgun to her neck, and shot her.  The men then ran 
up the street to a waiting getaway car and fled the scene.  The 
precise time of injury was 1:54 p.m.  Emergency personnel 
responded within minutes, but Williams was pronounced 
dead at the hospital less than an hour later.  
 
 B. Police Investigation and the Trial 
 The police undertook an investigation into the 
Williams murder, primarily aimed at determining the identity 
of the shooter.  Frank Jastrzembski led a team of detectives 
who pursued the investigation based on rumors that “Jimmy” 
Dennis from the Abbottsford Homes projects in East Falls1 
committed the crime, despite being unable to identify the 
source of the rumors. Resting on tips by neighbors from the 
                                              
 1 The Fern Rock SEPTA station is located in North 
Philadelphia.  The Abbottsford projects are located in 
Northwest Philadelphia.   
 
6 
 
projects, police proceeded with Dennis as the primary, if not 
the sole, suspect.2  
 
 Detectives obtained eyewitness reports and 
identifications, very few of which aligned with Dennis’s 
appearance.  Nearly all of the eyewitnesses who gave height 
estimates of the shooter described him as between 5’9” and 
5’10.”  He was described as having a dark complexion and 
weighing about 170 to 180 pounds.  The victim, Williams, 
had a similar build as the shooter; she was 5’10” and weighed 
150 pounds.  Dennis, on the other hand, is 5’5” tall and 
weighed between 125 and 132 pounds at the time of trial.  
 
Prior to trial, three eyewitnesses identified Dennis in a 
photo array, at an in-person lineup, and at a preliminary 
hearing: Williams’s friend, Zahra Howard; a man working on 
a garage near the intersection, Thomas Bertha; and a SEPTA 
employee who was standing in front of the station at the time 
of the murder, James Cameron.3  
                                              
 2 Detective Jastrzembski testified at trial that neither 
the alleged second individual nor the person in the car were 
ever arrested, although the case was ongoing. 
 3 Chief Judge McKee’s masterful concurrence 
summarizes with great detail the photo array, line up, and the 
bystanders’ identifications.  As Chief Judge McKee notes, a 
majority of the nine eyewitnesses who viewed the photo array 
were unable to identify Dennis.  Anthony Overstreet was 
installing stone facing on a nearby garage with Bertha at the 
time of the incident.  Overstreet told police that he recognized 
the shooter from around Broad and Olney Streets in North 
Philadelphia.  Although Overstreet stated that Dennis looked 
like the shooter when he reviewed the photo array, he 
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Zahra Howard 
 Photo Array: Howard identified Dennis, saying 
“this one looks like the guy, but I can’t be sure . . . 
He looks a little like the guy that shot Chedell.”  
App. 1537.  When asked if she could be sure, she 
replied “No.”  Id.   
 
 Lineup: Howard indicated that she “thought” 
Dennis was the shooter.  App. 586.4 
                                                                                                     
identified a different individual as the shooter during a later 
in-person lineup—not Dennis.  George Ritchie, who was 
across the street from Bertha and Overstreet, was unable to 
identify anyone as the shooter among photos provided by the 
police, despite initially asserting that he would be able to 
identify the perpetrators again.  The two fruit vendors 
Howard ran toward, David Leroy, a hot dog vendor near the 
station, and Clarence Verdell, a bystander on the SEPTA 
steps, did not identify Dennis from the photo array.  None of 
these bystanders were called to testify at trial.   
 4 The District Court reasoned that the eyewitnesses’ 
memory may have been supplanted by photos from the array: 
“That some (but notably not all) of the witnesses went on to 
identify Mr. Dennis in a life [sic] lineup two months after 
providing only tentative photo array identification indicates 
that their memories of the photo array may have ‘replaced’ 
their memories of the actual event.  Or, more simply, that Mr. 
Dennis was familiar to them because they had seen his photo 
previously, and had no prior exposure to the other members 
of the lineup.”  Dennis v. Wetzel, 966 F. Supp. 2d 489, 492 
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted), vacated and remanded sub nom. Dennis v. Sec’y, 
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 Preliminary Hearing and Trial: Howard testified at 
trial that she had identified Dennis as the shooter at 
a preliminary hearing.  App. 474-75.  She also 
made an in-court identification during trial.  Id.  
 
Thomas Bertha 
 Photo Array: Bertha initially said that the first 
photo, which was a photo of Dennis, looked like 
the man running with the gun and later confirmed 
his identification.   
 
 Lineup: When asked to identify the shooter, Bertha 
simply stated “three,” which was Dennis.  App. 
586.  
                                                                                                     
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 777 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 2015), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated (May 6, 2015) (“Dennis V”). 
 Chief Judge McKee’s concurrence expands on this 
concern.  He observes that “[a]llowing a witness to view a 
suspect more than once during an investigation can have a 
powerful corrupting effect on that witness’ memory.”  J. 
McKee Concurring Op. at 26.  Research shows “that while 
fifteen percent of witnesses who mistakenly identify an 
innocent person during the first viewing of a lineup, that 
percentage jumps to thirty-seven percent if the witness 
previously viewed that innocent person’s mug shot.”  Id.  
Here, “[t]he witnesses who identified Dennis at trial were 
given not two, but three, opportunities to view Dennis.  These 
multiple views could help explain why initially tentative 
guesses became certain identifications by the time the 
witnesses took the stand.”  Id. at 33 
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 Trial: Bertha identified Dennis as the shooter at 
trial. 
 
James Cameron 
 Photo Array: Cameron said that Dennis looked like 
the shooter, but wavered “I can’t be sure.”  App. 
1548.   
 
 Lineup: Cameron identified Dennis, who was in the 
third position in the lineup, by simply stating 
“number three” without reservation.  App. 689. 
 
 Preliminary Hearing and Trial: At trial, Cameron 
identified Dennis as the shooter and confirmed that 
he had identified Dennis at the preliminary hearing.   
 
At trial, the prosecutor introduced testimony from 
detectives who verified that Howard, Bertha, and Cameron 
each identified Dennis in the photo array and lineup.  No 
other eyewitness identifications were referenced.  
 
 Dennis was arrested on November 22, 1991.  His 
signed statement indicated that he stayed at his father’s house 
until about 1:30 p.m. on the day in question, when his father 
drove him to the bus stop and watched him get on the “K” bus 
toward Abbottsford Homes to attend singing practice that 
evening.  Dennis rode the K bus for approximately thirty 
minutes to the intersection of Henry and Midvale Avenues.  
During the trip, Dennis saw Latanya Cason, a woman he 
knew from Abbottsford Homes.  In his statement to police, 
which was read into the record at trial, Dennis asserted that 
when he and Cason disembarked the bus “[he] waved to her.”  
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App. 710.  After getting off the bus, Dennis walked to 
Abbottsford Homes, where he spent the rest of the day with 
his friends.  Dennis’s father, James Murray, corroborated 
Dennis’s story.  He stated that they spent the morning 
together, and that he drove Dennis to the bus stop shortly 
before 2:00 p.m. to catch the K bus to Abbottsford Homes.   
 
 The Commonwealth’s case rested primarily on 
eyewitness testimony, which Assistant District Attorney 
Roger King emphasized in his opening statement to the jury.  
Though ADA King acknowledged that the Commonwealth 
had no physical evidence—the silver handgun and the 
earrings were never recovered—he contended that the 
eyewitness identifications were sufficient for a conviction. 
Three eyewitnesses were called to testify at trial: Zahra 
Howard, Thomas Bertha, and James Cameron. 
 
 Zahra Howard, who was present with the victim at the 
time of the murder, led the Commonwealth’s case.  She 
recounted what had occurred, noting that the shooter was 
“right in front of” her and Williams, about one or two feet 
away, and that she looked the shooter in the face.  App. 467–
68.  About ten seconds passed between the first time she saw 
the men until she turned around and ran away from the scene; 
she also saw the shooter for about five to ten seconds while 
he was grabbing Williams in the street.  Howard identified 
Dennis in a photo array, at an in-person lineup, and at a 
preliminary hearing.  Defense counsel focused his cross-
examination on her hesitation in prior identifications.  
Howard described the shooter as wearing a black hooded 
sweatshirt and a red sweat suit.  In her statement, Howard 
said that the shooter was about same height as Detective 
Danks, who was 5’9” or 5’10,” or taller.  Howard testified at 
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trial that she had never seen the shooter or his accomplice 
before in her life.   
 
 Thomas Bertha and his partner, Anthony Overstreet, 
were installing stones on a garage near Tenth and Nedro 
Streets on the day in question.  After hearing the gunshot, 
they came down from their ladders and looked down the 
street from the sidewalk.  The two perpetrators ran past them.  
The shooter passed between three to eight feet in front of 
Bertha, and Bertha ran after him.  Bertha made visual contact 
with the shooter, who was running toward him, for about 
three to four seconds.  Defense counsel impeached Bertha by 
recalling that, at the preliminary hearing, Bertha testified that 
he could not have seen the shooter for longer than about a 
second.  Bertha viewed the photo array and attended the 
lineup, identifying Dennis at both.  He described the shooter 
as wearing red sweat pants, a red hooded sweatshirt, a black 
cap, and a leather jacket.  Bertha testified at trial that he 
remembered telling the police that the shooter was 5’9” and 
180 pounds. 
 
 James Cameron was working as a SEPTA cashier on 
the day of the murder.  He was about eight to ten feet from 
Williams when she was shot and saw the shooter for a few 
seconds.  Cameron saw the shooter’s face several times but 
acknowledged that he “didn’t really pay attention.”  App. 
664.  He testified at trial that he saw the shooter for about 
thirty to forty seconds collectively.  This estimate 
contradicted Cameron’s prior testimony at the preliminary 
hearing where he claimed that about twenty seconds passed 
between when he first saw the shooter and when the shooter 
ran away. Cameron viewed the array, attended the lineup, and 
testified at the preliminary hearing, identifying Dennis at each 
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instance, as well as at trial.  Cameron stated that Dennis 
looked like the shooter, “especially from the side.”  App. 676.  
He described the shooter as wearing a red sweat suit and a 
dark jacket, carrying a small silver revolver.  He did not 
remember giving detectives a specific height and weight 
description, but remembered telling them that the shooter was 
“stocky.”5  App. 664. 
 
 Aside from eyewitness testimony, the Commonwealth 
presented testimony from Charles “Pop” Thompson and 
Latanya Cason, who spoke about their interactions with 
Dennis on October 22, 1991, the day of the murder.  
Thompson was in Dennis’s singing group, which held 
rehearsal at Abbottsford Homes that day.  Thompson did not 
remember what Dennis was wearing, but told detectives that 
he saw Dennis with a gun that night.  He also identified an 
illustrative .32 chrome revolver, which had been admitted as a 
Commonwealth exhibit, as being similar to the one he saw in 
Dennis’s possession.  Thompson had an open drug possession 
                                              
 5 Detectives Manuel Santiago and William Wynn 
testified at trial about the eyewitnesses’ prior identifications.  
Detective Santiago supervised the activities at the crime scene 
on the day of the murder and compiled a photo array to show 
to Howard, Bertha, and Cameron, which included eight 
photographs with Dennis’s photo in the first position.  Dennis 
looked different in the photograph than at the time of arrest.  
Santiago did not ask Howard why she could not be sure that it 
was the shooter.  Detective Wynn, the lineup supervisor for 
the Philadelphia Police, conducted the in-person lineups for 
Howard, Bertha, and Cameron. Defense counsel placed 
Dennis as number three in the lineup.  All participants dressed 
similarly and carried large numbers for identification.   
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charge at the time of trial, but testified that he was not 
expecting any help from the Commonwealth with the drug 
charge in exchange for his testimony.  Three years after trial, 
Thompson attested in a statement that he had never seen 
Dennis with a gun and that his testimony at trial was false. 
 
 Latanya Cason, who knew Dennis “by living up [her] 
way” at Abbottsford Homes, testified that she saw him 
between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. at Henry and Midvale Avenues 
on October 22, 1991.  App. 731.  Cason’s estimate that she 
saw Dennis between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. was “strictly a guess” 
on her part—she did not know exactly what time she saw 
Dennis—but there was no question she saw him that day.  
App. 745.  Prior to seeing Dennis, Cason took public 
transportation to the 3-2 center where she picked up her 
public assistance check, signing a document to confirm pick 
up.  She then filled her daughter’s prescription, got some fish, 
ran a few additional errands, and went home via the K bus.  
Cason testified at trial that she did not see Dennis at 2:00 p.m. 
that day because she was just leaving work at 2:00 p.m.  
Although the Commonwealth introduced a schedule of 
payment and food stamps at trial, which stated that Cason was 
slated to pick up her public assistance check and food stamps 
on October 22, 1991, nothing was introduced at trial 
indicating the precise time of day she retrieved her benefits.   
 
 Detective Jastrzembski executed a search warrant of 
Dennis’s father’s home and seized two black jackets, a pair of 
red pants, and a pair of white sneakers.  The police lost the 
items prior to trial.  Detectives and two experts testified at 
trial about physical aspects of the crime, but the 
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Commonwealth did not introduce any physical evidence at 
trial. 6  
 Dennis’s defense strategy centered on his alibi, good 
character, and mistaken identity.7  His defense comprised of 
                                              
 6 The Commonwealth’s other witnesses did not testify 
as to Dennis’s connection to the murder.  Rather, they spoke 
to the emergency response to the crime (Fireman Oakes), the 
scene of the crime (Sergeant Fetscher), Williams’s body chart 
(Detective Brown), and the projectile removed from her body 
(Detective Reinhold).  Williams’s ex-boyfriend recounted a 
prior incident where Williams had been robbed at gunpoint 
for the same earrings she wore on the day of the murder. 
Officer Jachimowicz, a firearms expert, testified as to the type 
of gun that was likely used in the murder, and although he 
acknowledged that there were thousands of models of .32 
caliber handguns, he asserted with certainty that the nickel 
finish Harrington Richardson 733 was probably used in the 
murder. Detective Dominic Mangoni transported Howard and 
Bertha to the lineup. Detective Thomas Perks participated in 
Dennis’s arrest. Williams’s mother and father, Barbara and 
Barry, identified their daughter and testified to her future.  Dr. 
Sekula-Perlman, a medical examiner, ruled Williams’s death 
a homicide by a shot at close range. Sergeant Fetscher took 
information from witnesses at the scene, including Howard, 
Bertha, and Cameron.  None of these witnesses testified 
substantively as to Dennis’s alleged involvement in the 
murder.  
 7 Defense counsel sought to discredit eyewitness 
testimony put forth by the Commonwealth, primarily that of 
Zahra Howard.  However, counsel’s cross-examination was 
confined to highlighting Howard’s prior hesitation in 
identifying Dennis.  Similarly, defense counsel’s cross-
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testimony by his father, James Murray, Dennis himself, a few 
members of his singing group, and character witnesses.  
Dennis did not have evidence to support an “other suspect” 
defense. 
 
 Dennis’s father testified that the two of them were 
together from the evening of October 21, 1991, until about 
1:50 p.m. on October 22, 1991.  Murray lives about fifteen to 
eighteen blocks from the Fern Rock Station, roughly a five-
minute drive with traffic.  Murray testified that “[he] kn[ew] 
for a fact that [Dennis] was on [the K bus]” at the time of 
Williams’s murder because he drove Dennis to the stop and 
watched from his car as Dennis boarded the bus.  App. 804.  
The Commonwealth pointed out that Murray had visited 
Dennis forty times since his arrest.  
 
 Willis Meredith, James Smith, and Marc Nelson, 
members of Dennis’s singing group who had known Dennis 
for ten years or more, testified on Dennis’s behalf about 
rehearsal on the day of the murder.  Meredith saw Dennis for 
about twenty minutes around 2:15 or 2:30 p.m., which 
aligned with Dennis’s account.  Smith testified that Dennis 
was dressed in dark sweats and a dark hooded shirt at 
rehearsal that night—he was not wearing any red.  Meredith, 
Smith, and Nelson each testified that Thompson and Dennis 
frequently got into arguments.  Each testified that they had 
                                                                                                     
examination of Cason focused on shakiness in her 
recollection; counsel had nothing to indicate that her timeline 
was incorrect, or that she was mistaken or testifying falsely. 
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not seen a handgun in Dennis’s possession.8  Other defense 
witnesses, including Dennis’s brothers, friends, and church 
leaders, testified to Dennis’s reputation for being honest, 
truthful, peaceful, and law-abiding.9  
 
 Finally, Dennis took the stand.  He testified that he had 
nothing to do with Williams’s shooting and was not in the 
area at the time of her murder.10  In line with his father’s 
testimony, Dennis said he spent the previous night at his 
father’s house and left at 1:30 or 1:45 p.m. to take the bus to 
Abbottsford Homes for singing practice.  When Dennis left 
his father’s house, he was wearing a dark blue jeans set; he 
changed into black sweats at Merriweather’s house before 
rehearsal.  Dennis testified that he took the K bus, where he 
“thought” he saw Tammy Cason, to Henry and Midvale 
Avenues in East Falls, arriving around 2:30 p.m.11   App. 
                                              
 8 Lawrence Merriweather also testified to seeing 
Dennis on the day in question. Merriweather testified that he 
saw Dennis between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m.   
 9 The Commonwealth responded with character 
witnesses that disputed the testimony of Dennis’s character 
witnesses.  
 10 Dennis testified that Helen Everett, his girlfriend, 
told him about the rumor that he, Derrick, and Rodney, 
committed the murder.  He testified that Derrick and Rodney 
spoke with the police about the murder.  Neither testified at 
trial.  
 11 Anthony Sheridan, a SEPTA employee called by the 
Commonwealth, testified that there was a K bus that left the 
stop near Dennis’s father’s house at approximately 1:56 p.m. 
and that it would take approximately half an hour to arrive at 
Henry and Midvale.  
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1028.  Dennis then went to Willis Meredith’s house for 
twenty to thirty minutes.  Dennis acknowledged getting into 
frequent arguments with Thompson about Thompson’s desire 
to be the leader of the singing group.   
 
 Counsels’ closings reiterated the trial’s themes—
eyewitness identifications and Dennis’s alibi.  Defense 
counsel pointed to eyewitness identifications as the key 
question in the Commonwealth’s case, but he had no means 
of impeaching Howard, the eyewitness with the closest view 
of the shooter.  Defense counsel highlighted Thompson’s 
motive to lie, but Thompson’s testimony did not directly link 
Dennis to Williams’s murder.  Finally, defense counsel had to 
backtrack from using Cason to bolster Dennis’s timeline due 
to the timing discrepancy between her version—that they saw 
one another between 4:00 and 4:30—and Dennis’s account 
that he saw Cason at 2:30.   In his closing statement to the 
jury, counsel urged that Dennis had not, in fact, seen Cason 
on the bus to detract from the inconsistency.   
 
  
 ADA King similarly saw Howard as the key witness at 
trial and instructed the jury that “if you believe Zahra 
Howard, that’s enough to convict James Dennis.”  App. 1207.  
King attacked Dennis’s testimony that he saw Tammy Cason 
on the K bus as incredible, and undercut Dennis’s father’s 
testimony by urging that “blood is thicker than water,” 
leaving no disinterested witnesses to support Dennis’s 
account.  App. 1208-09. 
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 The jury found Dennis guilty of first-degree murder, 
robbery, carrying a firearm without a license, criminal 
conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of a crime.  It 
found Dennis’s lack of significant criminal history a 
mitigating factor during the penalty phase, but it also found 
that the killing was committed in the course of a felony, 
amounting to an aggravating circumstance.  The jury 
sentenced Dennis to death.  
 
 C. Undisclosed Evidence 
 The prosecution failed to disclose to Dennis’s counsel 
three pieces of exculpatory and impeachment evidence: (1) a 
receipt revealing the time that Cason had picked up her 
welfare benefits, several hours before the time she had 
testified to at trial, thus corroborating Dennis’s alibi (the 
“Cason receipt”); (2) a police activity sheet memorializing 
that Howard had given a previous statement inconsistent with 
her testimony at trial, which provided both invaluable 
material to discredit the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness and 
evidence that someone else committed the murder (the 
“Howard police activity sheet”); and (3) documents regarding 
a tip from an inmate detailing his conversation with a man 
other than Dennis who identified himself as the victim’s killer 
(the “Frazier documents”).   
 
  1. Cason receipt 
 Detectives interviewed Latanya Cason, the woman 
identified in Dennis’s initial statement, at Abbottsford Homes 
a few months after Dennis’s arrest.  Cason told detectives that 
she thought she remembered seeing Dennis the day of the 
murder, but her timeline contradicted the one Dennis 
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outlined.  She said that she worked until 2:00 p.m., went to 
the 3-2 center to pick up her public assistance check, picked 
up a prescription and some fish, boarded the K bus, and got 
off near Abbottsford Homes.  According to Cason, she saw 
Dennis when she got off the K bus between 4:00 and 4:30 
p.m., not between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. as Dennis indicated.  
The only discrepancy between Dennis’s testimony and 
Cason’s was the time of their interaction.  Police records 
indicate that Cason gave detectives a Department of Public 
Welfare (“DPW”) card marked “Schedule of check payment” 
at the time of her interview, which was introduced at trial.  
However, the Commonwealth possessed another DPW 
document not disclosed at trial—a receipt bearing the time 
Cason picked up her check.  Cason testified at trial as a 
witness for the prosecution and her testimony aligned with 
her initial statement to detectives.   
 
 On appeal, Dennis’s new appellate counsel obtained 
Cason’s time-stamped receipt from the DPW.12  Cason stated 
in an affidavit that police had a copy of the time-stamped 
receipt when they interviewed her and that she gave police 
her only copy of the receipt.  The receipt indicated that Cason 
picked up her welfare check at 13:03, or 1:03 p.m.  In 
complete contradiction to her trial testimony, then, Cason 
could not have been working until 2:00 p.m. that day.  Cason 
                                              
 12 It is not clear how counsel would have been able to 
obtain Cason’s receipt on appeal because DPW regulations 
placed strict limitations on the type of information it would 
disclose and to whom.  See 55 Pa. Code § 105.4(a)(1).  
Presumably, counsel would have sought permission from 
Cason, or assistance from Cason herself, in obtaining the 
receipt.  
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attributed her prior incorrect testimony to misunderstanding 
military time, so that she “may have thought that the 13:03, 
which is on the receipt, was 3:03 p.m.”  App. 1736.  Based on 
the discrete time indicated on the receipt, Cason’s affidavit 
stated she would have seen Dennis “between 2:00 and 2:30 
p.m. at the Abbottsford Homes, and not 4:00 to 4:30 that is in 
my statement.”  Id.   
 
  2. Howard police activity sheet 
 Two days after the murder, detectives interviewed 
Diane and Mannasset Pugh, Williams’s aunt and uncle.  
Diane Pugh told detectives that, the night after the murder, 
Zahra Howard told them that she recognized the assailants 
from Olney High School, where she and Williams were 
students.  Dennis did not attend Olney High School.  
Howard’s assertion that she recognized the assailants from 
school contradicted her prior statements to police that she had 
never seen the men before and did not recognize them from 
school.  Police recorded in their “THINGS TO DO” list that 
they planned to interview Howard about her inconsistent 
statements.  
 
 Howard further told the Pughs that two people named 
“Kim” and “Quinton” had also been present at the murder.  
The following day, another of Williams’s aunts, Elaine 
Parker, told police that Howard mentioned Kim and Quinton 
were at the scene.  The Commonwealth disclosed Parker’s 
statement prior to trial.  However, the prosecution did not 
disclose information about Howard’s inconsistent statement 
to the Pughs.  Mere hours after meeting with Parker and 
receiving additional information that Howard had omitted or 
misstated facts in her initial statement to police, two 
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detectives met with Howard, ostensibly to follow up on their 
“things to do.”  Ignoring their recorded intentions, however, 
the detectives only questioned Howard about a photo array 
and did not inquire about the inconsistent statements.  
 
  3. Frazier documents 
 Prior to Dennis’s arrest, Philadelphia detectives 
received a call from Montgomery County police relaying a tip 
from an inmate at the Montgomery County Correctional 
Facility, William Frazier.  Frazier told Montgomery County 
detectives that he spoke with the man who may have 
murdered Williams during a three-way call with Frazier’s 
friend, Tony Brown, facilitated by Frazier’s aunt.  During the 
call, Brown told Frazier and Frazier’s aunt that he “fucked 
up” and murdered Williams when the gun went off 
accidentally during a botched robbery of her earrings.  App. 
1692.  He also said that two other men, Ricky Walker and 
“Skeet,” aided in committing the crime.  Frazier told 
detectives that Brown had a brown car, that he “like[d] to 
wear sweat suits,” and that the men knew the victim as 
“Kev[’s] . . . girl.”13  App. 1694–95.  
 
 Frazier told police that Brown and the others had hid 
in Frazier’s empty apartment for two days following the 
murder.  Frazier provided addresses for the men, including 
their parents’ and girlfriends’ addresses, an address and phone 
number for his aunt, and an address for the pawn shop Brown 
frequented.  Frazier volunteered to take detectives on a “ride 
along” to point out the houses and pawn shop.  
                                              
 13 Williams, the victim, previously dated a man named 
Kevin Williams. 
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 Following the tip, Detectives Santiago and 
Jastrzembski interviewed Walker, who admitted to knowing 
Williams from Olney High School, but denied knowing 
Brown or Skeet.  Walker denied any involvement in the 
murder, and claimed that his mother could verify that he was 
sleeping when Williams was murdered.  Walker admitted to 
hanging out around Broad and Olney, the exact area where 
Overstreet said he had seen the perpetrator before.  Detectives 
never verified Walker’s alibi nor showed his photo to any of 
the eyewitnesses.  Detectives never located Brown or Skeet. 
 
 Detectives, including Jastrzembski, spoke with 
Frazier’s landlord, who had no knowledge of anyone entering 
Frazier’s apartment.  Detectives did not interview Frazier’s 
aunt to obtain her account of the call with Brown.   
 
 The Commonwealth suppressed at least six documents 
relating to the Frazier tip from Dennis’s trial counsel: (1) 
Frazier’s initial statement to the Montgomery County police 
(Oct 31, 1991); (2) Frazier’s statement to the Philadelphia 
police (Nov. 1, 1991); (3) Police Activity Sheet regarding 
Frazier’s landlord (Nov. 1, 1991); (4) Police Activity Sheet 
regarding Ricky Walker (Nov. 2, 1991); (5) Frazier’s signed 
search consent; and (6) Ricky Walker’s statement (Nov. 2, 
1991).  The Commonwealth concedes that these documents 
were not disclosed to Dennis until a decade after trial.  
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 D. Review of State Court Conviction 
 Like many habeas cases, this case has a lengthy 
procedural history.  Only those decisions and arguments 
relevant to the instant appeal are summarized below.  
 
 On July 22, 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed Dennis’s conviction and death sentence on direct 
appeal by a vote of four to three.  Commonwealth v. Dennis, 
715 A.2d 404 (Pa. 1998) (“Dennis I”).  Dennis argued on 
direct appeal that the Commonwealth violated his due process 
rights by failing to disclose Cason’s time-stamped receipt 
prior to trial, in opposition to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). 14  
 
 On September 15, 1998, Dennis filed a timely pro se 
petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief 
Act (“PCRA”), received new counsel, and also received 
discovery.  In December 1999, PCRA counsel was appointed 
and filed an amended petition, and, subsequently, a 
supplemental amended petition and a second supplemental 
                                              
 14 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2004 decision, 
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 859 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 2004) 
(“Dennis II”), is not relevant to this appeal.  On December 12, 
2000, Dennis filed a motion for discovery, seeking the 
prosecutor’s jury selection notes, and the PCRA court granted 
Dennis’s motion.  After granting the Commonwealth’s 
request for reconsideration of the order, the PCRA court 
reinstated the discovery order on July 10, 2001.  In Dennis II, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the order granting 
discovery of the prosecutor’s jury selection notes and 
remanded the case for completion of PCRA review. 
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petition on December 1, 2000, and July 10, 2002, 
respectively.  Two pieces of evidence at issue in this appeal 
were disclosed during PCRA discovery.  First, Dennis 
received the police activity sheet memorializing Howard’s 
statements to Diane Pugh the night after the murder, which 
indicated that she recognized the shooter from Olney High 
School.  Second, Dennis received the six documents relating 
to the Frazier lead that police had abandoned.  The PCRA 
court denied Dennis’s claims that the prosecution violated 
Brady by failing to disclose the Howard statement and the 
Frazier documents.  Dennis again appealed to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA 
court in part and vacated in part, and remanded two claims.  
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d 945 (Pa. 2008) (“Dennis 
III”).  The court found that the Commonwealth’s failure to 
disclose the Frazier documents did not violate Brady because 
the prosecution was not required to disclose “every fruitless 
lead” and that “inadmissible evidence cannot be the basis for 
a Brady violation.”  Id. at 968 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 
857 (2005)).   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded to the 
PCRA court Dennis’s claim that the Commonwealth violated 
Brady by suppressing the contents of the police activity sheet 
memorializing Zahra Howard’s inconsistent statement.  After 
evidentiary hearings on remand, the PCRA court again 
dismissed Dennis’s petition.  Commonwealth v. Dennis, Case 
No. 92-01-0484, slip op. (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 17, 2010).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that it was not 
relevant that Howard denied her prior inconsistent statement 
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at the evidentiary hearing before the PCRA court.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 309 (Pa. 2011) 
(“Dennis IV”).   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA 
denial on appeal.  Id.  It concluded that the police activity 
sheet was not material under Brady because “Howard was 
extensively cross-examined” and because “there were two 
eyewitnesses other than Howard who observed the shooting 
at close range . . . [and] positively identified [Dennis] as the 
shooter in a photo array, in a line up, and at trial.”  Id.   
 
 Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling, 
Dennis filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania for review of his conviction and death sentence.  
The District Court granted Dennis habeas relief based on 
Dennis’s Brady claims as to the Commonwealth’s failure to 
disclose the Cason receipt, the Frazier documents, and the 
police activity sheet containing Howard’s inconsistent 
statement.  Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 518.  
 
 The District Court concluded that the state court’s 
ruling regarding the Cason receipt involved an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
had concluded that the receipt was not exculpatory because 
(1) “[Cason’s] testimony would not support Appellant’s 
alibi”; (2) it would have been cumulative of testimony by 
another witness; and (3) there was no evidence that the 
Commonwealth withheld the receipt from the defense.  
Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408.  The District Court determined 
that the receipt corroborated Dennis’s alibi, provided direct 
evidence that Cason’s testimony was false, and would have 
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been strong impeachment evidence. Therefore, the state 
court’s determination that the receipt was not “exculpatory” 
was an unreasonable determination of the facts.  Dennis V, 
966 F. Supp. 2d at 508.   
 
 The District Court also concluded the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had engaged in a similarly unreasonable 
determination of facts regarding whether the receipt was 
actually suppressed by the police.  In its opinion, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the police came into 
possession of the receipt when interviewing Cason, and that 
the Commonwealth never claimed to have disclosed the 
receipt to defense counsel.  The District Court relied on Kyles 
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), for the proposition that 
favorable evidence in the police’s possession is imputed to 
the prosecution.  Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 509–10.  It also 
interpreted the three-factor balancing test in United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005), to come out in favor of 
required disclosure by the Commonwealth.  Further, the state 
court’s conclusion that the receipt was not material was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law 
because the “receipt and Cason’s accompanying corrected 
testimony would have provided independent, disinterested 
corroboration of Dennis’[s] explanation for where he was at 
the time of Williams’[s] murder,” would have transformed 
Cason from a government witness into a defense witness who 
supported Dennis’s alibi, and would have provided 
impeachment evidence to challenge Cason’s testimony that 
she had worked until 2:00 p.m. that day, which otherwise 
could not have been challenged.  Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 
511.  
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 The District Court also granted habeas relief on the 
basis of Dennis’s Brady claim regarding the Frazier 
documents, concluding that the state court had adopted an 
unreasonably narrow reading of Brady.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had held that the prosecution did not violate 
Brady by failing to disclose the Frazier documents because 
Dennis did not show that the documents were admissible and 
material.  The District Court rejected the assertion that 
inadmissible evidence cannot be the basis of a Brady claim, 
reasoning that the United States Supreme Court has never 
stated such a rule and that most circuit courts, including the 
Third Circuit, have held to the contrary.  Id. at 503.  
Additionally, that the United States Supreme Court proceeded 
with the Brady analysis after acknowledging that the 
polygraph results at issue in Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 
1 (1995), were not admissible indicated to the District Court 
that there is no admissibility requirement for Brady evidence.  
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 503. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had also held that 
the prosecution need not disclose every “fruitless lead” in 
order to comply with Brady.  The District Court determined 
that this conclusion was unreasonable under Kyles.  The 
Frazier documents contained “internal markers of credibility,” 
such as a description of the victim as “Kev[’s] . . . girl,” 
which was accurate, an admission to shooting the victim in 
the correct location on her body, and a description of the 
alleged perpetrators that matched other descriptions of the 
shooter more closely than Dennis did.  Id. at 504.  The 
District Court reasoned that the Frazier documents would 
have led to further investigation that could have proved vital 
to the defense and could have been used to impeach the police 
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investigation or provide a defense that another person 
committed the murder.  Id. at 505. 
 
 Lastly, the District Court granted habeas relief on the 
basis of Dennis’s claim that the Commonwealth violated 
Brady when it withheld the police activity sheet containing 
Howard’s inconsistent statements.  The District Court 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
unreasonably applied Brady and its progeny in rejecting the 
Howard Brady claim.  First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
had unreasonably dismissed the impeachment value of the 
evidence and incorrectly concluded that cross-examination of 
Howard rendered new impeachment evidence immaterial.  
The District Court noted that the United States Supreme 
Court has directly rejected the notion that there can be no 
Brady claim relating to impeachment evidence where a 
witness was already impeached with other information.  See 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 702 (2004) (rejecting the 
state’s argument that no Brady violation occurred because the 
witness was “heavily impeached at trial,” where the withheld 
evidence was the only impeachment evidence that the witness 
was a paid informant).15  The District Court emphasized that, 
although Howard was cross-examined at trial, she was not 
impeached.  Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 514–15.  Second, 
the District Court concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had incorrectly applied a sufficiency of the evidence 
test in direct contravention of Kyles’s directive that Brady 
material be viewed in light of all of the evidence.  Rather, the 
                                              
 15 The parenthetical language here is a direct quote 
from the parenthetical used by the District Court in its 
description of Banks.  See Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 514–
15.  
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state court should have focused on whether the defendant 
received a fair trial in the absence of the disclosed evidence.  
Id. at 516.  Finally, the District Court found it unreasonable 
that the state court had failed to consider the effect of the 
evidence on trial counsel’s investigation, pretrial preparation, 
decision to interview or call certain witnesses, or the effect of 
cross-examining detectives on their investigation into 
Howard. Given that the police themselves thought it was 
important to follow up with Howard about her possible 
statements to Pugh, the District Court concluded it was clear 
that the lead was material from an investigatory point of view.  
Id. 
 
 The District Court also concluded that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had failed to undertake a 
cumulative materiality analysis as required by Kyles.  Id. at 
517–18.  It did not rule on Dennis’s remaining claims.  Id. at 
491, 501 n.19 & 510 n.27.  The Commonwealth filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  
 
 A panel of this Court issued an opinion on February 9, 
2015.  Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 777 F.3d 642 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  This opinion was vacated and rehearing en banc 
was granted on May 6, 2015.  
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2241 and 2254 over Dennis’s habeas corpus petition.  This 
Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §§ 1291 and 
2253. The District Court based its decision on a review of the 
state court record and did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, 
so our review of its order is plenary and we apply the same 
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standard the District Court applied.  Branch v. Sweeney, 758 
F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2014); Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 
619, 627 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) dictates the manner in which we conduct our 
review.  Federal habeas courts cannot grant relief “with 
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
State court” unless the adjudication (1) “resulted in a decision 
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).   
 
 Under § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” 
means “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by 
the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its 
decision.”  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003).  
It “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 
Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant 
state-court decision.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 
(2000).  AEDPA allows federal courts to grant habeas relief 
only if the state court decision is contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 
 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 
established federal law if the state court (1) “applies a rule 
that contradicts the governing law” set forth in Supreme 
Court precedent or (2) “confronts a set of facts that are 
materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] 
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different” from that 
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reached by the Supreme Court.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–
06.  Interpreting Supreme Court precedent in a manner that 
adds an additional element to the legal standard for proving a 
constitutional violation is “contrary to” clearly established 
federal law.  Id. at 393–94, 397 (reasoning that the Virginia 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984), which increased the burden on 
petitioners, was “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent).   
 
 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application 
of federal law” if the state court “identifies the correct 
governing legal principle,” but “unreasonably applies that 
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  Id. at 413.  A 
strong case for habeas relief “does not mean the state court’s 
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”  Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).  Habeas relief may not be 
granted on the basis that the state court applied clearly 
established law incorrectly; rather, the inquiry is “whether the 
state court’s application of clearly established federal law was 
objectively unreasonable.”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 409 
(emphasis added).  A rule’s unreasonable application 
corresponds to the specificity of the rule itself: “[t]he more 
general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching 
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”  Richter, 562 U.S. 
at 101 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “A 
state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 
federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could 
disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 Finally, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court 
decision is based on an “unreasonable determination of the 
facts” if the state court’s factual findings are “objectively 
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unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-
court proceeding,” which requires review of whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the state court’s factual 
findings.  See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 
(2003).  Determinations of factual issues made by state courts 
are presumed to be correct.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-
El, 537 U.S. at 340.  However, “[d]eference does not by 
definition preclude relief.  A federal court can disagree with a 
state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by 
AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the 
factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing 
evidence.”  Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340.  
 
 Judges Fisher and Hardiman advance an interpretation 
of Richter that far exceeds its reach.  Further, their approach 
would have the federal habeas courts “rewrite” state court 
opinions, as Judge Jordan’s thorough concurrence observes.  
We recognize that the AEDPA standard is “difficult to meet . 
. . because it was meant to be.  As amended by AEDPA, § 
2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal-
court relitigation of claims already rejected in state 
proceedings.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.  The highly 
deferential standard “reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 
guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction 
through appeal.”  Id. at 102–03 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  This level of deference stems from deep-rooted 
concerns about federalism.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 436 (noting 
that Congress intended to “further the principles of comity, 
finality, and federalism” in passing AEDPA).  That said, 
Richter and its progeny do not support unchecked speculation 
by federal habeas courts in furtherance of AEDPA’s goals.  
While we must give state court decisions “the benefit of the 
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doubt,” as Judge Fisher recognizes, federal habeas review 
does not entail speculating as to what other theories could 
have supported the state court ruling when reasoning has been 
provided, or buttressing a state court’s scant analysis with 
arguments not fairly presented to it.  Make no mistake about 
it, the Dissents justify the state court ruling based on an 
argument never presented to it.  No case decided by our court 
or the United States Supreme Court permits this approach.  
We now write to clarify how we interpret the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence as to when and how federal courts 
ought to “fill the gaps” in state court opinions on federal 
habeas review subject to AEDPA.   
 
 The United States Supreme Court has clearly laid out 
the analytical path for federal habeas courts confronted with a 
state court opinion devoid of reasoning—i.e., a bare ruling.  
When a state court decision lacks reasoning, the Supreme 
Court instructed habeas courts to “determine what arguments 
or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the 
state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is 
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 
arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a 
prior decision of this Court.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 
(emphasis added).  Richter is that case.  This is not.  
 
 In Richter, the Court faced the question of whether 
AEDPA deference “applies when a state court’s order is 
unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief 
has been denied.”  Id. at 98.  The United States Supreme 
Court admonished the Ninth Circuit’s de novo review of the 
California Supreme Court’s one-sentence summary denial of 
petitioner’s claim under Strickland, and held that state court 
decisions that are devoid of reasoning, i.e., a bare ruling, 
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constitute adjudications on the merits that trigger AEDPA 
deference.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“[T]he habeas petitioner’s 
burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable 
basis for the state court to deny relief.  This is so whether or 
not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart 
claim it found insufficient . . . .”).  In other words, state courts 
need not articulate a statement of reasons to invoke AEDPA 
deference by federal habeas courts.  Id. (“[D]etermining 
whether a state court’s decision resulted from an 
unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that 
there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state 
court’s reasoning.”).  The California Supreme Court had 
provided no reasoning; accordingly, in order to determine 
whether the state court had made a decision that was contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of 
fact, the federal habeas court was required to theorize based 
on what was presented to the state court. 
   
 We suggest that the concept of “gap filling” is fairly 
limited.  It should be reserved for those cases in which the 
federal court cannot be sure of the precise basis for the state 
court’s ruling.  It permits a federal court to defer while still 
exploring the possible reasons.  It does not permit a federal 
habeas court, when faced with a reasoned determination of 
the state court, to fill a non-existent “gap” by coming up with 
its own theory or argument, let alone one, as here, never 
raised to the state court.  In Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 
(2011), decided on the same day as Richter, the state court 
had concluded that the petitioner had not received ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Strickland, but did not specify on 
which Strickland prong—performance or prejudice—
petitioner failed to meet his burden.  As in Richter, the 
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Supreme Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to assume “that 
both findings would have involved an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law.”  562 U.S. at 
123.  Unsure as to which prong formed the basis for the state 
court’s ruling, the federal court could fill the gap by exploring 
the two prongs of Strickland. 
  
 In contrast, when the state court pens a clear, reasoned 
opinion, federal habeas courts may not speculate as to 
theories that “could have supported” the state court’s 
decision.  The Supreme Court established this limitation on 
Richter “gap filling” in Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195 
(2012), where it described the proper analytical path for state 
court decisions accompanied by reasoning: 
 
Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine 
what arguments or theories supported . . . the 
state court’s decision; and then it must ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 
disagree that those arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 
of this Court. 
 
Id. at 1198 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102; alterations in 
original; emphasis added).  This is fairly straightforward.  As 
explained above, the Court in Richter included the language 
“or, as here, could have supported” when it initially instructed 
courts on gap filling.  Courts were tasked with considering 
what theories “could have supported” the state court decision 
in cases akin to those “as here,” or, summary denials.  
Removing the clause “or, as here, could have supported” from 
the instruction when the state court provides a fully-reasoned 
decision removed the task of speculative gap-filling from the 
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habeas court’s analysis.  Instead, federal habeas courts 
reviewing reasoned state court opinions are limited to “those 
arguments or theories” that actually supported, as opposed to 
“could have supported,” the state court’s decision.  The 
Supreme Court’s intent to limit deference to the state court to 
those reasons that it articulated in its opinion is further 
supported by the Supreme Court’s instruction that the court 
on remand consider whether “each ground supporting the 
state court decision is examined and found to be unreasonable 
under AEDPA.”  Id. at 1199.  
 
When a state court ruling is based on a reasoned, but 
erroneous, analysis, federal habeas courts are empowered to 
engage in an alternate ground analysis—relying on any 
ground properly presented—but, in such a case, the federal 
court owes no deference to the state court.  In Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), the state court had “simply 
found that respondent’s rejection of the plea was knowing and 
voluntary” in rejecting defendant’s ineffective counsel claim 
and “failed to apply Strickland,” despite referencing the 
performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland in its opinion.  
Id. at 1390.  “By failing to apply Strickland to assess the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim respondent raised, the 
state court’s adjudication was contrary to clearly established 
federal law” and the Supreme Court analyzed the Strickland 
claim de novo.  Id. at 1390.  The Court was not filling a gap 
in Lafler.  Instead, it was employing different analysis that 
was very much a part of the case, and supplied an alternate 
ground for concluding, on de novo review, that there was no 
ineffectiveness of counsel. 
   
Justices of the Supreme Court have indicated in a 
concurrence from the denial of a petition for certiorari that 
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federal courts are bound to the text of state court opinions.  
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Kagan, observed 
 
Richter’s hypothetical inquiry was necessary, 
however, because no state court opinion 
explained the reasons relief had been denied.  In 
that circumstance, a federal habeas court can 
assess whether the state court’s decision 
involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Federal law only by hypothesizing 
reasons that might have supported it.  But 
Richter makes clear that where the state court’s 
real reasons can be ascertained, the § 2254(d) 
analysis can and should be based on the actual 
arguments or theories that supported the state 
court’s decision. 
 
Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127–28, reh’g denied, 
136 S. Ct. 15 (2015) (mem.) (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citations omitted).  Other courts of appeals 
have similarly limited Richter’s gap-filling instruction to the 
bare ruling situation.  See Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 
907, 910 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When faced with an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits by 
the state courts, a federal habeas court ‘must determine what 
arguments or theories supported or, [if none were stated], 
could have supported, the state court’s decision[.]”(alterations 
in original) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102)); see also 
Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 813 F.3d 517, 525–26 
(4th Cir. 2016) (“looking through” a state court summary 
refusal to hear an appeal to the prior reasoned decision and 
observing that “where there is no indication of the state 
court’s reasoning, a federal habeas petitioner must show that 
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there was ‘no reasonable basis for the state court to deny 
relief,’ and a federal habeas court must defer under AEDPA 
to any reasonable ‘arguments or theories . . . [that] could have 
supported[ ] the state court’s decision’” (quoting Richter, 562 
U.S. at 98, 102) (internal citations omitted; alterations in 
original)); Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 700 (6th Cir. 
2011) (Clay, J., dissenting) (“If the state court articulated its 
reasons, the habeas court must identify and evaluate those 
reasons under § 2254(d); only if the state court did not 
articulate its reasons must the habeas court hypothesize as to 
the state court’s reasoning, and evaluate those hypothetical 
reasons.”).  Federal courts should only gap-fill when 
presented with a bare ruling or when it is unsure as to the 
basis of the state court ruling on the issue presented.  See 
Premo, 562 U.S. at 123 (concluding that when the state court 
neglected to articulate which prong of Strickland was 
deficient, the federal habeas court ought to evaluate both 
prongs of Strickland).  We will not gap-fill when the state 
court has articulated its own clear reasoning.  Instead, we will 
evaluate the state court’s analysis and review de novo any 
properly presented alternative ground(s) supporting its 
judgment.  
 
Dennis’s claims at issue on appeal stem from the 
Commonwealth’s violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963).  Prosecutors have an affirmative duty “to disclose 
[Brady] evidence . . . even though there has been no request 
[for the evidence] by the accused,” which may include 
evidence known only to police.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 280 (1999); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.  To comply with 
Brady, prosecutors must “learn of any favorable evidence 
known to the others acting on the government’s behalf . . ., 
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including the police.’’  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437). 
 
To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show the 
evidence at issue meets three critical elements.  First, the 
evidence “must be favorable to the accused, either because it 
is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching.”  Id. at 281–82; 
see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) 
(“Impeachment evidence . . ., as well as exculpatory 
evidence, falls within the Brady rule.”).  Second, it “must 
have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 
inadvertently.”  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282. Third, the evidence 
must have been material such that prejudice resulted from its 
suppression.  Id.; see also Banks, 540 U.S. at 691.  The 
“touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a 
different result.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  Materiality “does 
not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure 
of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in 
the defendant’s acquittal . . . [Rather], [a] ‘reasonable 
probability’ of a different result is . . . shown when the 
government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence 
in the outcome of the trial.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
III. Discussion 
 The District Court held that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had unreasonably applied Brady and its progeny in 
rejecting Dennis’s claims that the prosecution was required 
under Brady to disclose the Cason receipt, the Frazier 
documents, and the police activity sheet containing Howard’s 
inconsistent statements.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
issued a thorough decision on each claim.  We conclude, like 
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the District Court, that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding Dennis’s Brady claims rested on 
unreasonable conclusions of fact and unreasonable 
applications of clearly established law, or were contrary to 
United States Supreme Court precedent.  We will affirm the 
District Court and grant habeas relief on Dennis’s Brady 
claims based on the Cason receipt, the Howard police activity 
sheet, the Frazier documents, and their cumulative prejudice.  
 
 A. Cason Receipt 
  1. Facts 
The Commonwealth did not disclose the DPW receipt 
that was in the police’s possession, provided objective 
impeachment evidence of a key Commonwealth witness, and 
bolstered Dennis’s alibi.  Cason signed the DPW receipt 
when she picked up her check on October 22, 1991, the day 
of Williams’s murder.  The receipt’s time stamp shows Cason 
picked up a $94.00 payment for “public assistance” at 
“13:03,” or 1:03 p.m.  During Dennis’s direct appeal, Cason 
signed an affidavit detailing her recollection of the interview 
she had with police prior to Dennis’s trial.  According to 
Cason, detectives brought a copy of the time-stamped receipt 
to the interview, and she “located and gave the detective [her] 
pink copy of the same receipt.  The detective kept [her] copy 
of the receipt.”  App. 1735. 
   
The Commonwealth called Cason to testify at Dennis’s 
trial.  She testified that she left work around 2:00 p.m., picked 
up her welfare check, ran errands, and saw Dennis when she 
got off the K bus “between 4:00 and 4:30.”  App. 733.  The 
receipt serves two functions: (1) it negates her testimony that 
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she worked until 2:00 p.m. on October 22; and (2) it 
demonstrates that, contrary to Cason’s testimony at trial that 
she retrieved her receipt after 3:00 p.m., Cason actually 
picked up her check at 1:03 p.m.  Cason admits in her 
affidavit that she “may have thought that the 13:03, which 
was on the receipt, was 3:03 p.m.”  App. 1736.  In light of the 
time-stamped receipt, Cason explained in her affidavit, she 
“would have seen [James] Dennis between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. 
at the Abbottsford Homes, and not 4:00 to 4:30 that is in my 
statement.”  Id.   
 
  2. State Court Decision 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Dennis’s 
Brady claim stemming from the Cason receipt.  The Court 
found, consistent with Cason’s affidavit, that the “police 
came into possession of a Department of Public Welfare 
(DPW) receipt showing that Cason cashed her check at 1:03 
p.m.”  Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408.  In denying Dennis’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Court held that 
Cason’s new version of events “would not support [Dennis’s] 
alibi [] because the murder occurred at 1:50 p.m., forty 
minutes earlier than Cason’s earliest estimate” of when she 
saw Dennis.  Id.  The Court further held that the corrected 
testimony “would have been cumulative of testimony of 
witness Willis Meredith, who testified that he saw [Dennis] at 
the Abbottsford Homes at approximately 2:15 to 2:30 p.m.”  
Id.  The Court dismissed the Brady claim because the receipt 
was “not exculpatory, because it had no bearing on [Dennis’s] 
alibi, and there [was] no evidence that the Commonwealth 
withheld the receipt from the defense.”  Id. 
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  3. AEDPA Review 
 The state court ruling was a reasoned ruling that the 
District Court could understand; no gaps needed to be filled.  
Dennis was entitled to habeas relief based on the Cason 
Brady claim only if he could demonstrate that the decision 
was an unreasonable application of, or contrary to, clearly 
established law, or an unreasonable determination of the 
facts.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Addressing the reasoned view of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we conclude that it 
unreasonably applied Brady and its progeny in evaluating the 
Cason receipt and made unreasonable determinations of fact.  
The receipt would have served as independent documentary 
corroboration of a key witness for Dennis’s alibi defense, and 
suppression by the Commonwealth violated Brady.   
 
   a)  Favorability  
 The Cason receipt provided exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence that would have bolstered Dennis’s 
alibi defense at trial, so it easily meets Brady’s first prong.  
Banks, 540 U.S. at 691 (stating that both impeachment and 
exculpatory evidence satisfy the first Brady prong). 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred by failing to 
recognize the impeachment value of the Cason receipt, which 
would have provided documentary evidence that Cason 
testified falsely at trial.  The United States Supreme Court has 
made plain that impeachment evidence may be considered 
favorable under Brady even if the jury might not afford it 
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significant weight.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 450–51 (rejecting 
the state’s argument that the evidence was “neither 
impeachment nor exculpatory evidence” because the jury 
might not have substantially credited it; according to the 
Court, “[s]uch [an] argument . . . confuses the weight of the 
evidence with its favorable tendency”).16  
 
 Dennis’s defense strategy pitted his credibility, and 
that of his witnesses, against eyewitness credibility, Cason’s 
testimony, and the testimony of the other prosecution 
witnesses.  No physical evidence was admitted at trial.  
Evidence that challenged Dennis’s credibility, or that of other 
defense witnesses like his father, was therefore particularly 
crucial to the outcome of the trial.  As the District Court aptly 
noted:  
 
Armed with the receipt, Dennis’s counsel—at 
the very least—would have been able to show 
that Cason was mistaken about the timing of the 
afternoon, by pointing out that she could not 
possibly have worked until 2 p.m. since she was 
at the DPW center at 1:03 p.m. . . . The time 
stamped receipt would have directly 
contradicted [Cason’s testimony that she didn’t 
get off work until 2:00 p.m.].  
 
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 508.  Without evidence to 
challenge the veracity of Cason’s testimony, Dennis’s 
assertion that he saw Cason as he got off the K bus lost 
                                              
 16 This framing of Kyles was taken from Lambert v. 
Beard, 537 F. App’x 78, 86 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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significant credibility, as did his father’s corroboration of 
Dennis’s version of his timeline.  
 
 Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erroneously 
concluded that the receipt was not exculpatory because it did 
not affect Dennis’s alibi.  Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408.  It held 
that Cason’s revised recollection of the day “would not 
support [Dennis’s] alibi [] because the murder occurred at 
1:50 p.m., forty minutes earlier than Cason’s earliest 
estimate.”  Id.  This conclusion fails to recognize how 
Cason’s corrected testimony corroborates testimony provided 
by Dennis and other witnesses, namely, his father.  
 
 The Commonwealth argues that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the receipt did not 
require disclosure pursuant to Brady because Cason’s 
corrected testimony would not have made it impossible for 
Dennis to have been at Fern Rock station when Williams was 
murdered.  Cason’s affidavit stated that she saw Dennis at 
2:30 p.m. at Abbottsford Homes.  The Commonwealth 
contends that Dennis could have committed the murder at 
Fern Rock at 1:50 p.m. and returned to Abbottsford Homes 
by 2:30 p.m. because the shooter entered a waiting getaway 
car after the murder and it was a thirteen minute drive 
between the two.  This view unreasonably discounts the 
buttressing effect Cason’s corrected testimony would have on 
Dennis’s alibi theory.  Although Cason’s corrected testimony, 
assuming it would mirror precisely what she said in her 
affidavit, would not definitively place Dennis in a location 
where it was impossible for him to commit the murder, 
Cason’s testimony would have strengthened Dennis’s and his 
father’s testimony that Dennis had been with his father that 
afternoon and was on the bus at the time of the murder. 
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 Validating Dennis’s and his father’s testimony about 
his alibi on the day in question is sufficient to demonstrate 
favorability under Brady.  Exculpatory evidence need not 
show defendant’s innocence conclusively.  Under Brady, 
“[e]xculpatory evidence includes material that goes to the 
heart of the defendant’s guilt or innocence as well as that 
which may well alter the jury’s judgment of the credibility of 
a crucial prosecution witness.”  United States v. Starusko, 729 
F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).  That Cason’s corrected testimony 
does not wholly undermine the prosecution’s theory of guilt 
does not sap its exculpatory value.  The Commonwealth had 
an obligation to disclose the receipt under Brady because it 
would have altered the jury’s judgment about Cason’s 
credibility.  Cason’s evidence is not favorable simply because 
of where Cason said she saw Dennis as corrected in her 
affidavit—at Abbottsford Homes.  Rather, as Dennis argues, 
the exculpatory value lies in corroborating testimony of 
witnesses at trial who otherwise received little objective 
reinforcement, and whose credibility, as a result of Cason’s 
mistaken testimony in the absence of the receipt, was 
seriously undermined.  
 
  The only discrepancy between Cason’s testimony and 
the alibi established by Dennis and his father was the precise 
time Cason and Dennis saw one another—Cason claimed to 
have seen Dennis around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., while Dennis said 
it was around 2:30 p.m.  As both parties note, the other 
witnesses that testified on behalf of Dennis were friends and 
family, who were vulnerable to arguments of bias.  To the 
contrary, Cason offered disinterested testimony that 
corroborated the government’s theory.  Although the 
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Commonwealth indicates that Cason could have been 
discredited in a similar manner as Dennis’s other witnesses, 
nothing in the record indicates that Cason shared the type of 
close relationship with Dennis as other witnesses who 
testified on his behalf. 
  
 The receipt contradicted Cason’s testimony at trial.  
Her corrected recollection, coupled with a specific 
documentary basis, would have provided disinterested 
corroboration of Dennis’s and his father’s testimony.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court made an unreasonable 
determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of 
federal law in refusing to acknowledge the receipt’s 
exculpatory and impeachment value.  
 
   b)  Suppression of the receipt 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that “the 
police came into possession of [the] receipt” when 
interviewing Cason.  Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408.  Later, in a 
section analyzing materiality, it concluded there was “no 
evidence that the Commonwealth withheld the receipt from 
the defense.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided 
no explanation for its latter statement, and we cannot be sure 
whether the court was assessing the facts or interpreting the 
law.  If it was construing fact, it was clearly unreasonable 
because the police had the receipt and therefore so did the 
prosecution.17   See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38.  If it was 
                                              
 17 The Commonwealth argues on appeal that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not make a factual finding 
and that the statement that the police had the receipt was 
merely framing for the later substantive discussion.  In Bobby 
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making a conclusion of law as to the duty to disclose, the 
conclusion is similarly problematic because the court ignored 
Kyles.  As Judge Jordan observes in his concurrence, “[i]f one 
follows the instruction of Kyles, those two statements are 
impossible to harmonize.”  J. Jordan Concurring Op. at 16.  
 
 Once the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that 
the police detectives had obtained the receipt from Cason, the 
Commonwealth had constructive possession and was required 
to disclose the receipt to Dennis prior to trial.  In 1995, three 
years prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision, the 
United States Supreme Court explained this duty: 
 
[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what 
is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent 
responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of 
all [favorable] evidence and make disclosure 
when the point of “reasonable probability” is 
reached.  This in turn means that the individual 
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case, including the 
police.  But whether the prosecutor succeeds or 
                                                                                                     
v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009), cited in support by the 
Commonwealth, the Supreme Court held that a state court’s 
alleged factual finding could not support issue preclusion 
because there was no evidence that the alleged state court 
finding was supported by the record at trial or on appeal and 
further was not necessary to the judgments made by the state 
court.  Bies bears no relation to our case where there is ample 
evidence in the record that the police took possession of the 
receipt, as attested by Cason herself.  
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fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, 
a failure to disclose is in good faith or bad 
faith), the prosecution’s responsibility for 
failing to disclose known, favorable evidence 
rising to a material level of importance is 
inescapable. 
 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  In ignoring Kyles’s instruction that 
prosecutors must disclose evidence obtained by the police, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly 
established federal law.  The Commonwealth’s argument that 
the receipt did not appear in the prosecution file does nothing 
to undercut its duty to disclose under Kyles and, as the 
District Court correctly notes, borders on bad faith.  It 
explained: 
 
The Commonwealth admits that the entire 
homicide file—where one may expect a 
document recovered by the police to exist—
went missing in March 1997, before the 
Commonwealth had submitted its direct appeal 
briefing.  The Commonwealth may not point to 
a missing file and declare it the petitioner’s 
burden to prove that the receipt was, at one 
point, contained inside.  
 
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (citation omitted).  The 
Commonwealth has never asserted that it disclosed the receipt 
to Dennis.  We refuse to allow it to evade its duty under 
Brady based on failure to adequately search or maintain its 
own files.  
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 The Commonwealth argues that because Dennis’s 
appellate counsel was able to obtain the receipt from the 
DPW nearly five years post-trial, the prosecution had no 
responsibility under Brady to turn it over to defense counsel 
when the receipt came into its possession.  Judge Fisher 
adopts this approach and excuses the Commonwealth from its 
Brady responsibility by injecting an argument that was not 
even mentioned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, much 
less fairly presented before it.  
  
 The Commonwealth did not raise a “due diligence” 
argument, as such, before the state court.  Rather, in its 
Response to Defendant’s Reply Brief, the Commonwealth 
argued for the first time that there was no Brady violation 
because the receipt was publicly available.  The entirety of 
the alleged due diligence argument is below.  
 
 [A]lthough defendant does not explain how he 
obtained a copy of [the Cason receipt], he 
presumably did so from the Department of 
Public Welfare, thus establishing its public 
availability.  Brady does not require the 
Commonwealth to produce evidence that was 
not in its sole possession, but was available, as 
this document apparently was. 
 
App. 2026.  As Judge Jordan observes, Pennsylvania law 
generally regards arguments raised for the first time in reply 
briefs as waived.  J. Jordan Concurring Op. at 16 n.9.  
 
 Further, our review on habeas is limited to the record 
as presented to the state court.  See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 
U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011).  There was no evidence regarding 
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the availability of the receipt.  In fact, the Commonwealth’s 
assertion that the receipt was publicly available was incorrect, 
as it runs counter to specific Pennsylvania regulations in 
effect at the time.  As they existed during Dennis’s appeal, the 
DPW’s privacy regulations protected the vast majority of 
private information; the only exception was that the 
Commonwealth may disclose “the address and amount of 
assistance a person is currently receiving” following a direct 
request about a specific person. 55 Pa. Code § 105.4(a)(1).  
Even if the DPW receives a subpoena requesting information 
about a recipient, it must challenge that demand and “plead, 
in support of its request to withhold information, that under 
the Public Welfare Code (62 P.S. §§ 101–1503), the rules of 
the Department prohibit the disclosure of information in 
records and files, including the names of clients, except as 
provided in subsection (a).”  Id. § 105.4(b)(3).  To the extent 
that information was publicly available regarding Cason’s 
public assistance payments, it was limited to Cason’s address 
and her amount of assistance, which is irrelevant to her 
interaction with Dennis on the day of Williams’s murder.  
Only the Commonwealth held information that would support 
Dennis’s alibi—the time-stamped receipt Cason provided to 
the police. 
 
 Even if we were to imagine that a diligence argument 
was presented and considered by the state court, the United 
States Supreme Court has never recognized an affirmative 
due diligence duty of defense counsel as part of Brady, let 
alone an exception to the mandate of Brady as this would 
clearly be.  The Supreme Court has noted that its precedent 
“lend[s] no support to the notion that defendants must 
scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the 
prosecution represents that all such material has been 
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disclosed.”  Banks, 540 U.S. at 695.  To the contrary, defense 
counsel is entitled to presume that prosecutors have 
“discharged their official duties.”  Id. at 696 (quoting Bracy v. 
Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997)).   Further, the duty to 
disclose under Brady is absolute—it does not depend on 
defense counsel’s actions.  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
97, 107 (1976) (“[I]f the evidence is so clearly supportive of a 
claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a 
duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no 
request is made.”).  Brady’s mandate and its progeny are 
entirely focused on prosecutorial disclosure, not defense 
counsel’s diligence. 
  
 The emphasis in the United States Supreme Court’s 
Brady jurisprudence on fairness in criminal trials reflects 
Brady’s concern with the government’s unquestionable 
advantage in criminal proceedings, which the Court has 
explicitly recognized.  See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 
(reasoning that the “special status” of the prosecutor in the 
American legal system, whose interest “in a criminal 
prosecution is not that [he] shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done . . . explains . . . the basis for the prosecution’s 
broad duty of disclosure” (quoting Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  Construing Brady in a manner that 
encourages disclosure reflects the Court’s concern with 
prosecutorial advantage and prevents shifting the burden onto 
defense counsel to defend his actions.  Requiring an 
undefined quantum of diligence on the part of defense 
counsel, however, would enable precisely that result—it 
would dilute Brady’s equalizing impact on prosecutorial 
advantage by shifting the burden to satisfy the claim onto 
defense counsel. 
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 The focus on disclosure by the prosecutor, not 
diligence by defense, is reiterated in the Supreme Court’s 
approval of the shift in the traditional adversarial system 
Brady imposes.  In United States v. Bagley, the Court 
explained that “[b]y requiring the prosecutor to assist the 
defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited 
departure from a pure adversary model” because the 
prosecutor is not tasked simply with winning a case, but 
ensuring justice.  473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985).  Further, the 
Court placed the burden of obtaining favorable evidence 
squarely on the prosecutor’s shoulders.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. 
at 437 (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case.”).  That the government may 
be burdened by the Brady rule does not undercut its need to 
comply with it.  The imposition of an affirmative due 
diligence requirement on defense counsel would erode the 
prosecutor’s obligation under, and the basis for, Brady itself. 
 
 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned 
against such a rule.  It has rejected the notion that defense 
counsel’s diligence is relevant in assessing “cause” for the 
failure to raise a Brady suppression issue in state court 
proceedings.  In Strickler, it reasoned that because counsel 
was entitled to rely on the prosecutor fulfilling its Brady 
obligation, and had no reason for believing it had failed to 
comply, the failure to raise the issue earlier in habeas 
proceedings was justified.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 286–89.   
Similarly here, the prosecutor’s duty is clear.  Dennis’s 
counsel was entitled to rely on the prosecutor’s duty to turn 
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over exculpatory evidence.18  Assessing whether he could or 
should have discovered the receipt is beside the point.19   
 
 In Banks, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
notion that “the prosecution can lie and conceal and the 
prisoner still has the burden to . . . discover the evidence, so 
long as the potential existence of a prosecutorial misconduct 
claim might have been detected.”  540 U.S. at 696 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Banks concluded that 
“[a] rule . . . declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must 
seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to 
accord defendants due process.”  Id.; see also United States v. 
Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 712 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that 
“the clear holding in Banks” does away with any belief that 
Brady imposes a due diligence requirement on defense 
counsel); Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 242 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(Clay, J., dissenting) (“The rule emerging from Strickler and 
Banks is clear: Where the prosecution makes an affirmative 
                                              
 18 Dennis’s trial counsel asserted in an affidavit he “did 
not specifically request a copy of the welfare check receipt 
from the Commonwealth, because [he] did not know of its 
existence,” but he had “[b]y formal motion . . . request[ed] all 
exculpatory evidence be produced.”  App. 1725.  
 19 The Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit agree that 
defense counsel’s knowledge is not at issue in Brady.  Banks 
v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 
prosecution’s obligation to turn over the evidence in the first 
instance stands independent of the defendant's knowledge. . . . 
The only relevant inquiry is whether the information was 
exculpatory.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord In 
re Sealed Case, 185 F.3d 887, 896–97 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  
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representation that no Brady material exists, but in fact has 
Brady material in its possession, the petitioner will not be 
penalized for failing to discover that material.”).  
  
 While we think that the United States Supreme Court 
has made it clear that Brady requires the prosecution to turn 
over all material favorable evidence in its possession, we 
acknowledge that it is not totally frivolous under our Third 
Circuit jurisprudence for the Commonwealth to have argued, 
as it did here, that because defense counsel could or should 
have discovered the Cason receipt with due diligence, the 
prosecution was not required to disclose it.20  That is because 
our case law, as we discuss below, is inconsistent and could 
easily confuse.  Thus, we need to clarify our position: the 
concept of “due diligence” plays no role in the Brady 
analysis.21  To the contrary, the focus of the Supreme Court 
                                              
 20 Surprisingly, several courts of appeals have 
endorsed some form of a due diligence requirement.  For a 
comprehensive overview of common features of the diligence 
rule and where it emerged, see Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors 
Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the 
Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 138, 141, 
147–56 (2012).  Common features include that the evidence 
was equally available to the prosecution and the defense, that 
the evidence was known by the defendant, and that the 
relevant facts were accessible by the defendant.  Id. at 153–
56.  
 21 The Second Circuit also recently recognized in a 
habeas case that “[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has 
never required a defendant to exercise due diligence to obtain 
Brady material.”  See Lewis v. Conn. Comm’r of Corr., 790 
55 
 
has been, and it must always be, on whether the government 
has unfairly “suppressed” the evidence in question in 
derogation of its duty of disclosure.  See Gov’t of the V.I. v. 
Mills, 821 F.3d 448, 460 n.10 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The critical 
question in assessing constitutional error is to what extent a 
defendant’s rights were violated, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.” (quoting Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 68 
(3d Cir. 2002)). 
  
 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that 
the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”  
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).  Suppression is 
“[t]he prosecution’s withholding from the defense of evidence 
that is favorable to the defendant.”  Suppression of Evidence, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  Inquiries into 
prosecutorial suppression are, by nature, retrospective as to 
the actions of the prosecutor—they do not place affirmative 
duties on defense counsel pre-trial.  Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 
(“[T]he prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional 
duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient 
significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial.”). 
    
 The government must disclose all favorable evidence.  
Only when the government is aware that the defense counsel 
already has the material in its possession should it be held to 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 109, 121 (2d Cir. 2015).  It retained its test for when 
evidence is not “suppressed” for Brady purposes, however.  
Id.   
56 
 
not have “suppressed” it in not turning it over to the defense.  
Any other rule presents too slippery a slope.  In United States 
v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991), and United 
States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984), we 
opened the door to a due diligence exception to Brady.  
Starusko, 729 F.2d at 262 (“‘[T]he government is not obliged 
under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he 
already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain 
himself.’” (quoting United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 
852, 861 (5th Cir.1979))).  In Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 
230–31 (3d Cir. 2013), we may have widened that opening 
when we combined our conclusion that defense counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in violation of the defendant’s 
rights with a finding that there was no Brady violation 
because counsel clearly should have discovered the 
prosecutor’s key witness’s criminal record and been aware 
that he was on parole when the shooting occurred and when 
he testified at trial.  We did note in Grant that Grant himself 
had obtained the witness’s criminal records while in custody, 
but we did not rest our ruling on that fact. 
 
 In Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 663–64 (3d Cir. 
2009), we got it right.  There we concluded that “[i]f the 
prosecution has the obligation, pursuant to Perdomo, to notify 
defense counsel that a government witness has a criminal 
record even when that witness was represented by someone in 
defense counsel’s office, the fact that a criminal record is a 
public document cannot absolve the prosecutor of her 
responsibility to provide that record to defense counsel.”  Id. 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Thus, we held that a criminal record, which 
arguably could have been discovered by defense counsel, is 
suppressed if not disclosed.  Defense counsel in Wilson 
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certainly had the ability to obtain the alleged Brady 
material—a criminal record—by virtue of his legal training.   
Yet we required disclosure pursuant to Brady.  We also got it 
right in Pelullo when we rejected defendant’s argument that 
certain documents were Brady material and somehow 
“suppressed” when the government had made the materials 
available for inspection and they were defendant’s own 
documents.  Pelullo, 399 F.3d at 212 (“[T]he government 
repeatedly made the warehouse documents available to [the 
defendant] and his attorneys for inspection and copying.”). 
 
 To the extent that we have considered defense 
counsel’s purported obligation to exercise due diligence to 
excuse the government’s non-disclosure of material 
exculpatory evidence, we reject that concept as an 
unwarranted dilution of Brady’s clear mandate.  Subjective 
speculation as to defense counsel’s knowledge or access may 
be inaccurate, and it breathes uncertainty into an area that 
should be certain and sure.  See Weisburd, supra, at 164 
(“[P]rosecutors . . . cannot accurately speculate about what a 
defendant or defense lawyer could discover through due 
diligence.  Prosecutors are not privy to the investigation plan 
or the investigative resources of any given defendant or 
defense lawyer.”).  The United States Supreme Court agrees.  
It has recognized that ample disclosure is “as it should be” 
because it “tend[s] to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct 
from the prosecutor’s private deliberations, as the chosen 
forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations. . . 
. The prudence of the careful prosecutor should not therefore 
be discouraged.”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439–40 (internal 
citations omitted).   
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 All favorable material ought to be disclosed by the 
prosecution.  To hold otherwise would, in essence, add a 
fourth prong to the inquiry, contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
directive that we are not to do so.  In Williams v. Taylor, the 
Virginia Supreme Court had interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) 
“to require a separate inquiry into fundamental fairness even 
when [petitioner] [was] able to show that his lawyer was 
ineffective and that his ineffectiveness probably affected the 
outcome of the proceeding.”  529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000).  The 
Court held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s imposition of 
this additional test was an unreasonable application of, and 
contrary to, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 393–94.  Adding due diligence, whether 
framed as an affirmative requirement of defense counsel or as 
an exception from the prosecutor’s duty, to the well-
established three-pronged Brady inquiry would similarly be 
an unreasonable application of, and contrary to, Brady and its 
progeny. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 
prosecution did not withhold the Cason receipt was an 
unreasonable application of law and fact.  The receipt was in 
its possession pursuant to Kyles and, under United States 
Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that there is no additional 
prong to Brady and no “hide and seek” exception depending 
on defense counsel’s knowledge or diligence.  See Banks, 540 
U.S. at 696. 
 
 c)  Materiality 
 
Without a doubt, Dennis suffered prejudice due to the 
Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the receipt.  The defense 
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strategy was rooted in Dennis’s alibi that he was getting on 
the K bus at the time of the murder.  The Commonwealth’s 
withholding of the receipt transformed a witness who would 
otherwise have been an alibi witness for Dennis into a witness 
for the prosecution or, at least, left Dennis powerless to 
impeach Cason’s false testimony if offered by the 
prosecution.  The state court’s conclusion that Dennis 
suffered no prejudice is an unreasonable determination of fact 
and law.   
 
Failure to disclose the Cason receipt made testimony 
by a key government witness, who provided the sole 
testimony contradicting Dennis’s alibi, unassailable.  The 
Commonwealth highlighted how weighty Cason’s testimony 
was at trial.  In his opening, referring to Cason as simply a 
“lady from the neighborhood,” ADA King emphasized the 
discrepancy between Cason’s and Dennis’s testimony: 
“[Cason] had something very interesting to say. Yeah, I saw 
him when I was on the bus, but it wasn’t 2:00, it was 4:00.”  
App. 404.  At closing, King reiterated the inconsistencies 
between Cason’s and Dennis’s testimony, and added that 
“[the Commonwealth] called her, not the defense.  She came 
in and said, I was at work at 2:00.  I saw him somewhere 
between 4:00 and 4:30.  Try again, Jimmy. That one didn’t 
work.”  App. 1209.  Disclosure of the receipt would have 
given defense counsel evidence to demonstrate that Cason 
falsely testified when she asserted that she worked until 2:00 
p.m. on October 22.  Disclosure would have allowed defense 
counsel to undermine Cason’s credibility or would have 
caused her to correct her testimony—as she did later in an 
affidavit—so as to support Dennis’s version of events.  
Impeachment using the receipt may have caused Cason to 
explain to the jury that her prior testimony rested on a 
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misunderstanding of military time and allowed Cason to 
correct her timeline during trial.  More likely, the prosecution 
would not have called Cason at all, and Dennis would have 
called Cason to corroborate his testimony.22  Finally, ADA 
King would not have, at closing, been able to point out the 
inconsistencies between Dennis’s and Cason’s testimonies.   
 
Cason’s uncorrected testimony left the jury with 
conflicting stories as to Dennis and Cason’s interactions on 
the day of the murder.  Following Cason’s testimony that she 
could not have seen Dennis between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m., 
Dennis qualified his trial testimony and said that he only 
“thought” he saw Cason.  App. 1030.  During closing, 
Dennis’s counsel told the jury, “Remember what [Dennis] 
told you when he got up there? It’s wrong. He didn’t see 
[Cason] on the bus. He thought he saw her on the bus, but he 
didn’t.”  App. 1179–80. The District Court thoughtfully 
explained how Dennis’s uncorrected testimony damaged 
defense counsel’s strategy:  
 
This scrambled explanation left the jury with 
two options, equally unhelpful to Dennis: 
believe that Cason and Dennis had seen each 
other on the bus, as both testified, but that it 
happened later than Dennis said—and therefore 
find no alibi for the time of the crime; or believe 
counsel’s new story that Dennis was on the 
earlier bus, and thus could not have committed 
                                              
 22 The Commonwealth concedes that if it had the 
receipt, Cason would have provided little value to the 
prosecution and they would not have called her.  Indeed, 
Dennis probably would have.  
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the crime, but never saw Cason at all. Cason’s 
corrected testimony would have transformed 
Cason from a damaging Commonwealth 
witness to a uniquely powerful, disinterested 
defense witness who would provide document-
supported corroboration for Dennis’[s] alibi. . . .  
 
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 512.  The impeachment value 
the receipt provided would have eliminated the conflicting 
stories for the jury and, given the weight of Cason’s 
testimony alleged by the prosecution at trial, could have 
raised significant doubt about Dennis’s guilt.  The state 
court’s determination that Dennis did not suffer prejudice as a 
result of Cason’s unchallenged testimony was unreasonable.  
In concluding that the Commonwealth had evidence that its 
witness’s testimony was false, we need not reach whether the 
prosecutors here intentionally presented false evidence 
because the inquiry is solely the impact that the absence of 
evidence had on the trial.  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Mills, 
821 F.3d at 460 n.10. 
  
 In Banks, the United States Supreme Court 
admonished prosecutors for letting statements by an 
informant, which they believed to be false, stand uncorrected 
throughout the proceedings.  The Court concluded that 
“prosecutors represented at trial and in state postconviction 
proceedings that the State had held nothing back . . .  It was 
not incumbent on Banks to prove these representations false; 
rather, Banks was entitled to treat the prosecutor’s 
submissions as truthful.”  540 U.S. at 698.  Earlier Brady 
cases indicate similar concern for allowing false testimony.  
See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 (“[C]onviction obtained by 
the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally 
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unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury.”) (footnotes omitted).  Letting Cason’s 
testimony stand when the Commonwealth had evidence it 
was false unquestionably violated Brady and entitles Dennis 
to a new trial.  
 
The state court took an unreasonably narrow view of 
Brady materiality by focusing on the fact that Cason would 
only have been able to say that she saw him around 2:30 p.m.  
Cason’s testimony need not fully corroborate Dennis’s alibi 
in order to show materiality under Brady.  Kyles explained 
that Brady materiality does not turn on a determination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence, but instead requires the court to 
consider the constitutional error in light of all the evidence to 
determine whether it “put[s] the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”  
514 U.S. at 435.  Transforming Cason, a disinterested 
individual with documentary support, into a defense witness 
meets the requirements of Brady materiality because it would 
have necessarily bolstered Dennis’s alibi defense narrative 
and “put the whole case in . . . a different light.”  Id.    
 
Dennis testified that his father drove him to the bus 
stop around 1:50 p.m., where he boarded the K bus.  Dennis 
asserted in his statement to police, which was read into the 
record at trial, that he waved at Cason when “we got off” the 
K bus at Abbottsford Homes, a trip that generally took about 
thirty minutes.  App. 710 (emphasis added).  Dennis’s 
statement implies that they rode the K bus together and, 
setting aside the difference in timelines, Cason’s testimony 
aligns with his account since Cason also took the K bus to 
Abbottsford Homes and saw Dennis there after she 
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disembarked.  Regardless of whether the receipt would have 
refreshed Cason’s memory enough to cause her to testify that 
she and Dennis were on the 1:56 p.m. K bus together, it 
certainly would have empowered defense counsel to elicit 
testimony from Cason that the location in which she saw 
Dennis was consistent with her exiting the bus at the same 
time he did and to acknowledge that even if she did not notice 
him on the bus, she had no reason to disbelieve that he was 
there. 
 
Cason, unlike the other witnesses Dennis called, did 
not know him well.  Cason testified that she knew Dennis, but 
when ADA King asked her how long she had known him, 
Cason replied, “I don’t really, you know, know him, I know 
him by living up my way” at Abbottsford Homes.  App. 731.  
Because Cason simply knew Dennis from the neighborhood, 
she served as a significantly less interested witness compared 
to Dennis’s other testifying witnesses, who were all close 
friends, family, and church leaders.  As a result, she was less 
vulnerable to accusations of bias, and her testimony in 
support would have carried more weight with the jury.  This 
is particularly important given the nature of her testimony 
compared to Dennis’s other witnesses.  Unlike Dennis’s other 
witnesses, Cason’s testimony would have been supported by 
documentary proof of her timeline, the time-stamped receipt, 
to provide independent credibility to her testimony.  In light 
of the receipt, Cason’s testimony on Dennis’s behalf would 
have been doubly strong—she was disinterested, and the 
receipt provided documentary corroboration for her version of 
the events. 23 
                                              
 23 The Commonwealth argues that Cason’s testimony 
would be duplicative of Willis Meredith’s non-alibi 
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The Commonwealth criticizes the District Court’s 
analysis of the Cason receipt Brady claim as a 
misinterpretation of the record.  Primarily, this critique rests 
on the District Court’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court “overlook[ed] the fact that both Cason and 
Dennis testified that they saw each other on the bus.”  Dennis 
V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 511.  While it is true that Cason did not 
testify at trial that she saw Dennis on the K bus, nor did she 
deny it, and the Commonwealth’s failure to turn over the 
receipt deprived defense counsel of the opportunity to refresh 
Cason’s memory with the receipt or at least elicit that she saw 
Dennis immediately upon exiting the bus, thereby 
corroborating that they exited at the same location.  Given 
that her unrefreshed testimony put the encounter after 4:00 
p.m., defense counsel had no reason to elicit such testimony.  
But whether Cason testified that she saw Dennis on the bus or 
disembarking the bus, such testimony would have reinforced 
Dennis’s own testimony that he was on the bus and placed 
him in a location that would have made it practically 
impossible for him to murder Williams.  Brady, therefore, 
required that the Commonwealth disclose the receipt.   
 
                                                                                                     
testimony. Willis Meredith, a friend of Dennis’s, testified that 
he saw Dennis at Abbottsford Homes around 2:30 p.m. 
Cason’s testimony is not cumulative for two reasons: (1) 
Willis, like Dennis’s other witnesses, was a friend and open 
to accusations of bias from the prosecution; and (2) Cason’s 
testimony was corroborated by independent documentary 
evidence.  So, even if her testimony simply placed Dennis at 
Abbottsford Homes around 2:30, it did so with more 
evidentiary weight than Meredith’s. 
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At minimum, Cason’s time-stamped receipt would 
have empowered defense counsel to effectively impeach one 
of the Commonwealth’s strongest witnesses and mitigated the 
devastating effect of her testimony on Dennis’s credibility 
and his father’s.  At most, the Commonwealth’s case would 
have been short one witness, and Dennis’s alibi defense 
strategy would have been doubly strong due to (1) Cason’s 
status as a disinterested defense witness with the documentary 
corroboration and (2) the resulting increase in Dennis’s and 
his father’s credibility.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 
therefore unreasonable in concluding that the receipt was not 
favorable to Dennis when it would have bolstered his alibi.  It 
was unreasonable in concluding that there was “no evidence” 
that the Commonwealth had suppressed the receipt when the 
state court found that detectives had the receipt in their 
possession.  And finally, it was unreasonable in concluding 
that the receipt was not material.  Had the Commonwealth 
disclosed the receipt, the jury may well have credited 
Dennis’s alibi defense.  
 
 B. Howard Police Activity Sheet 
 
  1. Facts 
 
 A suppressed police activity sheet reveals that two 
days after Williams’s murder, Zahra Howard, an eyewitness 
and key witness for the Commonwealth at trial, made a 
statement to Williams’s aunt and uncle, Dianne and 
Mannasett Pugh, that was inconsistent with an earlier 
statement she had made to police.  Shortly after the murder, 
Howard told police that she did not recognize the shooter 
from school.  The Pughs told police, however, that Howard 
told them the day after the murder that she knew the 
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perpetrators from Olney High School, and that “Kim” and 
“Quinton” were at the scene when the shooting occurred.  
App. 1506.  Quinton was Dianne Pugh’s nephew.  The police 
indicated in their “THINGS TO DO” list that they intended to 
speak with the Pughs again and “[i]nterview Zahra Howard 
again” in light of her inconsistent statement to the Pughs.  
App. 1507.  When police met with Howard the following day, 
however, they did not ask Howard about her conversation 
with the Pughs.   
 
  2. State court decision 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court initially 
characterized Dennis’s Brady claim regarding Howard’s 
inconsistent statement as one “with at least arguable merit.”  
Dennis III, 950 A.2d at 969.  But the court was not prepared 
to rule on the record before it, and it remanded the Howard 
Brady claim to the PCRA court to address that claim in the 
first instance.  Id.   
 
 The PCRA court rejected the Brady claim following an 
evidentiary hearing. The District Court aptly summarized the 
PCRA hearing and decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court:  
   
Dennis sought to argue the merits of the Brady 
claim on the papers; he objected to the 
introduction of evidence from Howard and 
Diane Pugh because, he argued, their 
recollections now, a decade after the trial, about 
who the shooter was or what they told the 
police had no relevance on the question of 
whether the Commonwealth had violated Brady 
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by failing to disclose the activity sheet.  As 
Dennis’s PCRA counsel told the court: 
 
The testimony has to be evaluated 
in its trial context.  And all we can 
do at this point is put on paper for 
the court what we expect the 
impeachment to have been, 
assuming, for example, Zahra 
Howard denies having made the 
statement.  We have to 
demonstrate on paper how she 
could have been impeached, and 
how that evidence relates to other 
evidence in the case. . . .  Her 
testimony today about what she 
remembers from 16 years ago we 
can cross-examine, but it doesn’t 
illuminate the question of 
materiality in the context of the 
trial. 
 
NT 12/22/08 at 15.  The court allowed the 
testimony over Dennis’s objections.  As 
expected, both Howard and Pugh denied that 
Howard had ever suggested that she recognized 
the assailants. Pugh’s testimony should not 
carry much weight, however, given that she 
declared before she was even sworn in, “I don’t 
remember nothing, nothing at all. It’s been 15, 
16 years so I don't remember.  They just 
subpoenaed me and I’m here.”  Id. at 56. 
 
68 
 
 The PCRA court ultimately rejected the 
Brady claim.  It noted that, during the hearing, 
Howard “testified credibly that she did not 
know the appellant from Olney High School, 
nor had she seen him prior to the murder.”  
Commonwealth v. Dennis, Case No. 92–01–
0484, slip op. (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl. Mar. 17, 2010), at 
13.  Although the question whether Howard 
recognized James Dennis (“the appellant”) or 
had seen him before the murder is entirely 
irrelevant to whether she told Diane Pugh that 
she had seen the shooter before the murder, this 
is, in fact, the entirety of the testimony that the 
Commonwealth elicited from Howard at the 
PCRA hearing: 
 
Q: And in that conversation [with 
Diane Pugh] did you ever say 
anything about recognizing the 
defendant before? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you ever see the defendant 
at Olney High School? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you ever see him around 
Olney High School? 
A: No. 
 
NT 12/22/08 at 18.  On cross, when Dennis’s 
lawyer asked her about whether she said she 
had ever seen the shooter before, or whether she 
had ever told anyone she recognized the shooter 
from Olney High School, Howard denied 
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recognizing the shooter or having ever said she 
did.  Id. at 25–27. 
 
 Given both trial and PCRA counsel’s 
thorough cross-examination of Howard, the 
PCRA court determined that it was “unlikely 
that any additional impeachment evidence 
contained in the police activity sheet . . . would 
have created a reasonable probability that the 
result of the proceeding would have been 
different had it been disclosed.”  Dennis, slip 
op. at 14.  The court further noted that the 
government’s case at trial “did not rest solely 
on” Howard’s testimony. Id. Finally, the 
contents of the activity sheet amounted to 
inadmissible hearsay, which “cannot be the 
basis for a Brady violation.” Id. at 15. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court largely 
accepted the PCRA court’s determinations, 
despite its seeming recognition, in Dennis III, of 
the investigatory value the activity sheet would 
have had and its earlier dismissal of the 
admissibility issue.  It agreed that Dennis had 
failed to prove a reasonable probability of a 
different result had the activity sheet been 
disclosed.  Commonwealth v. Dennis, 609 Pa. 
442, 17 A.3d 297, 309 (2011) (“Dennis IV”).  It 
echoed the PCRA court in noting that “Howard 
was extensively cross-examined by defense 
counsel in an attempt to impeach her testimony 
during trial,” and that “there were two 
eyewitnesses other than Howard” who 
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identified Dennis; “[t]he disclosure of the 
activity sheet would have had no impact upon 
these eyewitnesses’ testimony.”  Id.  It did not 
specifically address the question of 
admissibility. 
 
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 513–14.   
 
  3. AEDPA Review 
 
 There is no question that Howard’s inconsistent 
statement would have been helpful to the defense but was not 
revealed to defense counsel until PCRA discovery, ten years 
after trial.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Dennis’s 
Brady claim regarding the Howard statement on materiality 
grounds.  Although the court articulated the proper standard 
for materiality, whether a “reasonable probability” of a 
different outcome has been established, it applied Kyles in a 
manner inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.  
 
 First and foremost, defense counsel could have used 
Howard’s inconsistent statement as an effective means of 
impeachment during trial.  As noted above, impeachment 
evidence unquestionably falls under Brady’s purview and 
cannot be suppressed by the prosecution.  The 
Commonwealth notes that evidence is not necessarily 
material under Brady simply because it may open up avenues 
for impeachment—the focus of the inquiry is on the 
“reasonable probability of a different result” under Kyles.  
Such a probability exists here.  The type of impeachment 
evidence provided by the activity sheet would have undercut 
the credibility of a key prosecution witness in a manner not 
duplicated by other challenges the defense was able to level at 
71 
 
trial.  Consequently, the impeachment material provided by 
the suppressed activity sheet is material under Brady, and it 
was unreasonable for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to 
hold otherwise.  
 
 Howard was the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness 
against Dennis and the Commonwealth accordingly 
highlighted her testimony.  ADA King emphasized the 
importance of Howard’s testimony in his closing argument: 
“[I]f you believe Zahra Howard, that’s enough to convict 
James Dennis.”  App. 1207.  As Williams’s friend and the 
person with the closest view of the shooter, Howard’s 
testimony carried significant emotional and practical weight 
with the jury. 24  
 
 Unlike other testifying eyewitnesses, Howard had 
views of the perpetrator at numerous stages during the 
incident.  At trial, Howard testified that she saw the shooter 
                                              
 24 Howard’s testimony undoubtedly bore more 
emotional weight with the jury than the other eyewitness 
testimony presented at trial due to Howard’s close friendship 
with the victim.  Because of Howard’s personal connection 
with, and physical proximity to, Williams at the time of her 
murder, stress may have played a particularly damaging role 
in the strength of her identification.  Chief Judge McKee 
explains in his concurrence that that stress may impair a 
witness’s identifications.  J. McKee Concurring Op. at 29–31.  
Here, the identification that the Commonwealth so 
confidently framed as sufficient to support Dennis’s 
conviction may have suffered the greatest from the effect of 
stress.  
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for approximately twenty seconds total.  This comported with 
her testimony at the preliminary hearing.  The two other 
testifying eyewitnesses’ views were much briefer.  Bertha 
testified at the preliminary hearing that he saw the assailant 
for about a second.  At trial, he expanded the amount of time 
he said he saw the shooter to three or four seconds.  Cameron 
initially testified at the preliminary hearing that he saw the 
assailant for twenty seconds but upped the amount of time to 
thirty to forty seconds at trial.  Notably, Cameron qualified 
his testimony by admitting that he “didn’t really pay 
attention.”25  App. 664.  In contrast to Bertha and Cameron’s, 
Howard’s testimony was consistent, lengthy, and involved 
numerous views of the assailant—on the subway stairs, 
during the face-to-face encounter and finally, when Williams 
was shot.  Because of the consistency and emotional weight 
of Howard’s testimony, defense counsel’s strategy was 
heavily reliant on impeaching Howard by any means—
counsel attempted to “discredit her any . . . way [he] could.”  
App. 1326.   
 
                                              
 25 Judge Fisher concedes that Bertha and Cameron may 
not have been paying attention during the incident, but urges 
that “the gunshot focused their view and spurred them into 
action.”  J. Fisher Dissent Op. at 21.  As Chief Judge 
McKee’s concurrence highlights, however, the presence of a 
weapon at a crime scene “has a consistently negative impact 
on both feature recall accuracy and identification accuracy.”  
J. McKee Concurring Op. at 32.  Here, the gunshot may have 
startled Bertha and Cameron to attention, but research 
demonstrates that the accuracy of their recollection of the 
perpetrators would have been reduced, not amplified, by the 
presence of the silver handgun.  
73 
 
 Counsel’s ability to discredit Howard was limited, 
however.  Without evidence that would directly contradict 
Howard’s testimony at trial, defense counsel sought to 
discredit Howard by pointing out her initial hesitation in 
identifying Dennis as the perpetrator during the photo array.  
Counsel could not challenge Howard’s trial testimony on 
other grounds.  But prosecutors held contradictory statements 
by Howard about whether she recognized the perpetrators.  
Howard had initially told police, and later testified at trial, 
that she had never seen the perpetrators before and had not 
recognized them from school.  According to the Pughs, 
however, Howard had said she recognized the shooter from 
Olney High School.  The Pughs (along with Parker) also 
stated that Howard had also identified two other individuals, 
Kim and Quinton, as being present at the scene.   
 
 As noted by the District Court, cross-examination does 
not equate to actual impeachment.  Defense counsel cross-
examined Howard, but he could only engage in limited 
questioning focused on challenging her hesitation 
identifications of Dennis as the shooter.  This is decidedly 
different from the actual impeachment enabled by the activity 
sheet.  In Banks, a witness was heavily impeached at trial, but 
the prosecution suppressed evidence that the witness served 
as a paid informant.  540 U.S. at 702.  Accordingly, none of 
the impeachment conducted at trial covered his status as an 
informant; the jury weighed his credibility without knowing 
this.  Id. at 702–03.  The Supreme Court rejected the state’s 
argument that because the witness was heavily impeached, 
further impeachment evidence was immaterial.  Id. at 702.  
We have similarly indicated that additional impeachment 
evidence helps to substantiate Brady claims in a way that 
might make them material.  In Lambert v. Beard, we stated 
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that “it is patently unreasonable to presume—without 
explanation—that whenever a witness is impeached in one 
manner, any other impeachment becomes immaterial.”  633 
F.3d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 2011), judgment vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195 (2012).  
The mere fact that a witness has been heavily cross-examined 
or impeached at trial does not preclude a determination that 
additional impeachment evidence is material under Brady.  
 
 Indeed, we have granted habeas relief on the basis of a 
“significant difference” between the suppressed impeachment 
and other types of impeachment evidence used at trial.  
Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 387 (3d Cir. 2004).  In 
Slutzker, we held that a police report memorializing a 
witness’s inconsistent statement was significantly different 
from the reports used to impeach the witness at trial.  In the 
reports used at trial, the witness failed to identify the 
defendant, but in the suppressed report, she definitively stated 
that the man she saw was not the defendant.  We concluded 
that “[t]he latter is much more convincing impeachment 
evidence, and the failure to disclose it leaves us in doubt that 
the trial verdict was worthy of confidence.”  Id.  The police 
activity sheet memorializing Howard’s statement similarly 
provides distinct and persuasive impeachment material that 
discredits Howard’s testimony more thoroughly than the 
identification challenges defense counsel levelled at trial.  
 
 The Commonwealth relies on United States v. Walker, 
657 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2011), and United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2002), in arguing that the activity sheet 
does not add anything significant to the record and is 
consequently immaterial, even if the evidence is unique.  
However, the activity sheet adds to the record in a distinct 
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and significant way, so Walker and Perez do not compel us to 
find it immaterial.  In Walker, defendants sought a new trial 
based on the state’s suppression of information, unrelated to 
the trial itself, about an informant witness.  The informant, 
who testified at defendant’s trial, was found with cocaine and 
marijuana in his pocket on the day of a controlled buy 
operation in an unrelated case.  We held that suppression of 
that information did not rise to the level of a Brady violation.  
657 F.3d at 188 (noting that another witness for the 
prosecution provided direct support).   Unlike our case, where 
Howard’s statement to the Pughs directly undercut the 
credibility of her eyewitness testimony in Dennis’s case, the 
alleged Brady evidence in Walker was wholly unrelated to 
defendant’s case.  Further, we reiterated the principle in 
Walker that “there are some instances where specific 
impeachment evidence is so important (for issues such as the 
identity of the culprit) that it is material for Brady purposes 
even when a witness has already been effectively impeached 
on other issues.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, Walker 
supports the view that withholding impeachment material that 
is germane to a critical aspect of the case—as here, the 
identity of the perpetrator—violates Brady.  
 
 Similarly, Perez does not support the 
Commonwealth’s contention.  The alleged Brady material in 
Perez was a witness’s later statement inculpating another 
defendant and exculpating Perez.  The initial statement, 
unlike Howard’s initial statement in this case, was 
corroborated by documentary evidence and co-defendant 
testimony at trial.  Here, Howard’s eyewitness testimony 
played a pivotal emotional and practical role that could not be 
replaced by other evidence.  There are material differences in 
impeachment value as well.  In Perez, we concluded that 
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cross-examination on the basis of the later statement would 
not have induced the co-defendant to admit to committing the 
crime.  Perez, 280 F.3d at 350–51.  Here, the type of 
statement at issue is different—Howard would have been 
confronted with an inconsistent statement, but not one that 
would have implicated her in the crime.   
 
 Armed with the activity sheet, defense counsel could 
have impeached Howard in a manner that very well may have 
led her to admit she recognized the perpetrators from her high 
school.  Regardless of whether she actually recognized the 
shooter, Howard’s credibility would have been placed counter 
to that of the victim’s aunt and uncle, the Pughs, who would 
have undoubtedly been called at trial.  Consequently, 
Howard’s impeachment could have changed the jury’s 
perception of her credibility.  
 
 There are significant, material differences between the 
type of cross-examination defense counsel engaged in and 
what he could have done had he known of the police activity 
sheet.  As the District Court noted, “the activity sheet would 
have shown that [Howard] either lied to Williams’[s] close 
relatives—only days after the murder and in a manner that 
implicated Diane Pugh’s own nephew—or she was lying at 
trial.”  Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 515.  Thus, the 
government’s suppression necessarily undermines confidence 
in the outcome of Dennis’s trial.  Discrediting the 
prosecution’s central witness, and the eyewitness with the 
most significant exposure to the shooter, would have had 
devastating effects on the prosecution’s case at trial.  The 
remaining two eyewitnesses were located farther away from 
the incident, had only brief glimpses of the perpetrators, or 
were admittedly paying little attention.  Challenging 
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Howard’s identification of the shooter did little to undermine 
her credibility as a witness; but armed with the inconsistent 
statement, defense counsel could have undercut Howard’s 
testimony sufficiently that a jury may not have convicted 
Dennis.  There is a reasonable probability that had the activity 
sheet been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  
 
 The Commonwealth argues that Howard did not make 
the statements attributed to her in the activity sheet.  In 
support of this assertion, the Commonwealth looks to 
Howard’s and the Pugh’s testimony during PCRA review—
over sixteen years after Dennis’s trial.  Her statements during 
PCRA review carry little weight in how we consider a jury’s 
credibility determination at trial.  In Kyles, the Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the contention that post-conviction 
credibility determinations could replicate the jury’s credibility 
determinations at trial.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 449 n.19 
(“[N]either observation [during post-conviction proceedings] 
could possibly have affected the jury’s appraisal of Burns’s 
credibility at the time of Kyles’s trials.”).  The court oriented 
its analysis around how the jury would have weighed the 
information, not the credibility of the post-conviction 
testimony itself.  Thus, the proper inquiry remains whether 
use of the activity sheet by defense counsel at trial would 
have resulted in a different outcome at trial.  The jury makes 
the credibility determination, not the Court sixteen years post-
trial. 
   
 Although the Supreme Court instructed habeas courts 
in Wood not to ignore testimony at evidentiary hearings that 
would undermine the potential usefulness of alleged Brady 
material, the admissions during a post-conviction hearing in 
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Wood differed significantly from those provided by Howard 
during PCRA review.  In Wood, counsel specifically admitted 
that “disclosure [of the polygraph results] would not have 
affected the scope of his cross-examination,” and 
consequently, he did not bother to obtain admissions during 
post-conviction review.  Wood, 516 U.S. at 7–8.  The post-
conviction testimony at issue here is markedly different.  
Dennis’s trial counsel testified that discrediting Howard 
through inconsistent statements was an integral part of the 
trial strategy.  Interpreting Howard’s statements during PCRA 
hearings as indicating that she did not, in fact, make the 
statements to the Pughs contained in the activity sheet would 
allow the Commonwealth to cure its suppression of material 
evidence through delay.  This we will not do. 
 
 The Commonwealth’s argument that the information 
contained in the activity sheet was double hearsay, so not 
admissible for impeachment purposes, fairs no better. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not rest its decision on an 
admissibility determination.  Rather, it rooted its analysis in a 
misapplication of the Kyles materiality standard: that “any 
additional impeachment based on the activity sheet would 
have created a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.”  Dennis IV, 17 A.3d 
at 309. 
   
 Counsel could also have used the information to 
challenge the adequacy of the police investigation.  Defense 
counsel could have questioned Detectives Jastrzembski and 
Santiago as to why they did not ask Howard questions about 
her inconsistent statement when they saw her again only a 
few hours after indicating that confronting her was part of 
their “things to do.”  Their subsequent meeting with Howard 
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centered on reviewing a photo array.  The detectives never 
asked Howard about admitting to the Pughs that she 
recognized the assailants from Olney High School. They 
never asked Howard about Kim and Quinton, despite having 
recently left a discussion with Parker, who stated that Howard 
mentioned Kim and Quinton to her as well.  There is also no 
indication that they conducted any further investigation into 
the Pughs and whether they misheard all of these details or 
had reason to fabricate Howard’s inconsistent statement.  
Armed with the statement, defense counsel could have 
highlighted the investigatory failures for the jury, which could 
have supported Dennis’s acquittal.  
 
 Further, defense counsel could have used the Howard 
inconsistent statement to mount an “other suspect” defense at 
trial.  According to the Pughs, Howard stated that she 
recognized the shooter from Olney High School where she 
and Williams were enrolled.  Dennis attended Roxborough 
High School for his entire high school career.  The simple 
conflict between where Dennis attended school and where 
Howard stated the assailants went to school would have 
removed Dennis as a suspect and empowered defense counsel 
to put forth an “other suspect” defense at trial, which he was 
otherwise unable to do.  Together with the failure to follow 
up on the statements to the Pughs, defense counsel could have 
urged that Dennis’s was a case where police arbitrarily put 
blinders on as to the possibility that someone else committed 
the crime and pursued the easy lead.  
 
 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “the omission is to be evaluated in the 
context of the entire record,” Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 309, it 
ultimately applied the Brady materiality standard 
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unreasonably by using sufficiency of the evidence as a 
touchstone.  As pointed out by the District Court, the 
Supreme Court instructed in Kyles that “[a] defendant need 
not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory 
evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not 
have been enough left to convict.”  514 U.S. at 434–35.  
Rather, “the Kyles Court rebuked the dissent for assuming 
that Kyles must lose on his Brady claim because there would 
still have been enough to convict, even if the favorable 
evidence had been disclosed. ‘The rule is clear, and none of 
the Brady cases has ever suggested that sufficiency of the 
evidence (or insufficiency) is the touchstone.’”  Dennis V, 
966 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 n.8).  
State courts may not “emphasize[] reasons a juror might 
disregard new evidence while ignoring reasons she might 
not.”  Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2016).  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that 
“[t]he disclosure of the activity sheet would have had no 
impact upon [two additional] eyewitnesses’ testimony” and 
consequently, the activity sheet was not material under Brady.  
Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 309.  In making its conclusion as to the 
materiality of the activity sheet, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court tied the materiality of the activity sheet to a 
requirement that Dennis show that Cameron’s and Bertha’s 
eyewitness testimony would not be sufficient to support the 
jury’s finding.  This analysis is entirely inconsistent with the 
Court’s instructions on materiality.  The Commonwealth 
argues, and the Dissent appears to accept, that by citing 
Commonwealth v. Weiss, 986 A.2d 808 (Pa. 2009)—which 
reiterated the Supreme Court’s admonition of the sufficiency 
of the evidence test—the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
applied the proper standard.  However, unreasonable 
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application of federal law under AEDPA occurs when the 
state court identifies the proper principle, but “unreasonably 
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.  Indeed, in Lafler, the state court 
had identified the two Strickland prongs—prejudice and 
performance—yet the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the state court had unreasonably used the 
“knowing and voluntary” standard and disregarded 
Strickland.  132 S. Ct. at 1390.  
 
 Here, the Commonwealth’s argument that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court knew the proper standard for 
materiality does little to demonstrate that it actually applied it 
reasonably.  Instead of engaging in a holistic materiality 
inquiry per Kyles, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceeded 
down an analytical path that hinged the activity sheet’s Brady 
materiality on the sufficiency of the evidence, namely, the 
strength of Bertha and Cameron’s eyewitness testimony, in 
direct contravention of how the Supreme Court has defined 
materiality.  
 
 Judge Fisher’s Dissent relies on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Strickler to support the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s approach to materiality in Dennis IV.  Like the 
activity sheet, the exculpatory materials at issue in Strickler 
would have cast doubt on the testimony of a key prosecution, 
Anne Stoltzfus.  In Strickler, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit below had identified the Kyles standard for 
materiality and had concluded that “without considering 
Stoltzfus’ testimony, the record contained ample, independent 
evidence of guilt, as well as evidence sufficient to support the 
findings of vileness and future dangerousness that warranted 
the imposition of the death penalty.”  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 
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290.  The United States Supreme Court soundly rejected the 
Fourth Circuit’s approach upon review in Strickler.  It 
instructed that “[t]he standard used by [the Fourth Circuit] 
was incorrect” and reiterated that “the materiality inquiry is 
not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the 
inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the 
remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s 
conclusions.”  Id. (“[T]he question is whether ‘the favorable 
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the 
verdict.’” (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435)).  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did precisely what the Strickler 
Court rejected—it evaluated whether, after considering 
Howard’s testimony, the remaining eyewitness testimony was 
sufficient for Dennis’s conviction.  Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 309 
(“[T]here were two eyewitnesses other than Howard who 
observed the shooting at close range. . . . The disclosure of 
the activity sheet would have had no impact upon these 
eyewitnesses’ testimony.”).   
 
 Further, the materiality of the impeachment evidence 
in Strickler is distinguishable from the police activity sheet at 
issue here because the evidence against petitioner in Strickler 
was far more extensive and varied than the Commonwealth’s 
case against Dennis.  As Judge Fisher recognizes, there was 
“considerable forensic and other physical evidence” linking 
the petitioner to the crime in Strickler.  527 U.S. at 293.  The 
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he record 
provide[d] strong support for the conclusion that petitioner 
would have been convicted of capital murder and sentenced 
to death, even if Stoltzfus had been severely impeached.”  Id. 
at 294.  Thus, the Strickler Court held that petitioner had not 
shown materiality under Brady.    
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 The record laid by the Commonwealth in Dennis’s 
case pales in comparison to the one mounted by the 
government in Strickler.  For instance, the police in Strickler 
recovered hairs from clothing found with the victim that were 
microscopically akin to petitioner’s, and petitioner’s 
fingerprints were found on the inside and outside of the 
victim’s car.  527 U.S. at 293 n.41.  No similar physical 
evidence exists on the record in Dennis’s case.  The Supreme 
Court recognized the importance of Stoltzfus’s testimony, as 
it was the only disinterested narrative account provided at 
trial, but ultimately concluded in its holistic materiality 
inquiry that petitioner failed to show that there was “a 
reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence would 
have been different had these materials been disclosed.”  Id. 
at 296.  The conclusion that petitioner failed to show 
materiality against the variety and extensiveness of the 
evidence against petitioner in Strickler differs from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court indication that two other 
eyewitness accounts were sufficient for a jury to convict 
Dennis.   
 
  In sum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably 
applied Brady and its progeny in denying Dennis’s Brady 
claim based on the Howard inconsistent statement.  It 
unreasonably disregarded the impeachment value of the 
evidence in discrediting the Commonwealth’s key eyewitness 
and the adequacy of the investigation.  It unreasonably 
applied a sufficiency of the evidence test by tying the 
materiality of the activity sheet to the sufficiency of the 
remaining inculpatory eyewitness testimony.  And finally, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to consider that the 
activity sheet would have enabled defense counsel to raise a 
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defense he was otherwise unable to present—that a student at 
Olney High School committed the murder.  There is a 
reasonable probability that, had the activity sheet been 
disclosed, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt as to 
Dennis’s guilt.  
 
 C. Frazier Documents  
 
  1.  Facts 
 
 Prior to Dennis’ arrest, Philadelphia police received a 
lead from Montgomery County Detectives that someone other 
than Dennis may have murdered Williams. William Frazier, 
an inmate at the Montgomery County Correctional Facility 
called police and told them that Tony Brown “shot . . . [a] 
female in the middle of the street near the Fern Rock station” 
after the girl resisted his efforts to take her earrings, which 
Brown sold at a pawn shop for $400.  App. 1689–90.   
 
 Frazier heard Brown’s confession during a three way 
call facilitated by his aunt, Angela Frazier.  Frazier recounted 
the conversation in a signed statement given to Philadelphia 
Police less than two weeks after Williams’s murder.  Brown 
admitted that he—along with Frazier’s cousin, Ricky Walker, 
and a man called “Skeet”—had “fucked up” and killed 
Chedell Williams.  App 1692.  Frazier told police that Brown 
knew Williams, and identified her as “Kev with the blue 
pathfinder . . . his girl.”  App. 1694. 
 
 During the call, Brown asked Frazier if he heard about 
“the incident on the news about the girl that [was] killed over 
a pair of earrings,” and Brown confessed “that was us.”  App. 
1692.  Frazier reported “[Tony] said that he and Ricky got out 
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of the car and Skeet was driving.  They approached the girl, 
Tony pulled his gun out and told her to give up the earrings . . 
. she refused.  So he put the gun to her neck . . . [and] it 
accidentally went off.”  Id.  Walker briefly joined the call and 
reported that they were scared, and that they left Frazier’s 
apartment, where they sought cover after the murder, in the 
middle of the night so that no one would see them.  Frazier 
reported that Brown and Walker sounded “extremely nervous 
and upset.”  App. 1694.  Frazier described Tony as 5’7”, two 
inches taller than Dennis, with light brown skin.  Like the 
assailant, Tony “like[d] to wear sweat suits;” he had also 
committed robberies in the past and owned “a collection of 
guns.”  App. 1693–95.  
 
 Frazier gave detectives addresses for Brown and 
Walker, the address where Skeet used to live.  Frazier also 
gave police Angela Frazier’s address and phone number, 
Brown’s mother’s address, and an address of the pawn shop, 
along with a description of the proprietor.  Frazier agreed to 
go on a ride along to show detectives the addresses he 
reported.  The Philadelphia police, including Jastrzembski, 
spoke with Frazier’s landlord, who confirmed that Frazier 
rented the apartment located at the address he provided.  
Although the landlord reported that nobody had been in the 
apartment since Frazier’s arrest, the men used unconventional 
means to enter Frazier’s apartment the night of the murder—
they climbed through Frazier’s right window. 26  
                                              
 26 While this matter was pending before the panel, the 
government located Frazier in federal prison and interviewed 
him.  During this interview, Frazier admitted the story he told 
police in 1991 was, in his words, “bullshit,” that the “three-
way” phone call with his aunt and “Tony Brown” “never 
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 Detectives interviewed Walker, who told them that he 
“c[ouldn’t] stand” his cousin, Frazier.  App. 1703.  Walker 
denied knowing Tony Brown and Skeet and denied any 
involvement with, or knowledge about, Williams’s murder.  
He told detectives that he was at his house with his mother on 
the day of the murder.  Police did not conduct an 
investigation into Walker’s alibi or alert defense counsel to 
any of the information on Frazier’s tip. 
 
  2. State court decision  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA 
court’s denial of Dennis’s Brady claim as to the Frazier 
documents on the grounds that Dennis failed to demonstrate 
that the documents were material and admissible.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on its decision in 
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848 (2005), in which it 
emphasized that the prosecution need not “disclose to the 
defense every fruitless lead followed by investigators of a 
crime” and asserted that “inadmissible evidence cannot be the 
basis for a Brady violation.”  Lambert, 884 A.2d at 857 
(citation omitted).  The court concluded: “In the absence of 
any argument regarding the gravamen of Lambert . . . 
[Dennis] has failed to establish a basis for relief” regarding 
the Frazier documents.  Dennis III, 950 A.2d at 968.  
However, as Dennis points out, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
                                                                                                     
happened,” and that he did not know anyone named “Tony 
Brown” or “Skeet.”  Response to Pet. Rh’g at 17 n.13.  
Ultimately, Frazier’s admission many years post-trial does 
not change our analysis of whether, given the information the 
Commonwealth had at the time of the tip, they were required 
to disclose the lead documents pursuant to Brady.  
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Court retreated from its decision in Lambert in a later opinion 
so as to comport with Supreme Court precedent regarding the 
need for admissibility.  Commonwealth v. Willis, 46 A.3d 
648, 670 (Pa. 2012) (“[W]e hold that admissibility at trial is 
not a prerequisite to a determination of materiality under 
Brady. . . . Therefore, nondisclosed favorable evidence which 
is not admissible at trial may nonetheless be considered 
material for Brady purposes[.]”).  
 
  3. AEDPA Review 
 
 The state court addressed the merits of the Frazier 
claim and, as a result, Dennis may obtain habeas relief only if 
he can demonstrate that the decision was an unreasonable 
application of, or contrary to, clearly established law, or an 
unreasonable determination of the facts.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  
It is undisputed that the first two elements of Brady are met.  
The Frazier documents indicated that someone other than 
Dennis committed the crime, and were thus exculpatory, and 
there is no question that the state did not disclose the 
documents until PCRA discovery.  However, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Brady and 
its progeny in concluding that the Frazier documents were 
immaterial.  Also, in appending an admissibility requirement 
onto Brady, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acted contrary 
to clearly established law, as defined by the United States 
Supreme Court.  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s justification that 
the Frazier documents were a “fruitless lead” was 
unreasonable.  There is no requirement that leads be fruitful 
to trigger disclosure under Brady, and it cannot be that if the 
Commonwealth fails to pursue a lead, or deems it fruitless, 
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that it is absolved of its responsibility to turn over to defense 
counsel Brady material.  The rationale behind Brady itself 
rests on the principle that prosecutors bear an obligation to 
structure a fair trial for defendants:  
 
Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our 
system of the administration of justice suffers 
when any accused is treated unfairly. . . . A 
prosecution that withholds evidence . . . which, 
if made available, would tend to exculpate him 
or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that 
bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the 
prosecutor in the role of an architect of a 
proceeding that does not comport with 
standards of justice, even [if] . . . his action is 
not the result of guile[.] 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88 (internal quotation marks and 
footnote omitted).  Structuring a fair trial for defendants 
demands that prosecutors freely disclose material that is 
helpful to the defense.  Consequently, making Brady 
disclosure depend on a prosecutor’s own assessment of 
evidentiary value, as opposed to the benefit to defense 
counsel, is anathema to the goals of fairness and justice 
motivating Brady.  
 
 The lead was not fruitless, it was simply not rigorously 
pursued.  Detectives did not interview Angela Frazier, who 
facilitated the three-way call and was on the phone when 
Brown confessed to the murder.  Detectives did not question 
Walker again—who admitted to having a bias against 
Frazier—after he stated that he did not know any Brown or 
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Skeet, nor did they attempt to verify Walker’s alibi on the day 
of the murder.  Detectives did not investigate the owner of the 
pawn shop where Brown purportedly sold Williams’s 
earrings.  Detectives did not obtain the photos of Brown, 
Skeet, and Walker that were in Frazier’s apartment.  
Detectives went to an incorrect address seeking information 
about Skeet and spoke with a woman named Janice Edelen, 
who said she did not know any man called Skeet.  Finally, 
detectives did not visit the addresses Frazier provided until 
ten years after the murder.  Armed with the Frazier 
documents, Dennis’s counsel would have been prepared to 
pursue the lead himself or at least informed the jury of the 
police’s misguided focus on Dennis and failure to pursue the 
lead.   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court grafted an 
admissibility requirement onto the traditional three-prong 
Brady inquiry when it rejected Dennis’s Brady claim as to the 
Frazier documents on the ground that he failed to 
affirmatively show that the documents were admissible.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s characterization of 
admissibility as dispositive under Brady was an unreasonable 
application of, and contrary to, clearly established law as 
defined by the United States Supreme Court.  
 
 The Commonwealth articulates the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision somewhat differently.  It argues 
that our role on habeas review is determining “whether, under 
Supreme Court precedent, it was objectively unreasonable for 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to reject Dennis’s claim that 
he only had to argue or allege that disclosure ‘might’ have 
affected his investigation or preparation for trial.”  Appellants 
Br. 74.  This framing incorrectly states what the Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court did in Dennis III.  It did not simply discount 
Dennis’s argument that defense counsel could have prepared 
differently had the documents been disclosed—it appended an 
admissibility requirement to Brady in contravention of clearly 
established law.   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited Wood v. 
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995), as attaching an 
admissibility requirement to Brady.  The United States 
Supreme Court’s holding in Wood compels the opposite 
conclusion, however.  The Supreme Court held in Wood that 
there was no Brady violation when the prosecution did not 
disclose the results of two polygraph examinations that were 
inadmissible at trial.  Wood, 516 U.S. at 6.  The Wood Court 
noted that Brady governs “evidence,” and that the polygraph 
results, since they were inadmissible under state law, were 
“not ‘evidence’ at all.”  Id. at 5–6.  However, under 
Washington law, polygraphic examinations cannot be 
admissible for any purpose at trial, even for impeachment 
purposes.  Id. at 5.  At most, the Court’s holding in Wood 
could support the proposition that evidence that cannot be 
used in any manner at trial under state law may be immaterial 
under Brady.  The holding does not reach so far as to allow 
state courts to attach a general admissibility requirement onto 
the Brady inquiry as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in 
Dennis III. 
 
 Further, the Wood Court analyzed the effect of 
suppressing the polygraph results, despite their 
uncontroverted inadmissibility.  After acknowledging their 
inadmissibility, the Wood Court proceeded to examine 
whether, if disclosed, the results would have led to the 
discovery of evidence that would have influenced the course 
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of trial, including pre-trial preparations.  See Wood, 516 U.S. 
at 7 (considering whether trial counsel would have prepared 
differently given the results, though ultimately concluding 
that disclosure would not have resulted in a different 
outcome).  The Supreme Court’s decision to continue its 
inquiry in light of wholly inadmissible alleged Brady material 
is telling.  As the District Court aptly observed, “[i]f 
inadmissible evidence could never form the basis of a Brady 
claim, the Court’s examination of the issue would have ended 
when it noted that the test results were inadmissible.”  Dennis 
V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 503.   
 
 The Supreme Court’s choice in Wood to consider the 
way in which suppression of the polygraph results affected 
preparation and trial aligns with the way in which materiality 
is discussed in Kyles.  Kyles makes clear that evidence is 
material under Brady when the defense could have used it to 
“attack the reliability of the investigation.”  514 U.S. at 446.  
As noted by the District Court, in Kyles, defense counsel 
could have used the information at issue “to throw the 
reliability of the investigation into doubt and to sully the 
credibility” of the lead detective.  Id. at 447.  The proper 
inquiry for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was to consider 
whether disclosure of the Frazier documents would have 
impacted the course of trial, which includes investigative 
activities.  Here, disclosure of the Frazier documents would 
have empowered defense counsel to pursue strategies and 
preparations he was otherwise unequipped to pursue.  
 
 Imposition of an admissibility requirement does not 
comport with the United States Supreme Court’s longstanding 
recognition that impeachment evidence may be favorable and 
material, and if so, is unquestionably subject to Brady 
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disclosure.  The Court stated definitively in Strickler that 
“[o]ur cases make clear that Brady’s disclosure requirements 
extend to materials that, whatever their other characteristics, 
may be used to impeach a witness.”  527 U.S. at 282 n.21 
(emphasis added).  As to both the first Brady prong, 
favorability, and the third Brady prong, materiality, the 
Supreme Court has held that impeachment evidence falls 
under Brady’s purview.  Id. at 281–82 (the evidence “must be 
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or 
because it is impeaching.”); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445 
(concluding that evidence was material because “the effective 
impeachment of one eyewitness can call for a new trial even 
though the attack does not extend directly to others”).  
Further, nearly all of the cases decided by the United States 
Supreme Court since Brady have dealt with impeachment 
evidence.  See Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016) (per 
curiam), Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195 (2012); Smith v. 
Cain,  132 S. Ct. 627 (2012); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 
(2009); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); 
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 
(1967).  It would be difficult to find stronger support for the 
proposition that admissibility is not a requirement under 
Brady, and the Supreme Court’s repeated consideration of 
impeachment material in Brady cases—without any 
reservation whatsoever—compels us to conclude that it is 
unreasonable to graft an admissibility requirement onto 
Brady’s traditional three-pronged inquiry. 
     
 Beyond the recognition that impeachment evidence is 
covered by Brady, the essence of the United States Supreme 
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Court’s Brady jurisprudence focuses on the benefits of 
disclosure to the defense, not admissibility.  This is evidenced 
by the definition of materiality itself.  Kyles provides that 
evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, 
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  514 U.S. at 433–
34 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of 
Blackmun, J.)) (emphasis added).  Quite simply, under Brady, 
the focus of the inquiry is on whether the information had 
“been disclosed to the defense,” not whether it was 
admissible at trial.  See id.  An admissibility requirement 
improperly shifts that focus.  
 
 The United States Supreme Court’s focus on 
disclosure is mirrored in the way in which it has applied the 
“reasonable probability” standard used to assess materiality 
under Brady.  When the Court has reviewed applications of 
the “reasonable probability” standard, it has weighed the 
strength of the suppressed evidence against the strength of 
disclosed evidence to evaluate its impact, not critiqued the 
character of the evidence itself.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 
290–94.  In Strickler, the Court denied a Brady claim on 
materiality grounds because “the record provides strong 
support for the conclusion that petitioner would have been 
convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, even if 
[an eyewitness] had been severely impeached.”  Id. at 294.  
Thus, the focus was on disclosure, given the effect of other 
available material, not the character of the material itself.  
 
 The Supreme Court’s later decision in Cone v. Bell 
similarly affirmed its longstanding focus on disclosure 
regardless of admissibility at trial.  There, the Court 
considered impeachment evidence including police bulletins, 
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statements contained in official reports, and FBI reports to be 
Brady material.  Cone, 556 U.S. at 470–71.  Neither the Sixth 
Circuit nor the District Court below fully considered whether 
the suppressed documents would have persuaded the jury to 
impose a lesser sentence.  Id. at 475 (“It is possible that the 
suppressed evidence, viewed cumulatively, may have 
persuaded the jury that Cone had a far more serious drug 
problem than the prosecution was prepared to acknowledge, 
and that Cone’s drug use played a mitigating, though not 
exculpating, role in the crimes he committed.”).  Cone held 
that the courts below had failed to “thoroughly review the 
suppressed evidence or consider what its cumulative effect on 
the jury would have been” regarding Cone’s sentence.  Id. at 
472.  By remanding the case for full consideration of the 
Brady claim despite the fact that the suppressed evidence was 
not necessarily admissible, the Court indicated that the 
admissibility of suppressed evidence ought not to change the 
materiality inquiry itself, which is understood as “a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”   Id. 
at 470, 476. 
 
 Our recent decision in Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117 
(3d Cir. 2013) further affirms the view that inadmissible 
evidence is often very material: 
 
[I]nadmissible evidence may be material if it 
could have led to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. Furthermore . . . we think that 
inadmissible evidence may be material if it 
could have been used effectively to impeach or 
corral witnesses during cross-examination. 
Thus, the admissibility of the evidence itself is 
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not dispositive for Brady purposes. Rather, the 
inquiry is whether the undisclosed evidence is 
admissible itself or could have led to the 
discovery of admissible evidence that could 
have made a difference in the outcome of the 
trial sufficient to establish a “reasonable 
probability” of a different result.  
 
Id. at 130 (citations omitted).  Here, however, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ignored how the United States 
Supreme Court has evaluated materiality and instead made 
inadmissibility a determinative factor, indeed, the 
determinative factor.   
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s characterization of 
admissibility as a separate, independent prong of Brady 
effectively added admissibility as a requirement.  This runs 
afoul of Supreme Court precedent.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court required “evidence sought under Brady be 
material and admissible.”  Dennis III, 950 A.2d at 968 
(emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has never added a 
fourth “admissibility” prong to Brady analysis.   Like the 
imposition of a due diligence prong, adding an admissibility 
prong would alter Brady’s traditional three-prong inquiry in a 
manner that the Supreme Court rejected in Williams.  See 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 393.  
 
 Most federal courts have concluded that suppressed 
evidence may be material for Brady purposes even where it is 
not admissible.  See United States v. Morales, 746 F.3d 310, 
314 (7th Cir. 2014) (listing cases).  However, the Seventh and 
Fourth Circuits have indicated that inadmissible evidence 
cannot be material.  Morales, 746 F.3d at 314; see also 
96 
 
Jardine v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Logically, inadmissible evidence is immaterial under [the 
Brady] rule”); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 
(4th Cir. 1996).  Jardine and Hoke involved evidence that 
was prohibited from being used under state evidence laws and 
their assertions regarding an admissibility requirement were 
not determinative to their holdings.  Jardine, 658 F.3d at 777 
(noting that the undisclosed material was inadmissible under 
state law and could not be used to impeach, but concluding 
that no Brady violation occurred only after evaluating other 
avenues through with the material could be used); Hoke, 92 
F.3d at 1355–56 (holding that the undisclosed information 
about the murder victim’s sexual history would not have been 
material in light of overwhelming physical and other evidence 
and resolving the case on grounds other than admissibility).  
Morales is similarly unpersuasive, as it observed that the 
Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have read Brady to include material but 
inadmissible evidence.  746 F.3d at 314.  The Morales court 
even conceded that “[w]e find the Court’s methodology in 
Wood to be more consistent with the majority view in the 
courts of appeals than with a rule that restricts Brady to 
formally admissible evidence.”  Id. at 315. 27   
                                              
 27 Although the United States Supreme Court recently 
recognized that circuit splits may indicate a possibility of fair-
minded disagreement under AEDPA, it did so where the 
circuit split emerged out of an express reservation left by the 
Supreme Court on the precise question decided by the state 
court.  In White v. Woodall, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
decided that a no-adverse inference instruction, required by 
the Fifth Amendment to protect a non-testifying defendant at 
the guilt phase, is not required at the penalty phase.  134 S. 
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 The Frazier documents were material under Brady.  
Dennis’s counsel could have used the information contained 
in the Frazier documents to challenge detectives at trial 
regarding their paltry investigation of the lead.  As we 
previously noted, the lead was “fruitless” because the 
Commonwealth failed to take sufficient action to determine if 
it was fruitful—the Commonwealth essentially abandoned it.  
The Commonwealth does not dispute that trial counsel could 
                                                                                                     
Ct. 1697, 1701 (2014) reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 2835 (2014).  
In so doing, the Kentucky Supreme Court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v. United States, 526 
U.S. 314 (1999), to support its denial.  Mitchell included an 
express reservation on the question the state court decided.  
See White, 134 S. Ct. at 1703.  In the wake of reservation in 
Mitchell, “[t]he Courts of Appeals . . . recognized 
that Mitchell left [the sentencing question] unresolved; their 
diverging approaches to the question illustrate the possibility 
of fairminded disagreement.”  White, 134 S. Ct. at 1703 n.3.  
Thus, the United States Supreme Court opined that the 
Kentucky Supreme Court’s rejection of respondent’s Fifth 
Amendment claim was not objectively unreasonable because 
there was an intentional lack of guidance from the Court.  The 
United States Supreme Court has made no such express 
reservations when it comes to Brady materiality or an 
admissibility requirement.  Consequently, to the extent that 
language from our sister circuits might be read to recognize a 
general admissibility requirement in Brady, we respectfully 
conclude that they have erred.  Discrepancies as to the 
interpretation of Wood ought not to substantiate the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s erroneous application of the 
Brady materiality standard in this case. 
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have used the information in the suppressed documents to 
question the detectives.  
 
 Further, had the Commonwealth not suppressed the 
Frazier documents, Dennis could have presented an “other 
person” defense at trial, which he was otherwise not able to 
do.  The Frazier documents bring to light that Walker 
admitted to going to Olney High School—the school 
Williams and Howard attended—and he recognized Williams 
from school.  Thus, the documents not only support an 
alternative shooter theory, but the very same alternative 
shooter theory that defense counsel could have been prepared 
to raise had the Howard activity sheet also been disclosed.  
Alterations in defense preparation and cross-examination at 
trial are precisely the types of qualities that make evidence 
material under Brady.  Consequently, it was unreasonable for 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to conclude that the Frazier 
documents were not material.  There is a reasonable 
probability that had the jury heard an “other person” defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably 
applied federal law and applied law in a manner contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent.  The Commonwealth’s suppression 
of the Frazier documents violated Brady as they were 
favorable to the defense, and could have been used by defense 
counsel as exculpatory and impeachment evidence.  Dennis is 
entitled to a new trial.  
  
 D. Cumulative Materiality 
  
 While the suppression of the Cason receipt, the 
Howard police activity sheet, and the Frazier documents 
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support ordering a new trial, the cumulative effect of their 
suppression commands it.  Had the Brady material been 
disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different, and its suppression 
undermines confidence in the verdict.   
 
 The District Court engaged in a cumulative materiality 
analysis in addition to granting each individual Brady claim.  
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18.  This analysis was 
proper.  When the issue ripened in Dennis IV and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have assessed the 
cumulative prejudice of withholding the Cason receipt, 
Frazier documents, and police activity sheet containing 
Howard’s statements, it declined to do so explicitly.  We are 
required to presume that the state court considered and 
rejected Dennis’s cumulative materiality argument.  Johnson 
v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097 (2013).  Just as the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejections of Dennis’s Brady 
claims constituted unreasonable application of federal law, its 
rejection of the cumulative materiality of the suppressed 
evidence, though not done explicitly, was an unreasonable 
application of Brady and its progeny.  
 
 The Supreme Court in Kyles instructed that the 
materiality of withheld evidence must be “considered 
collectively, not item by item.”  514 U.S. at 436.  The 
importance of cumulative prejudice cannot be overstated, as it 
stems from the inherent power held by the prosecution, which 
motivated Brady.  Id. at 437 (“[T]he prosecution . . . alone 
can know what is undisclosed[] [and] must be assigned the 
consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all 
such evidence and make disclosure when the point of 
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‘reasonable probability’ is reached.”).  The Supreme Court 
recently reiterated that state courts are required to evaluate the 
materiality of suppressed evidence cumulatively.  Wearry, 
136 S. Ct. at 1007 (“[T]he state postconviction court 
improperly evaluated the materiality of each piece of 
evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively.”) 
  
 As acknowledged by the District Court, the cumulative 
impeachment value of the suppressed evidence would have 
undermined the Commonwealth’s case.  The Cason receipt 
would have impeached the Commonwealth’s primary 
response to Dennis’s alibi by providing documentary proof 
that Cason testified falsely and would have transformed her 
into a witness for the defense. The inconsistent statement 
contained in the police activity sheet would have impeached 
Howard’s credibility, undoubtedly the Commonwealth’s most 
important eyewitness.  Her impeachment by the Pugh 
statement would challenge her credibility, not simply the 
reliability of her identification during the photo array and 
lineup, which was what defense counsel was limited to at 
trial.  Discrediting Cason and Howard may very well have 
raised sufficient doubt among the jury to acquit Dennis.  
Moreover, the Frazier documents could have supported the 
existence of another suspect who attended Howard’s high 
school, and the significance of this becomes even more 
pronounced when considered with Howard’s statements to the 
Pughs that the suspect attended her high school.  
  
 Together, the suppressed documents provided ample 
material to challenge the Commonwealth’s investigation 
following the murder.   As the District Court stated:  
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Defense would have had a strong case to make 
that the Commonwealth abandoned promising 
leads: Police failed to meet with Frazier’s aunt, 
to verify Walker's alibi, or to include Walker 
and Brown in photo arrays or line-ups; police 
also failed to follow up with Howard about the 
statement she allegedly made to the Pughs, to 
take a formal statement from the Pughs, or to 
interview Quinton. The Commonwealth 
allowed Cason to testify incorrectly that she 
worked until 2 p.m., and failed to investigate 
Dennis’[s] alibi given the actual timing of 
Cason’s activities. Discrediting the 
investigation is a crucial corollary to presenting 
an innocence/alibi defense: If the defense could 
lead the jury to believe that the Commonwealth 
conducted a shoddy investigation, the jury 
would have been more likely to listen to and 
believe Dennis’[s] alibi. 
 
Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 518.  The withholding of the 
Brady material would have given defense counsel unique 
ability to discredit the Commonwealth’s primary witnesses, 
bolster his alibi defense using objective documentary support 
from a disinterested party, highlight the shoddiness of the 
Commonwealth’s investigation, and perhaps point to another 
perpetrator.  The cumulative effect of the suppression of these 
documents requires habeas relief.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court and grant Dennis a conditional writ of 
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habeas corpus.  Petitioner shall be released unless the 
Commonwealth commences a new trial against him within 
ninety days after issuance of the mandate.   
1 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge, concurring.  
 
I. Introduction 
  
 More than three decades ago, Justice Brennan 
cautioned:  
 
[E]yewitness testimony is likely to be believed 
by jurors, especially when it is offered with a 
high level of confidence, even though the 
accuracy of an eyewitness and the confidence of 
that witness may not be related to one another at 
all. All the evidence points rather strikingly to 
the conclusion that there is almost nothing more 
convincing than a live human being who takes 
the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and 
says ‘That’s the one!’1 
 
James Dennis was sentenced to death because three 
eyewitnesses appeared at trial and confidently pointed their 
fingers at him when asked if they saw Chedell Williams’ killer 
in the courtroom. The prosecution later told the jury that if they 
believed these witnesses, they should convict James Dennis of 
first degree murder. And they did. 
  
 The Dissent would deny Dennis relief in large part 
because it believes that “the evidence against Dennis was 
strong.”2 According to the Dissent, “it is hard to discount the 
identification testimony of three eyewitnesses.”3 Yet, nearly 
half a century of scientific research teaches that eyewitness 
testimony can be one of the greatest causes of erroneous 
convictions. The jurors in Dennis’ trial, like many juries, were 
never properly instructed about the dangers of eyewitness 
identifications. The jury charge given in this case failed to 
equip them with the knowledge necessary to accurately assess 
the reliability of the three eyewitnesses who pointed their 
fingers at James Dennis and said, “He’s the one.” 
                                                 
1 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting 
Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 19 (1979)). 
2 Dissent at 1 (Fisher, J.). 
3 Id. 
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 I therefore write separately to underscore the problems 
inherent in eyewitness testimony and the inadequacies of our 
standard jury instructions relating to that evidence. Jury 
instructions must educate jurors on the relevant scientific 
findings regarding eyewitness reliability in order to mitigate 
the dangers associated with inaccurate eyewitness 
identifications. The standard instructions, which were used 
here, are not only insufficient, they are misleading. However, I 
join the Majority’s thoughtful explanation of why Dennis is 
entitled to relief under AEDPA’s stringent standard of review 
in its entirety.  
  
 In the last thirty years, over 2,000 studies have 
examined human memory and cognition and their relationship 
to the reliability of eyewitness identifications.4 This impressive 
body of scholarship and research has revealed that eyewitness 
accounts can be entirely untrustworthy. As the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police has concluded, “[o]f all 
investigative procedures employed by police in criminal cases, 
probably none is less reliable than the eyewitness 
identification.”5  
  
 Yet, the law has not caught up to the science. The 
Innocence Project has documented that, nationwide, 
eyewitness misidentifications have been a factor in seventy-
five percent of the wrongful convictions that were 
subsequently overturned by DNA evidence.6 One of the most 
                                                 
4 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 892 (N.J. 2011), holding 
modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011); Charles 
A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for 
Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense 
Stress, 27 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 265, 265 (2004). 
5 Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Training Key No. 600: 
Eyewitness Identification 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.ripd.org/Documents/APPENDIX/2/Supporting%2
0Materials/IP%20113%20IACP%202006.pdf. 
6 The Innocence Project, Reevaluating Lineups: Why 
Witnesses Make Mistakes and How to Reduce the Chance of a 
Misidentification 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/eyewitness_id_report-5.pdf; see also 
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powerful and prominent examples of such a wrongful 
conviction is the story of Ronald Cotton and Jennifer 
Thompson. In July 1984, a man broke into Thompson’s 
apartment and raped her at knife point.7 When shown a photo 
array three days later, Thompson tepidly selected Cotton as her 
attacker.8 “I think this is the guy,”9 she said, pointing to 
Cotton’s photo. The lead detective then asked her if she was 
sure, and she responded, “Positive.”10 But belying her 
professed certainty, she then asked the detective, “Did I do 
OK?”11 He reassured her, “You did great.”12 About a month 
later, Thompson viewed a live lineup, in which Cotton was the 
only one repeated from the prior photo array.13 When 
Thompson positively identified Cotton from that lineup, she 
stated that she was certain he was the one who had attacked 
her.14 Cotton was then arrested and charged with one count of 
rape. At his trial, Thompson testified that she was “absolutely 
                                                 
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal 
Prosecutions Go Wrong 8-9, 279 (2011) (finding same in 190 
of 250 DNA exoneration cases); Brief for Am. Psychol. Ass’n 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14-15, Perry v. 
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (“[S]tudies have 
consistently found that the rate of inaccurate identifications is 
roughly 33 percent.”). 
7 60 Minutes, Eyewitness: How Accurate is Visual Memory?, 
CBS News, Mar. 6, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eyewitness-how-accurate-is-
visual-memory. 
8 Id. 
9 Committee on Scientific Approaches to Understanding and 
Maximizing the Validity and Reliability of Eyewitness 
Identification in Law Enforcement and the Courts, Committee 
on Science, Technology, and Law, Committee on Law and 
Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and 
Education, National Research Council, Identifying the 
Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 10 (2014). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id.; 60 Minutes, supra. 
14 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 10.  
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sure” that Cotton was her rapist.15 There was no corroboration 
of her identification, and she admitted that she had not been 
wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the attack.16 Nonetheless, 
a jury convicted Cotton on the strength of Thompson’s positive 
identification.17 Cotton was sentenced to life in prison plus 
fifty-four years.18  
  
 The story does not end there. In prison, Cotton learned 
that a fellow inmate named Bobby Poole had admitted raping 
Thompson to another inmate. Based on this information, 
Cotton managed to win a new trial.19 At that retrial, Thompson 
had an opportunity to view Poole. Her reaction: “I have never 
seen him in my life.”20 As Thompson later recounted in an 
interview about the case, when she was asked to look at Poole 
during Cotton’s second trial, she was angry: “I thought, ‘how 
dare you. How dare you question me? How dare you try to 
paint me as someone who could possibly have forgotten what 
my rapist looked like, I mean, the one person you would never 
forget. How dare you.’”21  
  
 Based on Thompson’s unequivocal affirmation of her 
identification of Cotton, he was once again convicted. He 
served over a decade in prison before DNA tests finally 
confirmed that Cotton was innocent and Poole was, in fact, the 
rapist.22 As one legal commentator described this case, “[t]he 
fallibility of eyewitness testimony and the malleability of 
memory could not be clearer, as here a crime victim had seen 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Jules Epstein, Eyewitnesses and Erroneous Convictions: An 
American Conundrum, in Controversies in Innocence Cases 
in America 41, 43 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014). 
17 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 10. 
18 Id. 
19 Epstein, supra, at 43.  
20 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 10. 
21 60 Minutes, supra. 
22 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 10. 
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the scientifically proven perpetrator but instead saw Cotton’s 
face as that of her assailant.”23 
  
 As I will elaborate below when I discuss the even more 
remarkable story of John White’s erroneous conviction, 
Cotton’s story cannot readily be dismissed as a fluke. 
Moreover, problems of erroneous identification remain even 
where more than one eyewitness identifies the same person as 
the perpetrator. In thirty-eight percent of misidentification 
cases documented by the Innocence Project, multiple 
eyewitnesses misidentified the same innocent person. 24 
Almost without exception, eyewitnesses who identify the 
wrong person express complete confidence that they chose the 
real perpetrators.25  
  
 We should therefore find precious little solace in the 
fact that three eyewitnesses fingered James Dennis. As I will 
discuss, the procedures used to elicit the identifications of 
Dennis and the circumstances surrounding the crime raise 
serious questions about the accuracy of those identifications. 
The voluminous studies conducted on the subjects of memory 
and eyewitness identifications make it painfully clear that 
many of the identification procedures used in this case were 
inconsistent with the fundamental concept of neutral inquiry. 
As a result, these identifications lack many of the basic indicia 
of reliability. Yet, the jury that convicted Dennis was 
completely unaware of these problems. In addition, the jurors 
were never even informed that five other eyewitnesses, with 
similar or better opportunities to observe the shooting, either 
could not identify Dennis as Chedell Williams’ killer or 
identified someone else. Accordingly, the three courtroom 
identifications do little to assuage my concerns about the 
reliability of the identification testimony that the jury 
considered. Rather, I cannot help but wonder if an innocent 
man may have spent more than two decades on death row. 
  
 It is as obvious as it is tragic that mistaken 
identifications have disastrous effects for the unjustly accused. 
                                                 
23 Epstein, supra, at 43 (citation omitted). 
24 The Innocence Project, Reevaluating Lineups, supra, at 3. 
25 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 11. 
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That is particularly true where—as here—the death penalty is 
imposed. But wrongful convictions are not the only 
consequence of our continued failure to incorporate the 
teachings of scientific research into judicial proceedings. 
Mistaken identifications “also erode public confidence in the 
criminal justice system as a whole.”26 In addition, when 
someone is wrongfully convicted, the real perpetrator remains 
free to victimize again. Thus, this is an issue of far-reaching 
importance to the defense, prosecutors, police departments, as 
well as to judges: All have an interest in minimizing the 
possibility of erroneous identifications. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court accurately described the situation in its 
landmark decision discussing eyewitness identifications: “At 
stake is the very integrity of the criminal justice system and the 
courts’ ability to conduct fair trials.”27  
  
 Before I begin my discussion of the science as applied 
to this case, I want to emphasize that my point here is not to 
cast aspersions on the motives of the police or prosecutors 
involved in this investigation or to insinuate that they 
intentionally used suggestive procedures to convict Dennis. On 
the contrary, I have no reason to believe they were motivated 
by anything other than a sincere desire to bring the killer of 
Chedell Williams to justice. The science surrounding 
eyewitness identifications and reliability was simply not as 
well-understood at the time of Dennis’ investigation and trial 
as it is today.  
 
II. The Identifications 
 
A. The Crime 
 
As the Majority recounts and the Dissent emphasizes, 
the shooting at issue here occurred in broad daylight, at the 
intersection of Tenth Street and Nedro Avenue, in 
Philadelphia. This intersection is adjacent to the Fern Rock 
                                                 
26 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 22 (citing Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, National Summit 
on Wrongful Convictions: Building a Systemic Approach to 
Prevent Wrongful Convictions (2013)). 
27 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 879 (N.J. 2011), holding 
modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.3d 930 (N.J. 2011). 
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SEPTA station, where steps lead up to a ticketing office. On 
October 22, 1991, Chedell Williams and her friend Zahra 
Howard walked up these steps so that Williams could purchase 
a SEPTA Transpass. As they climbed the steps on opposite 
sides of a railing that extended up the middle, two men 
approached them head on. A man with a red sweat suit—whom 
witnesses later uniformly described as the shooter—initially 
approached Howard on her side of the railing and demanded 
her earrings. The women fled, and Howard managed to hide 
behind a nearby fruit stand while the man in the red sweat suit 
pursued Williams into the intersection of Tenth and Nedro. 
Howard later stated that, up until that point, she had not seen a 
gun. Howard watched as the man in the red struggled to take 
Williams’ earrings, pulled her close to him, and shot her in the 
neck with a “silver revolver.”28 Williams fell to the ground, and 
both men ran north on Tenth Street. 
 
Five other witnesses gave similar accounts of the 
shooting in police interviews conducted the day of the murder. 
First, James Cameron, a SEPTA cashier, stated that he was 
standing at Tenth Street and Nedro Avenue, chatting with 
another SEPTA employee, when he saw a man grab Williams 
in the street, pull out a “dull silver gun,” and shoot her.29 
 
As the two perpetrators fled, they ran past Anthony 
Overstreet and Thomas Bertha. Overstreet and Bertha were 
working on a house on North Tenth Street, near the intersection 
where the shooting occurred. After hearing screaming 
followed by a gunshot, both men saw Williams fall to the 
ground as the two perpetrators ran directly toward them. Both 
Overstreet and Bertha observed the man in the red sweat suit 
holding a chrome-plated gun in his hand.  
 
Overstreet’s initial interview with police is particularly 
important because he expressed confidence that he would be 
able to identify the shooter if he saw him again. Overstreet was 
about six feet from the perpetrators as they ran past him. In his 
interview, he recounted that they “both looked right in my 
face” as they fled.30 Moreover, Overstreet told officers that “he 
                                                 
28 J.A. 1495. 
29 J.A. 1496. 
30 J.A. 1494. 
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would definitely be able to identify them” because “he ha[d] 
seen the man with the red hooded jumpsuit who had the gun 
before.”31 Overstreet then explained that he might have known 
the shooter from the “area of Broad & Clearview St[reets] 
where he used to hang.”32 He later clarified that he thought he 
had seen the shooter at a house where Overstreet used to smoke 
cocaine, and he gave the police the address of that house. 
 
Another eyewitness who expressed confidence he could 
identify the shooter was George Ritchie. At the time of the 
shooting, Ritchie was repairing a car on Tenth Street. “He 
heard 2 [black men] hollering and running away from the train 
station and towards him in the middle of 10th St.”33 Ritchie 
was about twenty-five feet away from them and “saw them 
clearly.”34 He told police that “he did get a good look at these 
two [black males] and can identify them if he sees them 
again.”35 
  
 Another eyewitness, Clarence Verdell, had an 
opportunity to view the perpetrators immediately prior to the 
shooting and provided the police with a detailed description of 
the accomplice’s face. Verdell saw the perpetrators as they 
initially chased Williams and Howard down the ticketing 
office steps. A moment later, Verdell heard what sounded like 
a firecracker. He then turned and saw Williams fall to the 
ground. Verdell never saw the gun and had never seen either 
the girls or the males before. He told his interviewer that he 
would be able to recognize the accomplice, but did not get a 
good look at the shooter. 
 
Finally, police interviewed David LeRoy, a vendor who 
sold hot dogs at Tenth and Nedro. He stated that he saw the 
shooter pull Williams toward him and kill her. He noted that 
the shooter had on a red hat, pulled down to his eyes. 
  
 Two weeks after the crime, the police interviewed a fruit 
vendor and his son, Joseph DiRienzo and Joseph DiRienzo, Jr. 
                                                 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 J.A. 1493. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
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They had also been present at the murder scene and echoed the 
description of the crime provided by the other witnesses. 
 
B. The Photo Arrays 
 
A few days after the shooting, the police heard rumors 
that James Dennis might have been the shooter, and they 
decided to show witnesses photo arrays containing his picture. 
The detectives compiled three arrays of eight photographs 
each. Dennis’ picture was placed in the first position of the first 
array, and police used this array to solicit an identification of 
the shooter (the second array was used to attempt identification 
of the accomplice, and the third was shown thereafter to offer 
the witnesses one more opportunity to identify a suspect). At 
trial, Detective Manuel Santiago explained how he compiled 
the array: he used the “most recent photo”36 that he could find 
of Dennis and then “went into [police] files and obtained 
photos of young black males, which would not be too unlike 
the photo of Mr. James Dennis.”37 When Detective Santiago 
showed the witnesses the arrays, he instructed them: “I’m 
going to show you a photograph spread with eight photos. See 
if you recognize anyone.”38  
 
Only four of the nine eyewitnesses could make any 
identification from the arrays: Zahra Howard, Thomas Bertha, 
Anthony Overstreet, and James Cameron indicated that Dennis 
“look[ed] familiar.”39 However, none of these witnesses was 
initially certain about their “identifications.” For example, 
when Detective Santiago showed Howard the arrays, she 
pointed to Dennis and stated, “[t]his one looks like the guy, but 
I can’t be sure.”40 Detective Santiago next showed the same 
spreads to James Cameron. When asked if he recognized 
anyone, Cameron stated, “#1 looks familiar but I can’t be 
sure.”41 When provided the same arrays, Bertha pointed to 
Dennis and stated, “[t]hat looks like the one that was running 
                                                 
36 J.A. 165. 
37 Id. 
38 J.A. 161. 
39 J.A. 1548. 
40 J.A. 1537. 
41 J.A. 1548. 
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with the gun.”42 Santiago probed further: “Can you be sure that 
photo #1 is the male that you saw get away from the girl and 
run at you with the gun after the gunshot?”43 It was then that 
Bertha replied, “Yes I can.”44 Detective Santiago’s follow-up 
question and Bertha’s response bear an eerie resemblance to 
the follow-up question asked of Jennifer Thompson (“Are you 
sure?”) after her response (“Positive”) following her initial 
tentative selection of Ronald Cotton from a photo array. 
 
A different detective showed Anthony Overstreet the 
arrays. After Overstreet had reviewed the first array, the 
detective asked “[i]s there anyone in these photos that you can 
identify?”45 Overstreet replied: “Yes, in the first set of photos, 
#1 looks like the male who shot the girl.”46 The detective then 
asked Overstreet to repeat his identification: “The male that 
you identified, is he the male you saw running up the street 
with the gun?” “Yes he is,” Overstreet confirmed.47 Thus, 
when asked about the male that he had “identified,” Overstreet 
moved from saying that Dennis’ picture “looked like” the 
shooter to affirming that Dennis “is” the shooter. This may, at 
first, appear to be a meaningless distinction that is nothing 
more than innocuous reply to a simple follow-up question. 
However, as I will discuss in greater detail below, such subtle, 
and seemingly innocent, probes can sow seeds that blossom 
into certain, albeit inaccurate, identifications.48  
 
Significantly, none of the remaining five eyewitnesses 
selected Dennis from the photo arrays. When a detective 
showed Verdell the spreads, he stated, “The best I can say is 
it’s either #1, #5, or #8. I concentrated more on the male that 
was directly behind Chedell and I believe him to be the 
accomplice.”49 Verdell returned to the police station a few days 
later to reexamine the photos. The second time around, he 
stated “it would be either #1 or #8 who was the [shooter]. I lean 
                                                 
42 J.A. 1555. 
43 J.A. 1556. 
44 Id. 
45 J.A. 1565. 
46 Id. 
47 J.A. 1566. 
48 See infra Part III.A.4. 
49 J.A. 1576. 
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more towards #1 because of the build of the male but he 
definitely doesn’t have that cut of hair now. I definitely do not 
remember him having his hair cut that way.”50 Neither David 
LeRoy nor either of the DiRienzos identified Dennis from the 
arrays. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth denies that police ever 
showed George Ritchie a photo array. Ritchie vigorously 
disputes this claim. In 2005, Ritchie testified at Dennis’ Post-
Conviction Relief hearing that officers showed him an array 
during their investigation but became frustrated when Ritchie 
was unable to identify the shooter from the photos. Assuming 
arguendo that the Commonwealth’s claim regarding Ritchie is 
true, that means that the police and prosecution did not attempt 
to learn if Ritchie would have identified Dennis or someone 
else as the shooter even though Ritchie had initially expressed 
confidence in his ability to identify the shooter. 
 
C. The Lineup 
 
 On December 19, 1991, about a month and a half after 
the police showed the witnesses the photo arrays, officers 
conducted an in-person lineup involving Dennis and five 
fillers. Fillers are non-suspects who are added to the line-up to 
provide the witnesses with choices. Although Dennis’ attorney 
requested that all eyewitnesses be present, only the witnesses 
who had identified Dennis from the photo array (Howard, 
Cameron, Bertha, and Overstreet) participated.  
 
 The police had those four witnesses view the lineup at 
the same time, in the same room. Accordingly, nothing 
prevented the witnesses from observing each other’s reactions. 
As I elaborate below, studies consistently caution against 
conducting a lineup in this fashion.51 At trial, one of the 
officers that helped conduct the lineup, Detective William 
Wynn, testified that the following instructions were given to 
the four witnesses:  
 
We’re going to view a lineup of six men. They’ll 
be numbered from one through six from your left 
                                                 
50 J.A. 1581. 
51 See infra Part III.A.4. 
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to your right. . . . I want you to look at each man 
carefully, see if you can identify any of these 
men as being involved in your incident. If you 
can identify any of these men, just remember the 
number of the man that you can identify, and 
when we’re through looking at all six men, I’ll 
order them out of this viewing area or box, as we 
call it. At that time I will call you outside of the 
lineup room, one at a time by name, and ask you 
as to whether or not you can make an 
identification. If you can, just tell me the number 
of the man that you can identify. If you can’t, 
simply tell that you cannot. It’s important that 
while you’re in the lineup room, there will be no 
pointing, talking, shouting or displaying of 
emotions so as not to influence one another’s 
decision. It will be important to you not only this 
evening but also at a later date.52 
 
After the witnesses viewed each person in the lineup, the police 
called them out of the room, one by one, and asked if they 
could make an identification. 
 
 Cameron and Bertha identified Dennis. Howard pointed 
out Dennis, but was less sure, stating only “I think it was 
[him].”53 Overstreet—the witness who initially expressed the 
most confidence in his ability to identify the shooter due to his 
alleged prior exposure to him—identified an entirely different 
person from the lineup. 
 
D. In-Court Identifications 
 
 At Dennis’ trial over a year later, the prosecution called 
only the three witnesses who had picked him from the photo 
arrays and lineup. When asked whether Chedell Williams’ 
killer was in the courtroom, Bertha, Cameron, and Howard 
each confidently pointed to Dennis, even though all three had 
expressed doubt in their earlier identifications. 
 
III. The Science of Eyewitness Identifications 
                                                 
52 J.A. 226-27. 
53 J.A. 228-29. 
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 As I noted at the outset, we have long known that 
eyewitness identifications are not always as reliable as 
witnesses (and jurors) may believe them to be. In 1927, long 
before the explosion of research in this area, Justice Felix 
Frankfurter wrote: “[t]he hazards of [eyewitness identification] 
testimony are established by a formidable number of instances 
in the records of English and American trials.”54 In 1932, well 
before the availability of DNA analysis, Yale Law professor 
Edwin M. Borchard documented almost seventy cases 
involving eyewitness errors that caused miscarriages of 
justice.55 Over thirty years later, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged this problem in United States v. Wade.56 There, 
the Court famously proclaimed that “[t]he vagaries of 
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of 
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification.”57  
 
 In the ensuing decades, the scientific community has 
made significant strides in understanding this phenomenon.58 
A combination of basic and applied research on human visual 
perception and cognition has revealed that the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications is largely contingent on the 
conditions under which memories are created, stored, and then 
                                                 
54 Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti: A 
Critical Analysis for Lawyers and Laymen 30 (Universal 
Library ed., 1962). 
55 Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent; Sixty-Five 
Actual Errors of Criminal Justice (1932). 
56 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
57 Id. at 228. 
58 See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Nancy K. Steblay, & Jennifer E. 
Dysart, Double-Blind Photo Lineups Using Actual 
Eyewitnesses: An Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus 
Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39 L. & Hum. Behav. 1, 1 
(2015); Laura Smalarz & Gary L. Wells, Contamination of 
Eyewitness Self-Reports and the Mistaken-Identification 
Problem, 24 Current Directions Psychol. 120, 120 (2015); 
Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: 
The Eyewitness, Psychology, and the Law (1995); Eyewitness 
Testimony: Psychological Perspectives (Gary L. Wells & 
Elizabeth A. Loftus eds., 1984). 
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later recalled. “At its core, eyewitness identification relies on 
brain systems for visual perception and memory: The witness 
perceives the face and other aspects of the perpetrator’s 
physical appearance and bearing, stores that information in 
memory, and later retrieves the information for comparison 
with the visual percept of an individual in a lineup.”59 Research 
has shown that certain variables can impact the processes of 
these memory functions with serious implications for the 
reliability of the subsequent memories. These variables 
generally fall into two basic categories: system variables and 
estimator variables.  
 
A. System Variables 
 
 System variables are the procedures and practices law 
enforcement use to elicit eyewitness identifications.60 
Examples of system variables include the instructions law 
enforcement officers give to witnesses when they ask them to 
provide identifications, the comments of police to witnesses 
during the identification process, and the types of procedures 
(lineup, photo array, etc.) used to solicit the identification. 
These factors are important not only because they heavily 
influence the reliability of identifications, but also because they 
largely lie within the exclusive control of the criminal justice 
system. The following section explores a few critical system 
variables and their effects on the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications.  
 
1. Blinded versus Non-Blinded Procedures 
 
 One of the most important system variables that law 
enforcement can control is the blinding of identification 
procedures.61 Blinding occurs when the officer administering 
an identification procedure, such as a photo array, knows who 
the suspect is but cannot determine when the witness is 
                                                 
59 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 14-15. 
60 See id. at 16, 72, 76. 
61 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896-97 (N.J. 2011), 
holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011); 
National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 
24-25, 26. 
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viewing the suspect’s photo. “In one common ‘blinded’ 
procedure, the officer places each photo in a separate envelope 
or folder and then shuffles the envelopes/folders so that only 
the witness sees the images therein.”62 This blinding can also 
be doubled: for example, when an officer who neither knows 
the suspect’s identity nor position in the photo array shows the 
array to an eyewitness. Such blinding is used to prevent the 
officer from giving the witness conscious or unconscious cues 
that can affect the witness’ identification.63  
 
 Common sense suggests that identification procedures 
administered without some degree of blinding are inherently 
untrustworthy, and research confirms this.64 Typically, the 
greater the level of blinding, the more reliable the procedure. 
One of the foremost experts on eyewitness identifications has 
concluded that blind lineup administration is “the single most 
important characteristic that should apply to eyewitness 
identification.”65 Social psychologists believe this is crucial to 
avoiding the “expectancy effect”: “the tendency for 
experimenters to obtain results they expect . . . because they 
have helped to shape that response through their 
expectations.”66 In a seminal meta-analysis of 345 studies 
across eight broad categories of behavioral research, 
researchers found that “[t]he overall probability that there is no 
such thing as interpersonal expectancy effects is near zero.”67 
“Even seemingly innocuous words and subtle cues—pauses, 
gestures, hesitations, or smiles—can influence a witness’ 
behavior.”68 Moreover, the witness usually remains completely 
                                                 
62 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 25. 
63 Id. at 25.  
64 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896-97; National Research 
Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 24-25, 26. 
65 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
66 Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Interpersonal 
Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies, 3 Behav. & Brain 
Sci. 377, 377 (1978). 
67 Id. 
68 Henderson, 27 A.3d 896 (citing Ryann M. Haw & Ronald 
P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on 
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. Applied Psychol. 
16 
 
unaware of the signals she has been given or their effect on her 
identification.  
 
 Outside the realm of law enforcement, in scientific 
experiments for instance, it is standard practice to use blinding. 
The importance of blind administration is so great that a failure 
to implement such a policy can affect even seemingly objective 
processes, such as the analysis of DNA samples. In one 
experiment, researchers gave seventeen experienced DNA 
analysts a mixed sample of DNA evidence from an actual 
crime scene—a gang rape committed in Georgia.69 All 
seventeen analysts worked at the same accredited government 
laboratory in the United States.70 Years earlier, prosecutors had 
relied on this evidence to convict a man named Kerry 
Robinson.71 In the real investigation, two analysts from the 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation concluded that Robinson 
“could not be excluded” as a suspect based on his DNA profile 
relative to the crime scene sample.72 Nevertheless, of the 
seventeen analysts involved in the study of this case, only one 
agreed that Robinson “could not be excluded.”73 Four analysts 
found that the evidence was inconclusive, and the other twelve 
said he could be excluded.74 All seventeen analysts were 
blinded to contextual information about the case.75 Experts 
speculated that a failure to blind the DNA testing in the real 
investigation could explain the inconsistency between the 
results the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and the seventeen 
independent analysts obtained. “The difference between you 
giving them the data and saying ‘what do you make of it?’ and 
                                                 
1106, 1107 (2004) and Steven E. Clark, Tanya E. Marshall, & 
Robert Rosenthal, Lineup Administrator Influences on 
Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J. Experimental 
Psychol.: Applied 63, 66-73 (2009)). 
69 Linda Geddes, Fallible DNA Evidence Can Mean Prison or 
Freedom, 2773 The New Scientist: Special Report 1, 5 
(2010). 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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the local district attorney giving them the data and saying 
‘We’ve arrested someone, is his profile in here?’ is huge.”76  
 
 The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of 
such cues for decades. In 1967, in United States v. Wade, the 
Court ruled that a pretrial lineup is a “critical stage” of 
prosecution at which a defendant had a right to the presence of 
counsel.77 The Court explained:  
 
The fact that the police themselves have, in a 
given case, little or no doubt that the man put up 
for identification has committed the offense, and 
that their chief pre-occupation is with the 
problem of getting sufficient proof, because he 
has not “come clean,” involves a [] danger that 
this persuasion may communicate itself even in 
a doubtful case to the witness in some way.78 
 
The importance of conscious and unconscious police 
persuasion cannot be overstated in the context of a trial because 
it negates the effect that strenuous cross-examination may 
otherwise have on the witness’ confidence in her identification. 
“[E]ven though cross-examination is a precious safeguard to a 
fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute assurance of 
accuracy and reliability.”79 Obviously, if an eyewitness is 
completely unaware that her identification has been shaped by 
subliminal cues communicated by investigators, it is incredibly 
difficult, if not impossible, to dissuade that witness of the 
accuracy of her identification. As was true for Jennifer 
Thompson in the rape case discussed earlier, vigorous cross-
examination may serve only to reinforce the witness’ certainty 
of her identification.80 The Supreme Court recognized in Wade 
that once a pretrial identification is made, the identifying 
witness becomes “the sole jury.”81 Thus, “[t]he trial which 
                                                 
76 Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). 
78 Id. at 235 (internal alterations, quotation marks, and 
citation omitted). 
79 Id. 
80 See 60 Minutes, supra. 
81 Wade, 388 U.S. at 235. 
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might determine the accused’s fate may well not be that in the 
courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation.”82 
  
 None of the identifications in Dennis’ case were 
obtained through processes that included blinding. The officers 
who showed the photo arrays and conducted the lineup knew 
that Dennis was the suspect, and they knew his position in the 
arrays and in the lineup. As the above studies make clear, it is 
entirely possible that the officers investigating Williams’ 
killing gave the witnesses unconscious cues about their 
suspicions. Dennis’ jurors would have been in a far better 
position to assess the reliability of the three courtroom 
identifications had they been informed of the importance of 
blinding procedures and their absence here.  
 
2. Pre-Identification Instructions 
 
 The instructions police give witnesses prior to 
attempting to elicit an identification constitute a second 
important system variable. There is broad consensus that police 
must instruct witnesses that the suspect may not be in the lineup 
or array and that the witness should not feel compelled to 
identify anyone.83 In two meta-analyses, researchers found that 
providing this information to witnesses in advance 
significantly increased the reliability of the results in target-
absent lineups.84 In one study, the number of people that chose 
innocent fillers in target-absent lineups increased by forty-five 
percent when the lineup administrators failed to tell the 
subjects that they need not choose a suspect.85 
 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 897 (N.J. 2011), holding 
modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011). 
84 See Steven E. Clark, A Re-examination of the Effects of 
Biased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification, 29 
Law & Hum. Behav. 395, 418-20 (2005); Nancy M. Steblay, 
Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Lineup Instruction Effects, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 
283, 285-86, 294 (1997). 
85 See Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness 
Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the 
Offender, 66 J. Applied Psychol. 482, 485 (1981). 
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 One hardly needs to engage in a protracted review of the 
wealth of data on this point to appreciate its implications. 
Without such instructions, witnesses may misidentify innocent 
suspects merely because they assume the suspect is present and 
the person misidentified bears the strongest resemblance to the 
actual perpetrator. Research confirms this.86 It is therefore 
critical that courts inform jurors of this system variable where 
present. Such information enables jurors to consider the impact 
that the absence of such instructions may have had on witness 
identifications.  
 
 The record in Dennis’ case shows that the investigators 
failed to give such instructions to the witnesses. Accordingly, 
there is a real risk that the witnesses identified Dennis because 
he most closely resembled Williams’ killer. Indeed, that is a 
fair interpretation of this record. Upon seeing Dennis’ photo, 
Howard did not say “that’s him,” or “I think this is the shooter.” 
Instead, she tentatively told officers: “This one looks like the 
guy, but I can’t be sure.”87 Like Howard, Bertha and Cameron 
also initially responded to these arrays in a manner that 
strongly suggests that they selected Dennis because his 
photograph bore a closer resemblance to the shooter than any 
of the fillers. They qualified their selection of Dennis by 
saying: “Number 1 looks familiar but I can’t be sure”88; and 
“that looks like the one that was running with the gun.”89 It 
simply cannot be assumed that either statement was the 
equivalent of proclaiming: “that’s him,” or “he’s the one.” 
  
3. Photo Array and Lineup Construction 
 
 Researchers have also found that the way that a photo 
array or live lineup is constructed can affect the reliability of 
the resulting identifications. A number of considerations are 
critical. First, not surprisingly, mistaken identifications are 
more likely where the suspect stands out in comparison to the 
                                                 
86 See Clark, Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions, supra, at 
421; Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall, supra, at 
284. 
87 J.A. 1537 (emphasis added). 
88 J.A. 1548 (emphasis added). 
89 J.A. 1555 (emphasis added). 
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fillers.90 Using fillers that are relative look-alikes forces a 
witness to examine her memory, whereas placing the suspect 
among a group of individuals that bear little resemblance to 
him causes him to stand out. “[A] biased lineup may [also] 
inflate a witness’ confidence in the identification because the 
selection process seemed easy.”91 As of yet, there is no clear 
agreement among researchers about whether fillers should 
more closely resemble a witness’ pre-lineup description of the 
suspect or the actual suspect.92 However, whether the fillers 
more closely resemble the suspect or the witness’ pre-lineup 
description, the fillers’ appearances should not make the 
suspect stand out. 
 
 Second, all lineups should include a minimum of five 
fillers.93 The logic here, which appears to be a matter of general 
agreement, is again clear: the greater the number of choices, 
the less the chance of making a lucky guess, and the more the 
                                                 
90 See Roy S. Malpass, Colin G. Tredoux, & Dawn 
McQuiston-Surrett, Lineup Construction and Lineup 
Fairness, in 2 The Handbook of Eyewitnesses Psychology 
155, 156-58 (2007). 
91 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 898 (N.J. 2011), holding 
modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011) (citing 
David F. Ross et al., When Accurate and Inaccurate 
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Psychol. 677, 687 (2007) and Gary L. Wells & Amy L. 
Bradfield, Measuring the Goodness of Lineups: Parameter 
Estimation, Question Effects, and Limits to the Mock Witness 
Paradigm, 13 Applied Cognitive Psychol. S27, S30 (1999)). 
92 Compare Steven E. Clark & Jennifer L. Tunnicliff, 
Selecting Lineup Foils in Eyewitness Identification 
Experiments: Experimental Control and Real-World 
Simulation, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 199, 212 (2001), and Gary 
L. Wells, Sheila M. Rydell, & Eric P. Seelau, The Selection of 
Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 
835, 842 (1993), with Stephen Darling, Tim Valentine, & 
Amina Memon, Selection of Lineup Foils in Operational 
Contexts, 22 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 159, 165-67 (2008). 
93 See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eyewitness 
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 29 (1999). 
21 
 
witness is forced to rely on her own memory to identify the 
suspect.  
 
 Third, for similar reasons, lineups should not feature 
more than one suspect. In its landmark decision on the issue of 
eyewitness identification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
emphasized that, “if multiple suspects are in the lineup, the 
reliability of a positive identification is difficult to assess, for 
the possibility of ‘lucky’ guesses is magnified.”94  
 
 The trial judge here noted that the composition of the 
lineup was somewhat suggestive because Dennis was slightly 
shorter than the rest of the participants, causing him to stand 
out. The jurors were therefore able to consider this disparity as 
they evaluated the reliability of the identifications. However, 
the court did not provide the jury with an explanation of how 
this may have affected the witnesses’ identifications of Dennis 
in that lineup. Nor did it give the jurors information that would 
allow them to consider the lineup construction in context with 
all of the other factors that were involved in the identifications 
of Dennis.  
 
4. Interactions with Witnesses: Witness Feedback 
 
 Another critical system variable is whether law 
enforcement provides a witness with any feedback or other 
information in the course of her identification. As I touched on 
in my discussion of blinding procedures, “[t]he nature of law 
enforcement interactions with the eyewitness before, during, 
and after the identification plays a role in the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications and in the confidence expressed in 
the accuracy of those identifications by witnesses.”95 Elizabeth 
Loftus, a pioneering researcher in the field of human memory 
and cognition, has thoroughly documented the effects of 
received information on memory accuracy. In one study, she 
                                                 
94 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
95 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 91 (citing Steven. E. Clark, Tanya E. Marshall, & Robert 
Rosenthal, Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness 
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showed college students a video of a car crash on a country 
road.96 Afterward, she asked them to estimate how fast the car 
was going. Half the students were asked how fast the car was 
going when it “passed the barn” along the country road; the 
other half were simply asked how fast the car was going “along 
the country road.”97 A week later, she asked the same students 
whether they had seen a barn in the film. Approximately 
seventeen percent of the students who were given the “passed 
the barn” cue recalled seeing the barn in the video.98 In 
contrast, less than three percent of the non-barn cue group 
remembered a barn.99 In reality, there was no barn in the 
video.100 This demonstrates the very subtle—yet extremely 
powerful—effect statements at the time of memory recall can 
have. 
 
 In the eyewitness identification context, such 
information often comes in the form of pre- or post-
identification information that may reinforce an identification. 
For example, research confirms the intuitive proposition that 
when investigators give cues that suggest “you got the right 
guy,” the witness’ confidence in the identification is artificially 
inflated. A meta-analysis of twenty studies covering 2,400 
identifications found that witnesses who received feedback 
“expressed significantly more retrospective confidence in their 
decision compared with participants who received no 
feedback.”101 Such feedback not only causes a witness to 
misjudge the reliability of her identification, it can also result 
in the witness embellishing the opportunity she had to observe 
the perpetrator and the crime. “Those who receive a simple 
post-identification confirmation regarding the accuracy of their 
identification significantly inflate their reports to suggest better 
witnessing conditions at the time of the crime, stronger 
                                                 
96 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the 
Eyewitness Report, 7 Cognitive Psychol. 560, 566 (1975). 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Amy B. Douglass & Nancy M. Steblay, Memory 
Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Post-
identification Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive 
Psychol. 859, 863 (2006). 
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memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper memory abilities 
in general.”102 Furthermore, confirmational feedback need not 
be immediate to corrupt a witness’ memory. One study showed 
that the effects of confirmational feedback may be the same 
even when it occurs two days after an identification.103 Other 
research further substantiates that these effects can withstand 
the passage of time.104  
 
 The particular perils of witness feedback are evident in 
many of the documented cases of false identifications. Here 
again, the story of Ronald Cotton and Jennifer Thompson is 
illustrative: officer feedback led Thompson to harden her false 
memory of Cotton as her rapist. In the process, her memory 
was effectively immunized from any impact cross-examination 
may otherwise have had on her confidence, which impeded the 
jury’s ability to properly assess her testimony.  
 
 I realize, of course, that law enforcement officials are 
not completely in control of the feedback witnesses receive. 
Interactions among witnesses outside the confines of police 
proceedings, for instance, can affect the reliability of the 
witnesses’ identifications.105 For example, if one witness talks 
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to another, she can alter or reinforce the other’s memory of the 
same event. “[P]ost-identification feedback does not have to be 
presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g. 
police officer) in order to affect a witness’ subsequent crime-
related judg[]ments.”106 In one study, after witnesses made 
incorrect identifications, they were told either that their co-
witness made the same or a different identification.107 Not 
surprisingly, confidence rose among the witnesses that were 
told that their co-witness had agreed with them and fell among 
those told that co-witnesses had disagreed.108 
 
 Though law enforcement officials may not be able to 
completely insulate witnesses from this system variable, police 
did not even attempt to guard against it here. The witnesses 
                                                 
Co-Witness Relationship in Susceptibility to Misinformation, 
127 Acta Psychologica 476, 481 (2008) (noting that all 
participants “were susceptible to misinformation from their 
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Information: The Power of Co-Witness Suggestion, 20 
Applied Cognitive Psychol. 1083, 1083 (2006) (“Results 
suggest that co-witness information had a particularly strong 
influence on eyewitness memory, whether encountered 
through co-witness discussion or indirectly through a third 
party.”); John S. Shaw III, Sena Garven, & James M. Wood, 
Co-Witness Information Can Have Immediate Effects on 
Eyewitness Memory Reports, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 503, 
503, 516 (1997) (“[W]hen participants received incorrect 
information about a co-witness’s response, they were 
significantly more likely to give that incorrect response than 
if they received no co-witness information.”); C.A. Elizabeth 
Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness 
Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. 
Applied Psychol. 714, 717-18 (1994). 
106 Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-ups, 21 
Applied Cognitive Psychol. 489, 494 (2007). 
107 Luus & Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence, 
supra, at 717-18. 
108 Id.; see also Skagerberg, supra, at 494-95 (showing similar 
results). 
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who identified Dennis viewed the lineup in the same room and 
at the same time. Detective Wynn’s instruction to the witnesses 
not to react or show emotion during the lineup reduces the risk 
of feedback, but this instruction did not eliminate it. Therefore, 
the risk that the witnesses’ reactions may have influenced the 
results of the lineup cannot be discounted, and the jurors should 
have been instructed about this possibility. 
 
Furthermore, the record of Bertha’s photo array 
identification establishes the existence of at least some officer-
to-witness feedback. Detective Santiago asked Bertha to affirm 
his identification: “Can you be sure that photo #1 is the male 
that you saw get away from the girl and run at you with the gun 
after the gunshot?”109 Only then did Bertha state he was 
“sure”110 Dennis was the shooter as opposed to his initial 
statement that Dennis’ photo merely “look[ed] like”111 the 
shooter.  
 
I am not suggesting that Detective Santiago’s question 
ultimately negated Bertha’s ability to make an in-court 
identification. Nor am I suggesting that Detective Santiago 
intentionally tried to reinforce Bertha’s confidence in his 
identification or “prime” him for a subsequent in-court 
identification. I am, however, suggesting that the jury should 
have been informed of how Detective Santiago’s response to 
Bertha’s initial selection of Dennis’ photo may have affected 
the reliability of Bertha’s lineup identification and, as I next 
explain, his subsequent in-court identification as well.  
 
5. Multiple viewings 
 
 Another crucial system variable—and one that was 
clearly present here—is the opportunity to engage in multiple 
viewings of a suspect. Allowing a witness to view a suspect 
more than once during an investigation can have a powerful 
corrupting effect on that witness’ memory. It creates a risk that 
the witness will merely identify a suspect based on her past 
views of him rather than her memory of the relevant event. 
Meta-analysis has revealed that while fifteen percent of 
                                                 
109 J.A. 1556. 
110 Id. 
111 J.A. 1555. 
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witnesses mistakenly identify an innocent person during the 
first viewing of a lineup, that percentage jumps to thirty-seven 
percent if the witness previously viewed that innocent person’s 
mug shot.112 This phenomenon is known as “mug shot 
exposure.” Related studies have also shown the existence of 
“mug shot commitment.” This refers to the fact that once 
witnesses positively identify an innocent person from a mug 
shot, “a significant number” then “reaffirm[] their false 
identification” in a later photo lineup.113 This is true even when 
the real suspect is actually present in the lineup.114 
Nonetheless, multiple viewings seem to have no impact on the 
reliability of a lineup identification “when a picture of the 
suspect was not present in photographs examined earlier”115 by 
the witness. 
 
 The incredible story of John White that I mentioned at 
the outset serves as a powerful example of the impact that 
multiple viewings can have on witness identifications. In 1979, 
John White was accused of breaking into the home of a 
seventy-four-year-old woman and then beating and raping 
her.116 After the victim picked White out of a photo array, he 
was placed in a live lineup.117 White was the only person 
repeated in both the photo array and live lineup. The victim 
                                                 
112 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H. Bornstein, & Steven 
D. Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive 
Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and 
Unconscious Transference, 30 L. & Hum. Behav. 287, 299 
(2006). 
113 See Gunter Koehnken, Roy S. Malpass, Michael, S. 
Wogalter, Forensic Applications of Line-Up Research, in 
Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification 205, 219 
(Siegfried L. Sporer, Roy S. Malpass, Gunter Koehnken eds., 
1996). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 218. However, as noted earlier, Dennis’ picture was 
presented in photo arrays that witnesses saw prior to viewing 
the lineup. 
116 The Innocence Project, John Jerome White, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/john-jerome-white/ 
(last visited July 5, 2016).  
117 Id. 
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identified White from that live lineup.118 DNA analysis later 
revealed that the victim’s actual assailant was not White, but a 
man named James Parham. By the cruelest of ironies, Parham 
had actually been placed in the live lineup with White as a filler 
when the victim identified White as her assailant. Despite 
having an opportunity to view her real rapist in the lineup, the 
victim affirmed her initial selection of White. Her erroneous 
identification led to a life sentence for White, who served 
twenty-seven years before the DNA evidence exonerated 
him.119 
 
 A leading researcher offered the following explanation 
of White’s case: 
 
The witness had already identified John White 
from a photographic lineup. And, John White 
was the only person who was in both the 
photographic lineup and the live lineup. Hence, 
what we have here, I believe, is a strong 
example of how a mistaken identification from 
one procedure (a photo lineup) is repeated in 
the next procedure (a live lineup) even though 
the real perpetrator is clearly present in the 
second procedure. Repeating the same mistake 
can occur for several reasons. One possibility is 
that the initial mistaken identification changed 
the memory of the witness; in effect John 
White’s face “became” her memory of the 
attacker and the face of Parham no longer 
existed once she mistakenly identified John 
White. Another possibility is that she 
approached the live lineup with one goal in 
mind - find the man she had identified from the 
photos. Perhaps she never really looked at 
Parham because she quickly saw the man she 
identified from photos and did not need to look 
further.120 
                                                 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Gary Wells, The Mistaken Identification of John Jerome 
White, 
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 The witnesses who identified Dennis at trial were given 
not two, but three, opportunities to view Dennis. These 
multiple views could help explain why initially tentative 
guesses became certain identifications by the time the 
witnesses took the stand. The possibility cannot be ignored that 
the witnesses here, like the victims in White and Cotton’s 
cases, selected Dennis in the live lineup because they were 
looking for the man they had already identified from the photo 
arrays. The jurors should have been informed of the impact of 
multiple viewings so that they could have considered that 
effect in determining how much weight to afford the lineup 
identifications and/or the in-court identifications. Absent that 
information, the jurors were ill equipped to assess the 
possibility that Howard, Bertha, and Cameron’s lineup and in-
court identifications of Dennis may have been based on prior 
viewings of his picture rather than their memories of the crime. 
  
 These system variables on the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications highlight the importance of the procedures law 
enforcement officials use when soliciting identifications. As 
the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, “it is incumbent on 
courts and law enforcement personnel to treat eyewitness 
memory just as carefully as they would other forms of trace 
evidence, like DNA, bloodstains, or fingerprints, the 
evidentiary value of which can be impaired or destroyed by 
contamination. Like those forms of evidence, once 
contaminated, a witness’ original memory is very difficult to 
retrieve.”121  
 
B. Estimator Variables 
 
 Estimator variables are the conditions present during 
memory formation or storage. They can also have a substantial 
impact on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.122 
                                                 
https://public.psych.iastate.edu/glwells/The_Misidentification
_of_John_White.pdf (last visited July 6, 2016). 
121 State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 689 (Or. 2012). 
122 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 895 (N.J. 2011), 
holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011); 
National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 
1, 72, 92-93. 
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Crucial estimator variables include, but are not limited to, the 
amount of stress on the observer, the presence of weapons, and 
visibility conditions. Unlike system variables, estimator 
variables are beyond the control of the criminal justice system. 
Nevertheless, asking jurors to consider eyewitness 
identifications without properly instructing them on the impact 
that such estimator variables may have had erects yet another 
barrier to accurate evaluation of identifications.  
 
1. Stress 
 
 First, high levels of stress at the time of memory 
formation can negatively impact a witness’ ability to 
accurately identify the perpetrator.123 Stressful conditions 
impair a witness’ ability to identify key characteristics of an 
individual’s face.124 A meta-analysis of the effect of high stress 
on eyewitness identifications found that stress hampers both 
eyewitness recall and identification accuracy.125  
 
 A recent study examining the effects of stress on 
identifications at a U.S. Military mock prisoner-of-war camp 
illustrates this phenomenon.126 In this study, 509 active-duty 
military personnel, with an average of 4.2 years in the service, 
underwent two types of interrogations.127 After twelve hours of 
confinement, participants experienced either a high-stress 
interrogation involving real physical confrontation followed by 
a low-stress interrogation without physical confrontation, or 
                                                 
123 See Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Identification Is Significantly Associated with Performance 
on a Standardized Test of Face Recognition, 30 Int’l J.L. & 
Psychiatry 213 (2007); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A 
Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on 
Eyewitness Memory, 28 L. & Hum. Behav. 687 (2004); 
Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, supra. 
124 See Charles A. Morgan III et al., Misinformation Can 
Influence Memory for Recently Experienced, Highly Stressful 
Events, 36 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 11, 15 (2013). 
125 Deffenbacher et al., Effects of High Stress, supra, at 699. 
126 Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory, supra, at 
266. 
127 Id. at 267-68. 
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vice versa.128 The interrogations were separated by 
approximately four hours, and about half the participants 
received the high-stress interrogation first, while the other half 
experienced the low-stress interrogation first.129 Both 
interrogations lasted about forty minutes.130 Twenty-four hours 
after the interrogations, the participants were asked to identify 
their interrogators from live lineups, sequential photo arrays, 
or simultaneous photo arrays.131 Across all identification 
procedures, subjects had far more difficulty accurately 
identifying their high-stress interrogators.132 Sixty-two percent 
of subjects could identify their low-stress interrogators in live 
lineups, while only thirty percent of subjects could accurately 
identify their high-stress interrogators from such lineups.133 
Furthermore, fifty-six percent of subjects erroneously 
identified a person who was not their interrogator (false 
positive) during live lineups, while only thirty-eight percent of 
subjects did so for their low-stress interrogations.134  
 
 This study is particularly stunning when one considers 
that the subjects all had a prolonged and unobstructed 
opportunity to view their interrogators, and the interrogators 
were all within arm’s reach of their subjects. The subjects’ 
ability to see the faces of their interrogators was therefore 
exponentially better than the opportunity witnesses to most 
violent crimes have to see perpetrators. Their views were 
certainly better than those of Howard, Bertha, and Cameron. 
As the study’s authors explained,  
 
[c]ontrary to the popular conception that most 
people would never forget the face of a clearly 
seen individual who had physically confronted 
them and threatened them for more than 30 
min[utes], . . . [t]hese data provide robust 
evidence that eyewitness memory for persons 
encountered during events that are personally 
                                                 
128 Id. at 268. 
129 Id.  
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131 Id. at 269-70. 
132 Id. at 272. 
133 Id. 
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relevant, highly stressful, and realistic in nature 
may be subject to substantial error.135  
 
Notably, this study further found that memories formed during 
a stressful event are highly susceptible to modifications from 
misinformation received after the event. That has particular 
relevance here given the presence of the system variables 
described above. 
  
 Stress almost certainly affected all of the witnesses who 
saw Chedell Williams gunned down. The shooting 
undoubtedly caused Howard—the prosecution’s star 
witness—a significant amount of stress. Not only was she 
herself chased, but she also watched as the perpetrator grabbed 
her best friend and shot her at point-blank range. It is not 
surprising that multiple witnesses recalled hearing Howard 
screaming. Stress also likely affected Bertha’s ability to later 
make an accurate identification. He saw the shooter as the 
shooter rushed him, head on, pistol in hand. Jurors cannot 
properly assess eyewitness identification testimony where 
stress was present at memory formation unless this variable is 
explained to them.  
 
2. Weapon Focus 
 
 The presence of weapons is a second, and related, 
estimator variable. The National Research Council has stated, 
“[r]esearch suggests that the presence of a weapon at the scene 
of a crime captures the visual attention of the witness and 
impedes the ability of the witness to attend to other important 
features of the visual scene, such as the face of the perpetrator 
. . . . The ensuing lack of memory of these other key features 
may impair recognition of a perpetrator in a subsequent 
lineup.”136 In 1992, an analysis of weapon focus studies 
concluded that the presence of a weapon significantly reduced 
witnesses’ ability to recall their perpetrators.137 A more recent 
study of the pertinent literature confirms that weapon presence 
                                                 
135 Id. at 274. 
136 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 93.  
137 Nancy K. Steblay, A Meta-analytic Review of the Weapon 
Focus Effect, 16 L. & Hum. Behav. 413, 415-17 (1992). 
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has a consistently negative impact on both feature recall 
accuracy and identification accuracy.138  
 
 Here, the jury was never informed that visibility of the 
perpetrator’s gun may well have hampered the witnesses’ 
ability to observe and/or form an accurate memory of the 
assailant’s face. Howard, Bertha, and Cameron all provided 
clear descriptions of the gun, revealing their focus on it. But 
the jury was never informed of how this powerful estimator 
variable may have affected them. 
 
3. Memory Decay 
 
The period between memory formation and memory 
recall is known as the “retention interval” and constitutes 
another important estimator variable. A meta-analysis of fifty-
three facial memory studies found “that memory strength will 
be weaker at longer retention intervals than at briefer ones.”139 
Most of the studies analyzed in this meta-analysis examined 
retention intervals of less than one month, many of them less 
than one week. This meta-analysis also found agreement 
among experts that “the rate of memory loss for an event is 
greatest right after an event and then levels off over time.”140 
Furthermore,  
 
[t]he effect of the retention interval also is 
influenced by the strength and quality of the 
initial memory that is encoded, which, in turn, 
                                                 
138 Jonathan M. Fawcett et al., Of Guns and Geese: A Meta-
Analytic Review of the ‘Weapon Focus’ Literature, Psychol., 
Crime & L. 1, 22 (2011). 
139 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen 
Face: Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness’s Memory 
Representation, 14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 139, 
142 (2008); see also Carol Krafka & Steven 
Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field Experiment on 
Eyewitness Identification, 49 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 58, 65 (1985) (finding a substantial increase in the 
misidentification rate in target-absent arrays from two to 
twenty-four hours after event). 
140 Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once-Seen Face, 
supra, at 143. 
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may be influenced by other estimator variables 
associated with witnessing the crime (such as the 
degree of visual attention) and viewing factors 
(such as distance, lighting, and exposure 
duration).141  
 
The in-court identifications of Dennis were made nearly one 
year after the crime occurred—a very significant retention 
interval under the relevant studies. Research is hardly 
necessary to appreciate the difficulty of trying to accurately 
recall the details of this chaotic and traumatizing event—
lasting only a matter of seconds—a year later. The jurors 
should have been informed of that difficulty and its possible 
impact on the accuracy of these identifications. They were not. 
 
4. Exposure Duration, Distance, and Lighting 
 
 As one would expect, exposure duration, distance, and 
lighting affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.142 
The charge that was given here did alert the jurors to the impact 
of these factors on the accuracy of an identification.143 
                                                 
141 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 99. 
142 Brian H. Bornstein et al., Effects of Exposure Time and 
Cognitive Operations on Facial Identification Accuracy: A 
Meta-Analysis of Two Variables Associated with Initial 
Memory Strength, 18 Psychol., Crime & L. 473 (2012) (meta-
analysis of the effect of exposure duration on facial 
identification accuracy); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., How 
Variations in Distance Affect Eyewitness Reports and 
Identification Accuracy, 32 Law & Hum. Behav. 526 (2008) 
(study of the effect of distance on identification accuracy). 
143 Race-bias—referring to the relative races of the witness 
and perpetrator—is another crucial estimator variable. 
Although this variable does not raise concerns here because 
the three eyewitnesses and the perpetrator were all Black, it is 
nevertheless worth noting because it again shows the extent to 
which circumstances (other than opportunity to observe) can 
greatly impact the reliability of an eyewitness identification. 
Research has thoroughly documented a phenomenon known 
as “own-race bias” wherein people more accurately identify 
faces within their own race as compared to those of members 
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However, as I explain in the following section, it did not 
adequately convey the impact these factors can have on in-
court identifications.  
 
C. The Dissent’s Dismissal of Estimator Variables 
 
 As the Majority recounts, nearly all of the eyewitnesses 
who mentioned the shooter’s height in their initial police 
interviews described him as between 5’8” and 5’10”.144 The 
witnesses also described the shooter as having a dark 
complexion and weighing about 170 to 190 pounds. James 
Dennis is 5’5” tall and weighed between 125 and 132 pounds 
at the time of trial.  
 
 The Dissent dismisses and tries to rationalize away this 
considerable size discrepancy. In an attempt to reinforce the 
reliability of the three witnesses, the Dissent relies on research 
that concludes eyewitnesses tend to underestimate the height 
and weight of taller and heavier targets and overestimate the 
height and weight of shorter and lighter targets.145 The 
                                                 
of a different racial group. See National Research Council, 
Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 96; Roy S. Malpass & 
Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other 
Race, 13 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 330 (1969). The 
Innocence Project analyzed 297 DNA exonerations and found 
that a cross-racial misidentification occurred in forty-two 
percent of the cases in which an erroneous eyewitness 
identification was made. Edwin Grimsley, What Wrongful 
Convictions Teach Us about Racial Inequality, The 
Innocence Project (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/What_Wrongful_C
onvictions_Teach_ Us_About_Racial_Inequality.php. 
144 In fact, one eyewitness—Joseph DiRienzo Jr.—described 
the shooter’s height in terms of his own height: “about my 
height, about 5’9”.” J.A. 1649. 
145 Dissent at 3 (Fisher, J.) (citing Christian A. Meissner, 
Siegfried L. Sporer, & Jonathan W. Schooler, Person 
Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence, in 2 Handbook of 
Eyewitness Psychology 3, 8 (Rod C.L. Lindsay et al. eds., 
2007) and Rhona H. Flin & John W. Shepherd, Tall Stories: 
Eyewitnesses’ Ability to Estimate Height and Weight 
Characteristics, 5 Hum. Learning 29, 34 (1986)). 
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Dissent’s use of that research is cruelly ironic. The finding of 
those studies was not that we should disregard eyewitness 
inaccuracy, as the Dissent’s citation implies. Those researchers 
found just the opposite. The studies discovered that eyewitness 
identifications are frequently unreliable.146 As two of the 
researchers explained, “[t]he width and range of subjects’ 
errors for the targets’ height and weight in this study showed 
clearly that some subjects experience great difficulty in 
accurately judging another individual’s physical 
characteristics.”147 
 
 The Dissent also focuses on the strength of three 
estimator variables. The Dissent reminds us that “the visual 
conditions were excellent,”148 the witnesses saw the shooter at 
“close range,”149 and none of the identifications were cross-
racial.150 This is not only misleading, it also ignores many other 
system and estimator variables that were at least as important 
(if not more important) than the ones the Dissent focuses upon.  
 
 I agree that the lighting was good. However, the lighting 
here was likely no better than that in the rooms where the 
military personnel who failed to recognize the faces of their 
interrogators were questioned under stressful conditions.151 
The witnesses here were in close proximity to the shooter. 
However, they were not as close as Jennifer Thompson was to 
Ronald Cotton or John White’s accuser was to him. Moreover, 
these witnesses only had a matter of seconds to view the 
perpetrators. Howard saw the shooter as he rushed towards her, 
Cameron in the seconds the crime occurred, and Bertha as the 
shooter ran past him. All of the witnesses’ views occurred 
under highly stressful circumstances and their focus appears to 
have been as much on the gun in the shooter’s hand as on the 
                                                 
146 Meissner, Sporer, & Schooler, Person Descriptions as 
Eyewitness Evidence, supra, at 8 (citing the Flin and 
Shepherd study); Flin & Shepherd, Tall Stories, supra, at 36. 
147 Flin & Shepherd, Tall Stories, supra, at 36. 
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shooter’s face. As I will explain in greater detail below, the 
charge that the jurors received did not focus their attention on 
any of those considerations. 
 
 The lack of blinding, the presence of officer feedback, 
the fact that the record suggests that the witnesses thought they 
had to select someone from the photo arrays, the multiple 
viewings of Dennis, and the witnesses’ viewing of the live 
lineup in the same room, all suggest that the identifications 
may have been corrupted by cues from law enforcement and/or 
other witnesses.  
 
 We would be justifiably skeptical of any clinical trial 
where the researcher knew which sample was a placebo or who 
received the placebo. Yet, we do not think twice about allowing 
someone to be convicted of a crime and sentenced to death on 
the basis of identification procedures where the investigator 
presenting the photo array or lineup is fully aware of who the 
suspect is. The witnesses who identified Dennis at trial had not 
one, but three opportunities to view Dennis. And none of the 
procedures included any level of blinding. Nothing in this 
record suggests that anyone other than Dennis was present in 
both the photo array and lineup. Yet, the jury was not made 
aware of the potential importance of any of these 
considerations. That should sound a note of caution in 
assessing the reliability of these identifications.  
 
 Finally, we should not ignore the fact that the majority 
of the witnesses that police interviewed after the crime were 
unable to identify Dennis as the shooter. Jurors did not know 
that Joseph DiRienzo, Joseph DiRienzo, Jr., Clarence Verdell, 
and David LeRoy all were unable to identify Dennis from the 
photo array. Although Anthony Overstreet did identify Dennis 
from this array, he did not think Dennis was the shooter once 
he had an opportunity to view him in the lineup. Overstreet had 
expressed the most confidence in his ability to positively 
identify the shooter during the initial police interviews.152 
                                                 
152 The fact that Overstreet and other non-identifying 
witnesses could theoretically have been called by defense 
counsel is no answer. No defense attorney in her right mind 
would put such witnesses on the stand, knowing that the 
witnesses had seen photographs of the defendant and would 
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When the totality of circumstances is viewed in context, the 
evidence of Dennis’ guilt is not as uncompromising as the 
Dissent suggests. 
 
 Moreover, concerns about the reliability of these 
identifications should not be assuaged by evidence that was 
introduced in an attempt to corroborate the identification 
testimony. As the Majority explains, aside from eyewitness 
testimony, the Commonwealth presented testimony from 
Charles Thompson, who told detectives that he saw Dennis 
with a gun the night of the murder. Thompson identified an 
illustrative .32 chrome revolver (previously admitted as a 
Commonwealth exhibit) as being similar to the one he saw in 
Dennis’s possession. As the Majority notes, Thompson had an 
open drug-possession charge at the time of trial, but testified 
that he was not expecting help from the Commonwealth in 
exchange for his testimony. Years after trial, Thompson 
recanted his testimony, averring that he had never seen Dennis 
with a gun and that his testimony at trial was false.  
 
 I realize, of course, that it can be argued that 
Thompson’s recantation is not necessarily relevant to the force 
of the eyewitness identifications because it happened after trial. 
However, his testimony clearly corroborated the identification 
evidence, and it underscores the dangers of the inadequate 
identification instructions. The fact that the jurors were not 
given a sufficient basis to assess the identifications of Dennis 
severely undermined the potential force of Dennis’ alibi 
testimony. Why would jurors believe such testimony 
(especially since it was offered by his father) when three 
neutral witnesses identified Dennis as the shooter? Had the 
jurors been able to assess the identifications with an 
appropriate understanding of the variables I have discussed, 
Dennis’s alibi testimony may well have had much greater 
force, and jurors would have been in a better position to weigh 
Dennis’ alibi against Thompson’s testimony that appeared to 
corroborate the three eyewitnesses. That is particularly true 
when we factor in the evidence of the Cason receipt that the 
                                                 
know the person sitting at counsel table was the person the 
police had arrested for the crime. A criminal justice system 
seeking fairness and justice should not countenance the 
creation of such an absurd dilemma.  
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Majority explains.153 The Cason receipt could have further 
bolstered Dennis’ alibi testimony and raised a reasonable doubt 
about the accuracy of the eyewitness identifications. 
 
IV. Manson v. Brathwaite and its Progeny 
 
 In 1977, the Supreme Court established a basic 
framework for determining whether admission of a particular 
identification violates a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process in Manson v. Brathwaite.154 Under the 
Manson test, a court must first assess whether the eyewitness 
identification procedure at issue was, under the “totality of the 
circumstances,” unnecessarily suggestive.155 If the 
identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive, the 
inquiry ends. However, if it was unduly suggestive, a court 
must considers five factors to determine whether the resulting 
identification is nonetheless reliable. Those factors, drawn 
from the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Neil v. Biggers,156 
are: (1) “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at 
the time of the crime,” (2) “the witness’ degree of attention,” 
(3) “the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the 
criminal,” (4) “the level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation,” and (5) “the length of time 
between the crime and the confrontation.”157 These factors are 
weighed against “the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself.”158 Manson emphasizes that “reliability is 
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification 
testimony.”159 
 
Since Manson, more than 2,000 scientific studies have 
been conducted on the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications.160 As I have explained, we now understand that 
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154 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
155 Id. at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
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even seemingly neutral identification procedures can lead to 
unreliable results due to a myriad of subtle variables. We also 
now know that a witness’ subjective confidence in the accuracy 
of her identification has limited correlation to the reliability of 
her identification. As the National Research Council 
emphasized in its recent report on eyewitness identifications, 
the Manson test “treats factors such as the confidence of a 
witness as independent markers of reliability when, in fact, it 
is now well established that confidence judgments may vary 
over time and can be powerfully swayed by many factors.”161  
 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the approach 
laid out in Manson in Perry v. New Hampshire.162 There, an 
eyewitness saw a man break into a car, called the police, and 
then told the responding officer that a man standing in the 
building’s parking lot was the perpetrator.163 That man was 
then arrested and convicted in state court. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, he argued that the highly suggestive nature of 
the identification process entitled him to a suppression hearing 
prior to trial in order to determine the admissibility of the 
identification.164 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
only requires such a hearing when law enforcement arranged 
the unnecessarily suggestive circumstances under which the 
identification was obtained.165 The Court “linked the due 
process check, not to suspicion of eyewitness testimony 
generally, but only to improper police arrangement of the 
circumstances surrounding an identification.”166  
  
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the 
scientific research on eyewitness reliability.167 It recognized 
                                                 
161 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 6. 
162 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 
163 Id. at 721-22. 
164 Id. at 722-23. 
165 Id. at 730. 
166 Id. at 726 (emphasis added). 
167 Id. at 727 (“As one of Perry’s amici points out, many other 
factors bear on “the likelihood of misidentification,”—for 
example, the passage of time between exposure to and 
identification of the defendant, whether the witness was under 
stress when he first encountered the suspect, how much time 
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the importance of this body of science and urged more robust 
jury instructions. As the Court explained, “[e]yewitness-
specific jury instructions, which many federal and state courts 
have adopted, [] warn the jury to take care in appraising 
identification evidence.”168 The Court also stressed the 
importance of evidentiary rules “to exclude relevant evidence 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial impact or potential for misleading the jury.”169 
Thus, instead of considering the relevant system and estimator 
variables “under the banner of due process,”170 the Supreme 
Court advocated that courts incorporate the relevant scientific 
findings through other avenues, such as jury instructions and 
evidentiary rules.  
  
 Some state courts have heeded Perry’s call and created 
new procedures and evidentiary frameworks that minimize the 
risks associated with erroneous eyewitness identifications. 
Most notably, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey re-wrote the state’s rules governing the admission 
of eyewitness identifications in State v. Henderson.171 Prior to 
that decision, New Jersey courts relied on the Manson test to 
determine whether certain identifications were admissible.172 
Henderson, however, held that the Manson test did “not offer 
an adequate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter 
inappropriate police conduct.” The court also concluded that 
Manson “overstates the jury’s inherent ability to evaluate 
                                                 
the witness had to observe the suspect, how far the witness 
was from the suspect, whether the suspect carried a weapon, 
and the race of the suspect and the witness.” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
168 Id. at 728-29 (internal footnote omitted). 
169 Id. at 729.  
170 Id. at 727 (“To embrace Perry’s view would thus entail a 
vast enlargement of the reach of due process as a constraint 
on the admission of evidence.”).  
171 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. 
Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011). 
172 See id. at 918; State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254, 258-59 
(N.J. 1988) holding modified by State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872 (N.J. 2011). 
41 
 
evidence offered by eyewitnesses who honestly believe their 
testimony is accurate.”173  
  
 To remedy these problems, the court pioneered a two-
part revision to the judicial procedures related to eyewitness 
identifications. First, the court changed the requirements 
related to pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of eyewitness 
identifications. After Henderson, a defendant can now obtain a 
pre-trial hearing if she can show “some evidence of 
suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification.”174 
The court specified that this “evidence, in general, must be tied 
to a system—and not an estimator—variable.”175 The trial 
                                                 
173 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 878. 
174 Id. at 920. 
175 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court instructed courts to 
consider the following non-exhaustive list of system variables 
when deciding whether to hold a pre-trial hearing: 
 
1. Blind Administration. Was the lineup 
procedure performed double-blind? If double-
blind testing was impractical, did the police use 
a technique like the “envelope method” 
described above, to ensure that the 
administrator had no knowledge of where the 
suspect appeared in the photo array or lineup? 
2. Pre-identification Instructions. Did the 
administrator provide neutral, pre-identification 
instructions warning that the suspect may not be 
present in the lineup and that the witness should 
not feel compelled to make an identification? 
3. Lineup Construction. Did the array or lineup 
contain only one suspect embedded among at 
least five innocent fillers? Did the suspect stand 
out from other members of the lineup? 
4. Feedback. Did the witness receive any 
information or feedback, about the suspect or 
the crime, before, during, or after the 
identification procedure? 
5. Recording Confidence. Did the administrator 
record the witness’ statement of confidence 
immediately after the identification, before the 
possibility of any confirmatory feedback? 
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court can end this hearing at any time “if it finds from the 
testimony that defendant’s threshold allegation of 
suggestiveness is groundless.”176 But if the defendant’s claim 
is meritorious, the trial judge must weigh both system and 
estimator variables177 to decide whether, under the “totality of 
                                                 
6. Multiple Viewings. Did the witness view the 
suspect more than once as part of multiple 
identification procedures? Did police use the 
same fillers more than once? 
7. Showups. Did the police perform a showup 
more than two hours after an event? Did the 
police warn the witness that the suspect may not 
be the perpetrator and that the witness should 
not feel compelled to make an identification? 
8. Private Actors. Did law enforcement elicit 
from the eyewitness whether he or she had 
spoken with anyone about the identification 
and, if so, what was discussed? 
9. Other Identifications Made. Did the 
eyewitness initially make no choice or choose a 
different suspect or filler? 
 
Id. at 920-21.  
176 Id. at 920. 
177 The New Jersey Supreme Court told courts to consider the 
following, non-exhaustive list of estimator variables in 
assessing the reliability of an eyewitness identification: 
 
1. Stress. Did the event involve a high level of 
stress? 
2. Weapon focus. Was a visible weapon used 
during a crime of short duration? 
3. Duration. How much time did the witness 
have to observe the event? 
4. Distance and Lighting. How close were the 
witness and perpetrator? What were the lighting 
conditions at the time? 
5. Witness Characteristics. Was the witness 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs? Was 
age a relevant factor under the circumstances of 
the case? 
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the circumstances,” the defendant has “demonstrated a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”178 If 
the trial court concludes that the defendant has met this burden, 
the court must suppress the identification evidence.179 
  
 Second, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the 
state judicial system to develop “enhanced jury charges on 
eyewitness identification for trial judges to use.”180 As the 
court explained, “[w]e anticipate that identification evidence 
will continue to be admitted in the vast majority of cases. To 
help jurors weigh that evidence, they must be told about 
relevant factors and their effect on reliability.”181  
  
                                                 
6. Characteristics of Perpetrator. Was the 
culprit wearing a disguise? Did the suspect have 
different facial features at the time of the 
identification? 
7. Memory decay. How much time elapsed 
between the crime and the identification? 
8. Race-bias. Does the case involve a cross-
racial identification?  
. . .  
9. Opportunity to view the criminal at the time 
of the crime. 
10. Degree of attention. 
11. Accuracy of prior description of the 
criminal. 
12. Level of certainty demonstrated at the 
confrontation. 
Did the witness express high confidence at the 
time of the identification before receiving any 
feedback or other information? 
13. The time between the crime and the 
confrontation. (Encompassed fully by “memory 
decay” above.) 
 
Id. at 921-22. 
178 Id. at 920. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 878. 
181 Id. 
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 Henderson also emphasized that the “factors that both 
judges and juries will consider are not etched in stone.”182 
Rather, “the scientific research underlying them will continue 
to evolve, as it has in the more than thirty years since 
Manson.”183 Accordingly, the court clarified that its decision 
does not “limit trial courts from reviewing evolving, 
substantial, and generally accepted scientific research.”184  
 
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that, 
where appropriate, trial courts consider giving instructions 
during the trial before eyewitness identification testimony is 
elicited. Such instructions would help inform juries, up front, 
of the problems that can arise from seemingly unequivocal 
courtroom identifications.185  
  
 After Henderson, in July 2012,186 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court released its expanded set of jury instructions 
governing evaluation of identifications. These instructions 
explain that scientific research has shown eyewitness 
identifications can be unreliable, and they emphasize that 
eyewitness evidence “must be scrutinized carefully.”187 To this 
end, the instructions identify a specific set of factors that jurors 
should consider when deciding whether eyewitness 
identification evidence is reliable, including estimator and 
system variables.188 These instructions are consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Perry and will better equip jurors 
to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identifications.189 
                                                 
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 922. 
185 Id. at 924. 
186 These instructions were released a year after the opinion in 
Henderson. 
187 Supreme Court of New Jersey, New Jersey Criminal 
Model Jury Instructions, Identification: In-Court 
Identifications Only 2 (2012), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instructio
n.pdf. 
188 Id. at 3-9. 
189 New Jersey is not alone in its response to the vast body of 
research on the reliability of eyewitness identifications. In 
2011, the Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
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 The Supreme Court of Oregon has likewise reformed 
the state judicial system’s approach to eyewitness 
identifications. However, Oregon has taken a slightly different 
approach. In State v. Lawson,190 the court addressed the 
reliability issue from an evidentiary standpoint as opposed to a 
due process one. Prior to Lawson, Oregon courts adhered to a 
rule under which trial courts could not consider whether an 
identification was unreliable until some evidence of 
suggestiveness was first introduced.191 In rejecting that 
approach, the Oregon Supreme Court explained:  
 
Such a requirement [] conflates evidentiary 
principles with due process concerns. A 
constitutional due process analysis might 
properly consider suggestiveness as a separate 
prerequisite to further inquiry because the Due 
Process Clause is not implicated absent some 
                                                 
Court convened a study group to “offer guidance as to how 
our courts can most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive 
identification procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful 
conviction.” Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Study 
Group on Eyewitness Evidence, Report and 
Recommendations to the Justices 1 (2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The report made five recommendations 
aimed at minimizing misidentifications: (1) acknowledge 
variables affecting identification accuracy; (2) develop a 
model policy and implement best practices for police 
departments; (3) expand use of pretrial hearings; (4) expand 
use of improved jury instructions; and (5) offer continuing 
education to judges and bar leaders. Id. at 2-5. Like 
Henderson, the Massachusetts report recommended that, 
when a defendant contests the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification, the trial judge should conduct a pretrial hearing 
to determine whether law enforcement used suggestive 
identification procedures to elicit that identification. Id. at 
109-16. If a suggestive procedure was used, the report 
recommended that courts assess whether those procedures 
impacted the reliability of the identification. Id. at 111. The 
report suggested that courts consider both estimator and 
system variables in pre-trial hearings. Id. 
190 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012). 
191 See id. at 688; State v. Classen, 590 P.2d 1198 (Or. 1979). 
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form of state action, such as the state’s use of a 
suggestive identification procedure. As a matter 
of state evidence law, however, there is no reason 
to hinder the analysis of eyewitness reliability 
with purposeless distinctions between 
suggestiveness and other sources of unreliability. 
. . . A trial court tasked with determining a 
constitutional claim must necessarily assume 
that the evidence is otherwise admissible; were it 
inadmissible on evidentiary grounds, the court 
would never reach the constitutional question. 
However, a trial court tasked with considering a 
question of evidentiary admissibility clearly 
cannot begin by assuming admissibility.192 
 
Lawson then fashioned a new approach to examining 
eyewitness identifications from existing rules of evidence. 
Under this revised test, “when a criminal defendant files a 
pretrial motion to exclude eyewitness identification evidence, 
the state as the proponent of the eyewitness identification must 
establish all preliminary facts necessary to establish 
admissibility of the eyewitness evidence.”193 If the challenged 
eyewitness evidence implicates the Oregon equivalents of 
Federal Rules of Evidence 602194 and 701,195 the state must 
                                                 
192 Lawson, 352 P.3d at 688-89 (citing Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into 
reliability of an eyewitness identification when the 
identification was not procured under unnecessary suggestive 
circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”)). 
193 Id. at 696-97 (emphasis added).  
194 Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only 
if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that 
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence 
to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s 
own testimony.”).  
195 Fed. R. Evid. 701 (“If a witness is not testifying as an 
expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one 
that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) 
helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, 
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prove that the eyewitness has personal knowledge of the matter 
on which she will testify, and her identification “is both 
rationally based on [her] first-hand perceptions and helpful to 
the trier of fact.”196 This flips the burdens in due process cases 
such as Manson and Henderson. Rather than the defendant 
proving that the identification at issue is unreliable, the state 
must first prove that the identification meets the evidentiary 
requirements of Rules 602 and 701.  
  
 If the state successfully shows that the identification 
evidence is admissible, the burden then shifts to the defendant 
to establish that “the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.” 197 Thus, Oregon courts now rely on the 
state equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 403198 to exclude 
unreliable eyewitness identifications that are otherwise 
admissible. If a trial court concludes that the defendant has 
made such a showing, “the trial court can either exclude the 
identification, or fashion an appropriate intermediate remedy 
short of exclusion to cure the unfair prejudice or other dangers 
attending the use of that evidence.”199  
  
 State courts are not alone in their responses to the 
scientific research. Federal circuit courts of appeals have also 
acknowledged the unreliability of certain eyewitness 
                                                 
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of 
Rule 702.”).  
196 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697. 
197 Id. 
198 Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.”). 
199 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697.  
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testimony.200 In United States v. Brownlee,201 we recognized 
the importance of expert testimony in safeguarding against 
unreliable eyewitness identifications. There, we held that a 
district court properly admitted expert testimony concerning 
the effects of race, hair covering, weapons focus, and exposure 
on the identification accuracy of multiple witnesses.202 We 
further held that the district court improperly excluded expert 
testimony comparing the show-up procedure used in that case 
(a procedure where law enforcement presents a single 
individual arguably fitting a witness’ description to that 
witness for identification) and other identification procedures 
and analyzing the suggestiveness of the show-up and its 
potential effect on the identifications. We also held that the 
district court improperly excluded expert testimony on 
confidence malleability, post-event suggestiveness, and 
confidence of accuracy.203 In doing so, we joined the growing 
chorus in acknowledging that  
 
The recent availability of post-conviction DNA 
tests demonstrate that there have been an 
overwhelming number of false convictions 
stemming from uninformed reliance on 
eyewitness misidentifications. . . . In fact, 
mistaken eyewitness identifications are 
responsible for more wrongful convictions than 
all other causes combined. Eyewitness evidence 
presented from well-meaning and confident 
citizens is highly persuasive but, at the same 
time, is among the least reliable forms of 
evidence.204 
 
We then explained that expert testimony can play a crucial role 
in counteracting the falsely persuasive effect of unreliable 
                                                 
200 See, e.g., United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1147 (2010); United States 
v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 141-44 (3d Cir. 2006). 
201 454 F.3d 131 (2006). 
202 Id. at 137. 
203 Id. at 141. 
204 Id. at 141-42 (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
alterations omitted). 
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eyewitness testimony.205 As the National Research Council has 
recognized, expert testimony on eyewitness identifications 
may hold certain advantages over jury instructions as a method 
to explain the relevant science to juries.206 Expert witnesses: 
(1) “can explain scientific research in a more flexible manner, 
by presenting only the relevant research to the jury”; (2) are 
more “familiar with the research and can describe it in detail”; 
(3) “can convey the state of the research at the time of the trial”; 
(4) “can be cross-examined by the other side”; and (5) “can 
more clearly describe the limitations of the research.”207 
Therefore, expert testimony on eyewitness accuracy is a crucial 
tool for educating juries on the science surrounding 
identifications. 
  
 It is against this backdrop that we must assess the jurors’ 
acceptance of the three eyewitness identifications of Dennis 
and the adequacy of the charge that guided their deliberations. 
 
V. The Jury Charge 
 
 In Watkins v. Sowders, Justice Brennan wrote: “Surely 
jury instructions can ordinarily no more cure the erroneous 
admission of powerful identification evidence than they can 
cure the erroneous admission of a confession.”208 Although 
Justice Brennan was referring to the admissibility of certain 
eyewitness identifications rather than their reliability, his 
caution underscores the limited utility of a bare bones jury 
instruction that does not properly inform jurors about the many 
factors that can undermine courtroom identifications. This is 
particularly so given the powerful countervailing effect of 
jurors’ predisposition to believe eyewitness testimony.  
 
 Studies have documented that jurors tend to 
misunderstand how memory works and often believe it to be 
much more reliable and less susceptible to outside influence 
                                                 
205 See id. at 144. 
206 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, 
at 40. 
207 Id. 
208 449 U.S. 341, 350 (1981) (Brennan, J. dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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than it actually is.209 One survey of 1,000 potential jurors in 
Washington, D.C. found that almost two-thirds of the 
respondents thought the statement “I never forget a face” 
applied “very well” or “fairly well” to them.210 Another thirty-
seven percent thought the presence of a weapon would enhance 
the witness’ reliability, while thirty-three percent either 
believed that the weapon would have no effect or were unsure 
what effect the weapon would have.211 Finally, thirty-nine 
percent of respondents believed that when an event is violent, 
it makes a witness’ memory for details more reliable, while 
thirty-three percent responded either that this would have no 
effect or that they were unsure of the effect violence during the 
commission of the crime would have.212 The studies I have 
discussed show how wrong these beliefs are. There is no reason 
to believe the jurors who convicted Dennis were any more 
enlightened about memory formation and recall than the 
respondents in these studies. 
 
 Yet, the jurors who convicted James Dennis were only 
provided with a “plain vanilla” instruction. They had no 
knowledge of the potential distortion that can be caused by the 
factors discussed here. The trial court’s entire jury instruction 
regarding how the jurors should evaluate the eyewitness 
identifications was as follows:   
 
 There have been several Commonwealth 
identification witnesses. . . . However, a mistake 
can be made in identifying a person even by a 
witness attempting to be truthful.  
 Where the opportunity for positive 
identification is good and the witness is positive 
in his or her identification and his or her 
identification is not weakened by prior failure to 
identify but remains, even after cross-
examination, positive and unqualified, the 
                                                 
209 Epstein, supra, 46-48; Elizabeth F. Loftus, Timothy P. 
O’Toole, & Catharine F. Easterly, Juror Understanding of 
Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey of 1000 Potential Jurors in 
the District of Columbia l (2004).  
210 Loftus, O’Toole, & Easterly, supra, at 6.  
211 Id. at 8.  
212 Id. at 9. 
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testimony as to identification need not be 
received with caution and can be treated as a 
statement of fact.  
 On the other hand, where a witness is not 
in a position to clearly observe the assailant or is 
not positive, as to identify, or his or her positive 
statements as to identity are weakened by 
qualification or by inconsistencies or by failure 
to identify the defendant on one or more prior 
occasions, then the testimony as to identification 
must be received with caution. You have heard 
the testimony in this case to the effect, and I 
leave it to your judgment and for your 
determination, but my recollection is that there 
were some prior identifications that were less 
than unqualified or positive. I think that’s been 
gone over at length by counsel. Under those 
circumstances, you should receive the testimony 
with caution. But it’s for you to determine 
whether or not this is so, you decide whether the 
testimony was weakened and what the evidence 
was.  
 If, according to these rules, you decide 
that caution is required in determining whether 
or not to accept the testimony of the identifying 
witnesses, then you must take into consideration 
the following matters: A, whether the testimony 
of the identification witness is generally 
believable; B, whether his or her opportunity to 
observe was sufficient to allow him or her to 
make an accurate identification; C, how the 
identification was arrived at; D, all of the 
circumstances indicating whether or not the 
identification was accurate; and E, whether the 
identification testimony is supported by other 
evidence. And you must conclude that it is so 
supported before you can accept it as being 
accurate.  
 My advice to you is this. In this case, my 
recollection, that’s why I’m not being so 
emphatic, my recollection is that one of the 
witnesses said, “I think[,]”[] another witness, for 
example, said, at a certain time, “I can’t be sure.” 
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Witnesses who testified that way, their testimony 
as to identification should be received with 
caution and you should follow the rules that I’ve 
given you.213 
 
 Absent from this instruction is any explanation of the 
relevant system or estimator variables that so crucially impact 
the reliability of witness identifications. The caution the trial 
court urged is of precious little help given that omission. Jurors 
need to be informed of the applicable variables before they will 
be in a position to exercise the caution that this instruction 
urged. Without those detailed instructions, jurors simply are in 
no position to fully appreciate that “[t]he witness’ recollection 
of [a] stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or 
by later actions of the police.”  
  
 Moreover, as should be evident from my discussion, the 
italicized text instructing the jurors that they need not be 
cautious about accepting the identification of a witness who 
appears certain of her identification and had a good opportunity 
to observe the crime is extraordinarily dangerous. Contrary to 
the court’s instruction, that testimony cannot be accepted as 
fact. Social science aside, one need only consider the professed 
certainty of the accusers of Ronald Cotton and John White to 
understand just how problematic such a charge is. We again 
face a familiar and problematic reality: How ill-equipped these 
jurors were to assess the accuracy of the three eyewitnesses 
who pointed to Dennis and said “that’s the one.” 
 
VI. Conclusion: Un-Ringing the Bell 
 
 In 1977, Justice Marshall emphasized that “‘the 
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the 
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification.’”214 They are known far better today. As Justice 
Marshall continued: “It is, of course, impossible to control one 
source of such errors[—]the faulty perceptions and unreliable 
memories of witnesses[—]except through vigorously 
                                                 
213 J.A. 1237-39. 
214 Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 119 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal alteration omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)). 
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contested trials conducted by diligent counsel and judges.”215 
Given the quantity and quality of research that has been 
conducted since Justice Marshall wrote those words, we judges 
must do a better job of educating ourselves and jurors about the 
dynamics of eyewitness identifications. Although no system so 
dependent on the limits of human abilities will ever be able to 
totally eliminate the problems endemic in eyewitness 
testimony, the integrity of the criminal justice system demands 
that we do better. 
 
“[J]urors seldom enter a courtroom with the knowledge 
that eyewitness identifications are unreliable. Thus, while 
science has firmly established the inherent unreliability of 
human perception and memory, this reality is outside the jury’s 
common knowledge and often contradicts jurors’ 
‘commonsense’ understandings.”216 Therefore, thorough and 
appropriately focused jury instructions that reflect the 
scientific findings are critical to allowing jurors to discharge 
their solemn obligation to assess evidence.217 Such instructions 
will also encourage police to use more neutral procedures in 
investigating crimes. If law enforcement officials know that 
juries will be informed about best practices for obtaining 
identifications, police will have a very strong incentive to 
                                                 
215 Id. 
216 United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 
2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
217 It is important to note that jury instructions are only one of 
several promising remedies. As we mentioned in our 
discussion of Brownlee, expert testimony regarding the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications can also help jurors 
accurately assess the reliability of such identifications. The 
National Research Council has also recommended that, where 
appropriate, trial judges make basic inquiries into eyewitness 
identification evidence. National Research Council, 
Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 109-10. As the National 
Research Council suggested, “while the contours of such an 
inquiry would need to be established on a case-by-case basis, 
at a minimum, the judge could inquire about prior lineups, 
what information had been given to the eyewitness before the 
lineup, what instructions had been given to the eyewitness in 
connection with administering the lineup, and whether the 
lineup had been administered ‘blindly.’” Id. at 110. 
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adopt protocols consistent with those best practices. As the 
National Research Council has explained, such instructions 
therefore “create an incentive for agencies to adopt written 
eyewitness identification procedures and to document the 
identifications themselves.”218 
 
It is difficult to un-ring the bell that an unreliable 
eyewitness identification tolls. Therefore, in the first instance, 
it is law enforcement—not the courts—that can best ensure 
against an undue risk of convicting the innocent. However, 
robust jury instructions can minimize the dangers associated 
with inaccurate eyewitness identifications. In this case, had the 
jury been appropriately informed of the problems associated 
with the procedures used to solicit the identifications, as well 
as the numerous estimator variables that could have affected 
them, the jurors may well have concluded that James Dennis 
was not the one who shot Chedell Williams.  
                                                 
218 Id. at 110.  
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APPENDIX: Eyewitness Identifications 
 
Table 1—Photo Array Identifications 
 
Name Reaction to Array J.A. Cite 
Zahra Howard, 
Second victim 
Selects Dennis: “This looks like the guy, but I 
can’t be sure.” 
1537 
Thomas Bertha, 
Construction worker 
Selects Dennis: “This one, #1. . . . That looks 
like the one that was running with the gun.” 
1555 
Anthony Overstreet, 
Construction worker 
Selects Dennis: “[I]n the first set of photos, #1 
looks like the man who shot the girl.” 
1565 
James Cameron, 
SEPTA employee 
Selects Dennis: “#1 looks familiar but I can’t 
[be] sure.” 
1548 
David LeRoy,  
Hot dog vendor 
Could not identify anyone from arrays. 1510 
George Ritchie, 
Repairing car nearby 
Ritchie says he could not make an 
identification when shown the photos. The 
Commonwealth maintains the police never 
showed Ritchie an array. 
1384-85 
Clarence Verdell, 
Pedestrian (passed 
Williams and Howard 
on the stairs at the 
station) 
Could not identify anyone from arrays: “I 
originally had said the possibilities on this 
spread were 1, 5, and 8. I say now that it 
wasn’t #5, it would be either #1 or #8 who was 
the [shooter]. I lean more towards #1 because 
of the build of the male but he definitely 
doesn’t have that cut of hair now. I definitely 
do not remember him having his hair cut that 
way. He was behind Chedell’s girlfriend 
when I saw them.” 
1580 
Joseph DiRienzo Jr.,  
Son of fruit stand 
vendor  
Could not identify anyone from arrays. 
 
1650 
Joseph DiRienzo,  
Fruit stand vendor 
Could not identify anyone from arrays. 
 
1653 
56 
 
Table 2—Lineup Identifications  
Name Lineup Identification J.A. Cite 
Zahra Howard, 
Second victim 
Positively identifies Dennis: “I think it 
was – I think it was three.” 
228-29 
Thomas Bertha, 
Construction worker 
Identifies Dennis. 228 
Anthony Overstreet, 
Construction worker 
Identifies a different person in the 
lineup. 
228 
James Cameron, 
SEPTA employee 
Identifies Dennis. 228 
 
1 
 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment: 
 
 To say this case is troubling is a serious 
understatement.  James Dennis was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death based almost entirely upon the testimony 
of three problematic eyewitnesses and despite a dearth of 
physical evidence.  On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence in 
an opinion that is no credit to that court’s usual standards.  
See Dennis I, 715 A.2d 404 (Pa. 1998).  It rejected in a mere 
three sentences Dennis’s Brady claim with respect to the 
Cason receipt, a piece of evidence thoroughly described in 
today’s Majority opinion.  Here is the entirety of the state 
court’s analysis: 
 
Finally, it is clear that there clearly was no 
Brady violation.  The DPW receipt was not 
exculpatory, because it had no bearing on 
Appellant’s alibi, and there is no evidence that 
the Commonwealth withheld the receipt from 
the defense.  Accordingly, Appellant’s claims of 
ineffectiveness regarding Cason and the DPW 
receipt have no arguable merit. 
 
Id. at 408. 
 
 Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of that drive-by 
discussion is the assertion that the Cason receipt was not 
exculpatory because “it had no bearing on [Dennis]’s alibi.”  
Id.  In reality, the pertinence and importance of the receipt 
could not be more glaring.  It shows exactly what time 
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witness Latanya Cason received her public assistance check, 
thus shifting the timeline of events that she laid out during her 
trial testimony so that, instead of contradicting Dennis’s 
testimony, she almost perfectly corroborated his alibi.  The 
previously-undisclosed receipt thus transforms Cason from a 
damning prosecution witness into a powerful witness for the 
defense. 
 
 Every judge of our en banc Court has now concluded 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s contrary 
determination was not only wrong, but so obviously wrong 
that it cannot pass muster even under AEDPA’s highly-
deferential standard of review.  In other words, it is the 
unanimous view of this Court that any fairminded jurist must 
disagree with the Dennis I court’s assessment of the 
materiality and favorability of the Cason receipt.  Yet 
somehow a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
endorsed Dennis’s conviction and death sentence.  The lack 
of analytical rigor and attention to detail in that decision on 
direct appeal is all the more painful to contemplate because 
the proof against Dennis is far from overwhelming.  He may 
be innocent. 
 
 But the strength of the case against James Dennis need 
not be the focus of our attention.  This case can and should be 
resolved on a single point: the Brady claim concerning the 
Cason receipt.  That is one reason why I cannot join the more 
expansive opinion of my colleagues in the Majority.  Their 
correct conclusion that the error in Dennis I regarding the 
Cason receipt is by itself enough to warrant habeas relief 
means that we have no call to address the Brady claims with 
respect to the Howard police activity report and the Frazier 
documents.  And, in fact, I disagree with the Majority’s 
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analysis of those latter two claims and fully agree with my 
dissenting colleagues’ rejection of them, which is another 
reason I cannot join the Majority opinion. 
 
 Moreover, I also agree with the Dissent’s position,1 set 
forth in its discussion of the Cason receipt, that imposing a 
“reasonable diligence” requirement upon defense counsel 
does not violate a clearly established holding of the Supreme 
Court.  The “reasonable diligence” requirement is, in effect, a 
rule that a Brady claim will not lie when the evidence in 
question was available to the defense by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.  E.g., Brown v. Cain, 104 F.3d 744, 750 
(5th Cir. 1997).  We are obligated by AEDPA to uphold a 
state court’s decision unless it is “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Under AEDPA, whether any of us 
thinks that imposing a reasonable diligence requirement is a 
good idea or the best interpretation of Brady is irrelevant.  
What matters is that one can reasonably perceive such a 
requirement being allowed by Supreme Court jurisprudence.2  
                                              
 1 All references to the “Dissent” refer to Judge Fisher’s 
dissenting opinion, unless the reference is explicitly made to 
Judge Hardiman’s dissent. 
 
 2 Although the Majority is correct that the “Supreme 
Court has never recognized an affirmative due diligence duty 
of defense counsel as part of Brady” (Majority Op. at 50), 
there is no Supreme Court opinion that forecloses the 
adoption of that duty.  The Supreme Court has emphasized 
that the Brady rule requires disclosure of evidence that is 
“unknown to the defense,” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
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97, 103 (1976), and that the rule is rooted in “the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial,” id. at 108.  Based on that language, 
several courts of appeals have concluded that information is 
not unknown to the defense for Brady purposes if it can be 
obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and that 
requiring diligence on the part of defense counsel does not 
implicate the right to a fair trial.  See, e.g., Lugo v. Munoz, 
682 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1982) (“Since the information at issue 
here was available to the defense attorney through diligent 
discovery, we find that the prosecutor’s omission was not of 
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial” (internal quotation marks 
omitted).); United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5th 
Cir. Unit A 1980) (“Truth, justice, and the American way do 
not … require the Government to discover and develop the 
defendant’s entire defense.”); United States v. Hedgeman, 
564 F.2d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 1977) (establishing a diligence 
requirement and noting that “the prosecutor will not have 
violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his 
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial”).  The Dissent has also 
collected cases to that effect.  (See J. Fisher Dissent Op. at 13-
14 n.1.)  In any event, on AEDPA review it is sufficient for 
our purposes that there is no Supreme Court decision clearly 
holding that there is not a reasonable diligence requirement.  
See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (noting 
that a state-court error on habeas review must be one that is 
“well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 
any possibility for fairminded disagreement”). 
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We ourselves have applied it repeatedly,3 so we can hardly 
say that it constitutes an unreasonable application of federal 
law.   
 
 Of course, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court never said 
anything at all in its Dennis I decision about defense 
counsel’s lack of diligence in locating the Cason receipt.  But, 
under Harrington v. Richter, habeas review requires that we 
engage in so-called “gap-filling,” and apply AEDPA 
deference to whatever reasonable “arguments or theories … 
could have supported[] the state court’s decision,” if that 
decision does not provide reasoning for its conclusions.4  562 
U.S. 86, 102 (2011).  Thus, despite the fact that the 
                                              
 3 See Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“It is therefore clear that trial counsel could have 
discovered [the otherwise-suppressed evidence] had he 
exercised reasonable diligence.”); United States v. Pelullo, 
399 F.3d 197, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he burden is on the 
defendant to exercise reasonable diligence.”); United States v. 
Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant 
with information which he already has or, with any 
reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself” (internal 
quotation marks omitted).). 
 
 4 More specifically, Richter says: “Under § 2254(d), a 
habeas court must determine what arguments or theories 
supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s 
decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 
of th[e Supreme] Court.”  562 U.S. at 102. 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court never itself discussed diligence, 
Richter might prompt us to apply a reasonable diligence 
requirement and reject Dennis’s Cason receipt Brady claim – 
exactly as the Dissent has suggested – if there were a gap in 
the state-court decision for us to fill.  The problem I have with 
the Dissent is that I see no gap in the state court’s reasoning, 
at least not in the sense contemplated in Richter.  My 
dissenting colleagues are not filling a gap here; they are re-
writing the opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
adding and then elaborating a theory that was never litigated 
in state court. 
 
 The reality of what happened in Dennis I is more 
straightforward.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court simply 
erred.  Its opinion stated both that “the police came into 
possession of” the Cason receipt and that “there [was] no 
evidence that the Commonwealth withheld the receipt from 
the defense.”  Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408.  There was, 
however, no recognition that those statements are 
fundamentally at odds.  Under the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Kyles v. Whitley, any evidence in the possession of the 
police is, for Brady purposes, also in the possession of the 
prosecution.  514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).  If a piece of 
favorable, material evidence is in the possession of the police 
but is not turned over to the defense, it is necessarily withheld 
by the prosecution in violation of Brady.  See id. (prosecutors 
are responsible for “any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, 
including the police”). 
 
By entirely failing to apply Kyles, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court acted “contrary to … clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
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United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).5  In light of the state 
court’s error, I would review Dennis’s Brady claim with 
respect to the Cason receipt “unencumbered by the deference 
AEDPA normally requires,” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930, 948 (2007), to determine whether Dennis is “in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws … of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).6  On that de novo review, I 
                                              
 5 At the same time, the court went so far astray in 
applying Brady that its decision also “involved an 
unreasonable application of … clearly established Federal law 
… .”   28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 
 6 It is important to understand the interplay between 
§§ 2254(a) and 2254(d).  “Section 2254(a) permits a federal 
court to entertain only those applications alleging that a 
person is in state custody ‘in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.’”  Cullen v. Pinholster, 
563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).  Section 2254(d) imposes an 
“additional restriction” on habeas relief in cases where a 
claim “has been adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
those circumstances, habeas relief is barred unless the state 
court’s decision is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1).  Section 2254(d) thus sets forth a necessary, but 
not sufficient, prerequisite to habeas relief only for those 
claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.  If that high 
bar is cleared – i.e., the state court’s decision is so 
unreasonable or contrary to federal law as established by the 
Supreme Court – we are still restricted to granting habeas 
relief only if the petitioner has shown he is in custody in 
violation of federal law under § 2254(a).  In that second 
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would hold that the evidence in question meets all three 
requirements of Brady – the Cason receipt is material and 
favorable, and it was suppressed by the Commonwealth – for 
the reasons set out in Part III.A of the Majority opinion.  I 
therefore concur in the judgment.  I also agree with Part II of 
the Majority opinion and write separately to explain my view 
of the limits of Richter gap-filling and the proper scope of 
AEDPA deference. 
 
Recall that in Dennis I, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court said, “there is no evidence that the Commonwealth 
withheld the [Cason] receipt from the defense.”  715 A.2d at 
408.  My dissenting colleagues believe “it is not clear what 
the court meant by [that].”  (J. Fisher Dissent Op. at 8.)  They 
then proceed to fill the “gap” they think is created by the 
ambiguity they perceive, saying, “the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court could have meant that the receipt was not withheld 
because it was available to the defense with reasonable 
diligence.”  (J. Fisher Dissent Op. at 11.) 
 
 The precedent that establishes a gap-filling 
requirement, Richter, dealt with a state court decision that 
was unsupported by any reasoning.  562 U.S. at 96-97.  The 
state court issued a summary order, with no written opinion, 
denying a prisoner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  
                                                                                                     
analysis, we review the petitioner’s claim de novo, without 
deference to the state court’s legal conclusions.  Panetti, 551 
U.S. at 953 (“When a state court’s adjudication of a claim is 
dependent on an antecedent unreasonable application of 
federal law, the requirement set forth in § 2254(d)(1) is 
satisfied.  A federal court must then resolve the claim without 
the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”). 
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Id.  The gap in the state court’s reasoning was obvious – there 
was no reasoning at all.  The Supreme Court held that, even 
in those circumstances, “[w]here a state court’s decision is 
unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s 
burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable 
basis for the state court to deny relief.”  Id. at 98.  Thus 
federal courts must fill gaps in a state court’s reasoning so 
that there is something against which to measure a 
petitioner’s efforts.  In short, “a habeas court must determine 
what arguments or theories … could have supported[] the 
state court’s decision” and afford AEDPA deference to those 
theories.  Id. at 102. 
 
 Premo v. Moore extended Richter’s gap-filling 
directive a bit beyond cases devoid of all reasoning.  562 U.S. 
115 (2011).  There, a prisoner claimed ineffective assistance 
of counsel because his attorney had failed to file a motion to 
suppress a confession.  Id. at 119.  In concluding that such a 
motion “would have been fruitless,” id., the state court’s 
opinion expressly referenced trial counsel’s explanation that 
“suppression would serve little purpose” because the 
defendant had made full and admissible confessions to others.  
Id. at 123.  The state court did not, however, specify which of 
the two prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 
– deficient performance or prejudice – formed the basis of its 
rejection of the claim.  Premo, 562 U.S. at 123.  The Supreme 
Court therefore held that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had to fill that gap by assuming “that both findings 
would have involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law.”  Id.  Critical to the ultimate denial of 
habeas relief, the Supreme Court believed that the state 
court’s justification for rejecting the petitioner’s claim was 
10 
 
sufficient to address either prong of Strickland.7  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision was not an 
exercise in speculation but was rooted in the state court’s 
actual reasoning.  Premo did not require consideration of an 
entirely new argument that had not already been identified 
and accepted by the state court.  See id. at 124 (“[T]he [state 
court’s] first and independent explanation – that suppression 
would have been futile – confirms that [counsel’s] 
representation was adequate under Strickland.”).  The “gap” 
that the Court filled was thus quite narrow. 
 
 The very next year, the Supreme Court put a limit on 
gap-filling.  In Lafler v. Cooper, it upheld a grant of habeas 
corpus.  132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).  The petitioner, Anthony 
Cooper, had shot at a woman’s head but missed, instead 
hitting her in the buttock, hip, and abdomen.  Id. at 1383.  The 
prosecution offered Cooper two plea deals, and Cooper 
expressed interest.  Id.  He ended up rejecting the offers, 
though, because (he later alleged) his attorney convinced him 
                                              
 7 See Premo, 562 U.S. at 126-27 (on performance: “It 
is not clear how the successful exclusion of the confession 
would have affected counsel’s strategic calculus.  The 
prosecution had at its disposal two witnesses able to relate 
another confession. … Moore’s counsel made a reasonable 
choice to opt for a quick plea bargain.”); id. at 129 (on 
prejudice: “The state court here reasonably could have 
determined that Moore would have accepted the plea 
agreement even if his second confession had been ruled 
inadmissible.  By the time the plea agreement cut short 
investigation of Moore’s crimes, the State’s case was already 
formidable and included two witnesses to an admissible 
confession.”). 
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that the prosecution would be unable to establish intent to 
murder because he shot his victim below the waist.  Id.  After 
he was convicted on all charges, Cooper claimed ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Id.  The Michigan Court of Appeals 
rejected his claim, analyzing it as follows: 
 
[T]he record shows that defendant knowingly 
and intelligently rejected two plea offers and 
chose to go to trial. The record fails to support 
defendant’s contentions that defense counsel’s 
representation was ineffective because he 
rejected a defense based on [a] claim of self-
defense and because he did not obtain a more 
favorable plea bargain for defendant. 
 
People v. Cooper, No. 250583, 2005 WL 599740, at *1 
(Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2005) (per curiam) (internal 
citations omitted).  After the district court granted Cooper’s 
petition for habeas relief, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
emphasizing the problem in the state court’s decision with 
this comment: “it is not clear from the [state] court’s 
abbreviated discussion (only two sentences of the opinion is 
even arguably responsive to petitioner’s claim) what the court 
decided, or even whether the correct legal rule was 
identified.”  Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App’x 563, 568-69 (6th 
Cir. 2010), vacated by 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 
 While it ultimately affirmed the habeas decision, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the state court’s two-sentence 
analysis “may not be quite so opaque as the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit thought … .”  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390.  
The state court had identified Cooper’s ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, but had failed to apply the proper Strickland 
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standard to assess it.  Instead, the state court had “simply 
found that respondent’s rejection of the plea was knowing and 
voluntary.”  Id.  Although the Michigan court recited the 
Strickland standard, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
state court had mistakenly relied upon an entirely different 
standard (i.e., the “knowing and voluntary” standard), which 
was contrary to Strickland.  By relying upon the wrong 
standard altogether, “the state court’s adjudication was 
contrary to clearly established federal law.”  Id.  As a 
consequence, the Supreme Court declined to apply AEDPA 
deference to the state court decision and, instead, engaged in 
de novo review of Cooper’s Strickland claim, concluding that 
his counsel’s deficient performance and the prejudice 
therefrom required relief.  Id. at 1390-91.  The Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Lafler suggests that we should be hesitant 
to deem a state court opinion to be so lacking in analysis that 
it is comparable to an “order … unaccompanied by an 
opinion explaining [its] reasons.”  Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.  In 
other words, we ought not engage in error correction under 
the guise of gap-filling. 
 
 That holds true here.  In Dennis I, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court correctly identified Brady and its requirement 
that, for relief to be warranted, the evidence in question must 
be both exculpatory and withheld.  Nevertheless, the court 
applied a standard contrary to Brady and its progeny when it 
concluded that the prosecution did not withhold evidence that 
the police had in their possession.  Cf. Sears v. Upton, 561 
U.S. 945, 952 (2010) (per curiam) (“Although the court 
appears to have stated the proper … standard, it did not 
correctly conceptualize how that standard applies to the 
circumstances of this case.”).  Kyles is very clear in 
explaining that, for purposes of a Brady analysis, the 
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prosecution functionally possesses all favorable evidence in 
the possession of the police.  See 514 U.S. at 437 (“[T]he 
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s 
behalf in the case, including the police.”).  Just as the 
Michigan state court in Lafler failed to apply Strickland to 
assess an ineffective assistance claim, so too the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court failed to apply Kyles to assess Dennis’s Brady 
claim with respect to the Cason receipt.  Rather than applying 
Kyles, the court simply found that there was no evidence that 
the prosecutor possessed the Cason receipt.  Compare Lafler, 
132 S. Ct. at 1390 (“Rather than applying Strickland, the state 
court simply found that respondent’s rejection of the plea was 
knowing and voluntary.  An inquiry into whether the rejection 
of a plea is knowing and voluntary, however, is not the 
correct means by which to address a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”).  Lafler implies a limit on the gap-
filling called for by Richter and Premo.  As was done in 
Lafler, we should take the state court’s decision as written, 
rather than construct our own “not unreasonable” theory to 
justify that court’s conclusion. 
 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lafler further supports the 
analogy between that case and this one.  Indeed, his opinion 
reads much like the Dissent here.  First, he pointed out that 
the Michigan state court had recited the Strickland standard.  
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1396 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  He next 
read the subsequent paragraph of the state court’s decision as 
an attempt to apply that standard.  Id.  He then concluded that 
the state court did not apply a standard “contrary to” federal 
law.  Instead, by direct analogy to Premo, he argued that his 
colleagues should have assessed whether the state court 
opinion constituted an unreasonable application of clearly 
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established federal law, subject to Richter’s gap filling 
requirement: 
 
Since it is ambiguous whether the state court’s 
holding was based on a lack of prejudice or 
rather the court’s factual determination that 
there had been no deficient performance, to 
provide relief under AEDPA this Court must 
conclude that both holdings would have been 
unreasonable applications of clearly established 
law. 
 
Id.  Justice Scalia’s effort to salvage the state court decision 
in Lafler provides some support for the Dissent’s approach 
here.  But Justice Scalia was himself writing a dissent.  Had 
the Supreme Court wanted us to save every problematic state 
court opinion by gap-filling and application of AEDPA 
deference, Justice Scalia’s opinion would have been the 
majority position. 
 
 I can discern no ambiguity in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s Brady analysis regarding the Cason receipt.  
The Dennis I opinion is clear about it.  Very brief and very 
wrong, but clear.  The analysis under the suppression prong 
of Brady can be distilled from two sentences of the opinion.  
First, the court says, “During their investigation … the police 
came into possession of” the Cason receipt.8  Dennis I, 715 
                                              
 8 The Commonwealth argues that this sentence is not 
necessarily a factual finding to which we must defer under 
§ 2254(e)(1), but was instead the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s recapitulation of Dennis’s argument.  The Majority 
rightly rejects that argument.  (See Majority Op. at 46 n.17.)  
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The plain language of Dennis I indicates that the statement 
was a finding of fact.  See Paulson v. Newton Corr. Facility, 
Warden, 703 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 2013) (interpreting, in a 
habeas case, a state-court opinion consistent with its “plain 
language”).  When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 
referring to arguments from the parties, it said so: in the very 
next paragraph of that opinion, every sentence contains some 
version of the words “appellant argues.”  No such language 
appears in the disputed sentence (or its entire surrounding 
paragraph, for that matter).  Thus, it certainly appears that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was making a statement of 
historical fact when it said that “the police came into 
possession of” the Cason receipt.  Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408. 
 Without the deference afforded to an express factual 
finding, it would be an open question whether the police 
actually possessed the Cason receipt.  When Dennis first 
offered Cason’s affidavit alleging that the police took her 
receipt, he himself argued that a “remand for an evidentiary 
hearing” would be “necessary to establish the record” before 
the Brady issue could be resolved.  (App. 2012; see also App. 
1891, 2021.)  Likewise, the Commonwealth understood 
Cason’s affidavit to be merely a proffer of her “proposed 
testimony,” and argued that such testimony would have 
lacked the support of “competent evidence.”  (App. 1923.)  
Further complicating matters, Cason’s 1997 recollection of 
her interview with the police is in conflict with the police’s 
contemporaneous record of that encounter in 1992 (which did 
not enter the court record until after Dennis I, during PCRA 
proceedings).  Were we here on de novo review of that factual 
finding, we could well question whether the police did, in 
fact, have the Cason receipt.  As it stands, the state court’s 
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A.2d at 408.  It then says, “there is no evidence that the 
Commonwealth withheld the receipt from the defense.”  Id.  
If one follows the instruction of Kyles, those two statements 
are impossible to harmonize.  But if one ignores Kyles and 
assumes there exists some dividing line between the police 
and the prosecution, the court’s reasoning is plain.  To the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the fact that the police had the 
receipt does not mean that the Commonwealth had the receipt, 
and thus the Commonwealth did not suppress what it did not 
have.  There is no hint that “reasonable diligence” was part of 
the analysis.  The Commonwealth did not advance a 
reasonable diligence argument,9 nor did the court reference a 
diligence requirement anywhere in its opinion.  In failing to 
apply Kyles, the state court’s opinion was “contrary to” and 
“involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 
My dissenting colleagues treat the contradictory 
sentences in Dennis I like a “Magic Eye” image, staring past 
the obvious error until the illusion of a fillable gap 
materializes.  They do so, I assume, because it is hard to 
accept that a court would make such a clear error of law: How 
                                                                                                     
factual findings are “presumed to be correct.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(1). 
 
9 In its sur-reply brief before the state court, the 
Commonwealth mentioned the potential “public availability” 
of the receipt.  (App. 2026.)  Under Pennsylvania law, 
however, arguments raised for the first time in reply briefs are 
generally regarded as waived.  Commonwealth v. Potts, 566 
A.2d 287, 296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
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could the state court possibly have concluded both that the 
police possessed the receipt and that the prosecution did not 
withhold it?  That conclusion makes absolutely no sense if 
one assumes the state court knew of and applied Kyles.  See 
Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting 
that we start with the “presumption that state judges know 
and follow the law”).  But state courts, just like us, do 
sometimes err.  And when they do, we are not free to label 
significant errors as “gaps” to be corrected under Richter and 
Premo. 
 
Limiting our habeas review to the actual, expressed 
reasoning of a state court is itself a form of deference.  The 
principles of comity and federalism underlying AEDPA’s 
highly-deferential standard compel us to acknowledge the 
state court’s reasoning if we can fairly discern it.  See Ylst v. 
Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (describing an 
“unexplained” state-court order as one from which that 
court’s rationale is “undiscoverable”).10  We would do real 
                                              
 10 In Ylst, the Supreme Court held that when there is 
one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, any 
later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting 
the same claim will be presumed to rest upon the same 
ground.  501 U.S. at 803.  In emphasizing the difficulty of 
discerning the reasoning behind an unexplained state-court 
order – or one “whose text or accompanying opinion does not 
disclose the reason for the judgment,” id. at 802 – the Court 
said: “Indeed, sometimes the members of the court issuing an 
unexplained order will not themselves have agreed upon its 
rationale, so that the basis of the decision is not merely 
undiscoverable but nonexistent.”  Id. at 803.  Although Ylst 
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damage to those principles were we to begin re-writing state 
court opinions to save them.  Sometimes what appears to be a 
fundamental misstep is exactly that.  Since the passage of 
AEDPA, the narrow purpose of federal habeas review has 
been to address just such missteps.  See Richter, 562 U.S. at 
103 (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a 
federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s 
ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”). 
 
 There is yet another reason to think that Dennis I 
presents nothing more complicated than a Kyles error: the 
Commonwealth advocated it.  Before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, the Commonwealth advanced the incorrect 
theory that it was not required to turn over favorable evidence 
in the possession of the police.  It emphasized that, “even 
though Cason claims in her affidavit that [the receipt] was 
taken by the police,” the failure to produce that document 
could not constitute a Brady violation because “there [wa]s no 
reason to believe it was in the Commonwealth’s possession to 
be produced.”  (App. 2026.)  That argument presupposes, 
contrary to Kyles, that there exists a divide between 
discoverable evidence taken by the police and discoverable 
evidence in the prosecutor’s case file. 
 
 At the time, that argument may have had some basis in 
Pennsylvania law, although it was already untenable because 
                                                                                                     
predates the passage of AEDPA, the Richter Court cited it 
favorably, 562 U.S. at 99-100, thus indicating the continued 
validity of its presumption. 
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of Kyles.  In 1995, when Kyles was decided, the Pennsylvania 
rules governing discovery and evidence disclosure were not 
based on the premise that evidence possessed by the police is 
possessed by the prosecution.  See Pa. R. Crim. Pro. 305B 
(Repealed) (requiring mandatory disclosure of evidence 
favorable to the accused only when it “is within the 
possession or control of the attorney for the 
Commonwealth”).  Even after Kyles was decided, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court continued to hew to the out-
moded state-law rule.  See Commonwealth v. McElroy, 665 
A.2d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court likewise continued to apply its discovery rules 
as written.  See Commonwealth v. Gribble, 703 A.2d 426, 
435-36 (Pa. 1997).  It did not explicitly abrogate the faulty 
state rule of discovery until 2001.  See Commonwealth v. 
Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. 2001).  Dennis I was 
decided in 1998.  Thus, the court was not leaving a gap in its 
Dennis I opinion.  It was accepting the Commonwealth’s 
unsound argument, and it practically said so. 
 
 The wisdom of Richter gap-filling is open to 
reasonable criticism.  A widely respected judge has expressed 
the view that gap-filling is unfair and incentivizes unreasoned 
decisions; it is a perspective that my colleague Judge 
Hardiman evidently shares, as described in his Dissent.  See 
Mann v. Ryan, 774 F.3d 1203, 1225 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(Richter “has the perverse effect of encouraging state courts 
to deny relief summarily, to insulate their orders from 
tinkering by the federal courts.”), on reh’g en banc, No. 09-
99017, 2016 WL 3854234 (9th Cir. July 15, 2016).  Given 
those criticisms, it has been suggested that we should engage 
in Richter gap-filling, and thus apply AEDPA deference, even 
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when a state court does give a reasoned basis for its 
conclusions.  See id. at 1224 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“After Richter, it seems clear that we 
should assess the reasonableness of a state court’s decision, 
not its reasoning.”).  Judge Hardiman would follow that 
approach here.  (See J. Hardiman Dissent Op. at 4 (“I would 
hold that regardless of the thoroughness – or even the 
correctness – of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s stated 
reasoning, its judgment may not be upset so long as its 
decision did not contravene or unreasonably apply clearly 
established federal law … .”).)  And, indeed, his approach 
may have some appeal as a matter of policy – he has 
identified those policy justifications well – but, as a matter of 
law, I do not believe we can go so far.  Lafler does not accept 
that logic. 
 
 Nor does the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wetzel v. 
Lambert, a post-Richter decision in which the Court dealt 
with a fully-reasoned (i.e., gapless) state court opinion.  132 
S. Ct. 1195 (2012) (per curiam).  Wetzel described the 
required analytical path as follows: 
 
Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine 
what arguments or theories supported … the 
state court’s decision; and then it must ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 
disagree that those arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 
of this Court. 
 
Id. at 1198 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102).  The ellipsis in 
that quotation is significant, as the Court wholly excised the 
“or, as here, could have supported” language from its 
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quotation of Richter when describing how federal courts 
review a reasoned state-court decision.  Compare supra note 
4.  Rather than extending Richter, both Lafler and Wetzel 
suggest that gap-filling is reserved for only those cases where 
we cannot discern the basis for the state court’s conclusions.11 
                                              
 11 That reading of Richter has ample support in other 
circuits.  See, e.g., Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1158 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t does not follow from Richter that, when 
there is a reasoned decision by a lower state court, a federal 
habeas court may no longer ‘look through’ a higher state 
court’s summary denial to the reasoning of the lower state 
court.”); Johnson v. Secretary, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 930 n.9 
(11th Cir. 2011) (“The Court’s instruction from Harrington 
does not apply here because the Florida Supreme Court did 
provide an explanation of its decision … .”); Sussman v. 
Jenkins, 642 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing 
Richter because that case “addresses the situation in which a 
state-court decision ‘is unaccompanied by an explanation,’” 
whereas in the instant case “the state appellate court issued an 
opinion”). 
 To read Richter to apply to a state court’s ultimate 
decisions, irrespective of stated reasoning, also requires that 
we assume the Richter Court intended to overrule some 
precedents sub silentio.  In particular, Ylst established a 
presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state 
judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders 
upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon 
the same ground.”  501 U.S. at 803.  Judge Hardiman 
endeavors to narrow the Ylst presumption to only apply when 
we are uncertain as to whether the state court decided a claim 
“on the merits.”  (J. Hardiman Dissent Op. at 15 n.7.)  So, in 
his view, we look through to the last reasoned state court 
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decision to determine whether the case was decided on the 
merits, and then, having answered that question, take no 
account of the reasoning in that state court decision.  But, in 
applying the Ylst presumption, the Supreme Court has 
analyzed and discussed the expressed reasoning of lower state 
courts.  See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1097-99 
(2013); see also Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2128 
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) 
(“There is no reason not to ‘look through’ … to determine the 
particular reasons why the state court rejected the claim on 
the merits.”).  The proper application of the Ylst presumption 
raises all of the same policy problems Judge Hardiman has 
noted – just one step lower in the state review process.  If we 
“look through” an unreasoned state court decision, Ylst 
presumably requires that we then review the reasoning given 
in the lower state court.  If not, then why bother “looking 
through” at all?  If we truly read Richter in the way Judge 
Hardiman proposes – and took his reasoning to its logical 
conclusion – it would require that we void the Ylst 
presumption, because we need not “look through” unreasoned 
judgments when we actually review only decisions and not 
their reasoning.  But, in the words of the Supreme Court, “a 
presumption which gives [unreasoned orders] no effect – 
which simply ‘looks through’ them to the last reasoned 
decision – most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily 
intended to play.”  Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804 (emphasis in 
original).  It is hard to accept that the Richter Court intended 
to implicitly overrule Ylst, particularly because the Court 
cited Ylst favorably.  See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99-100.  The 
Court also applied the Ylst presumption just this past term, 
thus confirming its continued viability.  See Kernan v. 
Hinojosa, 136 S. Ct. 1603, 1605-06 (2016) (per curiam).  
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And, under Judge Hardiman’s approach, Ylst is not the 
only precedent that would have to fall.  Compare J. Hardiman 
Dissent Op. at 14-15 (“Where the state court denies relief but 
addresses only certain prongs of a test or components of a 
claim, the reviewing federal court should likewise consider 
what reasons regarding an unaddressed prong or component 
could have supported the decision.”), with Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (reviewing a Strickland claim, and 
concluding that its “review is not circumscribed by a state 
court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the 
state courts below reached this prong of the Strickland 
analysis”), and Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 400 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citing Wiggins for the proposition “that because 
the state courts did not decide the prejudice issue on the 
merits, AEDPA’s deferential standards do not apply to our 
resolution of the prejudice question”).  In Wiggins, the 
Supreme Court did not defer to the state court’s order in 
assessing the second prong of the petitioner’s Strickland 
claim because “neither of the state courts below reached this 
prong of the Strickland analysis.”  539 U.S. at 534.  The 
Court thus acted contrary to Judge Hardiman’s proposed 
holding here – it engaged in de novo review of the second 
prong even though “the state court denie[d] relief but 
addresse[d] only certain prongs of a test or components of a 
claim … .”  (J. Hardiman Dissent Op. at 14.)  Judge 
Hardiman forthrightly acknowledges that his proposed 
holding is in tension with Wiggins, but then suggests that 
Richter (as the later of the two cases) undermines Wiggins.  I 
do not believe that Richter intended that result, especially 
because the two cases can be reconciled. 
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 That is not the case here.  Were Dennis in exactly the 
same position but the Dennis I opinion contained one or two 
fewer sentences, there would perhaps be a gap to fill and I 
would be joining my dissenting colleagues in applying 
AEDPA deference, but there is no gap.  The Dennis I opinion 
suffers from erroneous and not opaque reasoning.  It may 
seem odd that so much hinges on so little, with a man’s life 
depending on the difference between bad reasoning and no 
reasoning.  That, however, is the analytical distinction drawn 
by Supreme Court precedent, including Richter, Premo, and 
Lafler.12   
                                              
 12 Again, if we determine that a state court’s reasoning 
is contrary to clearly established federal law, we then engage 
in de novo review of the claim in question.  See supra note 6; 
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948-54.  In his dissent, Judge Hardiman 
posits a hypothetical in which our decision to grant habeas 
relief could turn on the state court’s method of drafting its 
decision.  If the state court issues a summary order, we would 
apply Richter and deny habeas relief by application of 
AEDPA deference.  If, however, it issues a reasoned decision, 
and that reasoning is contrary to clearly-established federal 
law, we would grant habeas relief – to the very same claimant 
– after de novo review of the underlying claim.  My colleague 
thinks that outcome absurd, but, whether we like it or not, that 
is what the Supreme Court directs us to do.  Under AEDPA, 
we must defer (1) to the reasoning actually elaborated in a 
state court decision, and (2) to any basis that can reasonably 
support a state court’s decision, but only if its own reasoning 
cannot be fairly discerned.  The latter is the import of Richter.  
If the Supreme Court wanted us to afford AEDPA deference 
to all state court decisions regardless of the extent of their 
reasoning, that would be a rule of considerable consequence 
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Given the magnitude of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s error regarding the Cason receipt, this case presents 
the sort of “extreme malfunction[] in the state criminal justice 
system” that demands our intervention.  Richter, 562 U.S. at 
102 (internal quotation marks omitted).  I therefore concur in 
Part III.A of the Majority’s opinion, insofar as it explains why 
it is proper to grant Dennis habeas relief on de novo review of 
the Cason receipt Brady claim, and I concur in Part II of the 
Majority opinion and in the judgment. 
                                                                                                     
for habeas petitioners.  Presumably the Supreme Court would 
have said (or at least suggested) as much in Richter, Premo, 
Lafler, Wetzel, or any of the other numerous habeas appeals it 
has considered in recent years and that Judge Hardiman has 
collected in his dissent.  If anything, though, the Court has 
said the contrary.  See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954 (“§ 2254 does 
not preclude relief if either the reasoning or the result of the 
state-court decision contradicts” clearly-established Supreme 
Court precedent (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted, emphasis added).). 
 A petitioner does not get any windfall under the 
approach I have outlined based on Supreme Court precedent.  
If his claim does not have merit, it will fail even under de 
novo review.  Under Judge Hardiman’s approach, by contrast, 
state prosecution teams do get a windfall.  They would prevail 
unless every conceivable route to victory is “contrary to … 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1).  In other words, the prosecution wins even if it 
never argued a sensible position and the state court gave only 
a completely erroneous basis for its decision.  I do not believe 
we can or should read Richter as going that far. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom SMITH, 
CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges, join.  
A Philadelphia jury convicted James Dennis of murder 
and sentenced him to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
affirmed his conviction and sentence. His petition for 
postconviction relief was denied, and, after several interven-
ing decisions, this denial was affirmed by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. The Majority overturns these state-court 
decisions by concluding that the prosecution failed to disclose 
to Dennis exculpatory material in violation of Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Majority is particularly 
concerned about the reliability of eyewitness testimony and 
about a “shodd[y]” investigation by the Philadelphia police. 
Maj. Op. 89. By taking this approach, the Majority goes off 
course for two reasons. First, the evidence against Dennis was 
strong—it is hard to discount the identification testimony of 
three eyewitnesses. Second, and more importantly, the 
Majority fails to adhere to the narrowly circumscribed scope 
of habeas review. Congress has decreed that we may not grant 
a writ of habeas corpus unless the judgment of the state court 
was clearly unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Applying this 
standard of review to a case such as this one is difficult, but 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed those courts of 
appeals that have not faithfully followed this mandate. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply 
clearly established federal law, and for that reason I dissent. 
I 
On a sunny fall afternoon in 1991, Chedell Williams and 
her friend Zahra Howard got off the bus that had brought 
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them from their high school and climbed the steps of the Fern 
Rock SEPTA station in Philadelphia. Two men accosted them 
and demanded their earrings. Williams ran into the street to 
escape. One of the men chased her, grabbed her, and ripped 
her earrings out of her ears. He raised a silver revolver and 
fired one shot into her neck from less than an inch away. 
Williams collapsed and died. The shooter fled. Three 
eyewitnesses, including Howard, observed the shooter at 
close range. They each identified the shooter in a photo array, 
in a lineup, and at trial: the shooter was James Dennis. 
The Majority discusses in detail the testimony of the 
three eyewitnesses who testified at trial that Dennis shot 
Williams: Zahra Howard, Thomas Bertha, and James 
Cameron. The Majority calls out discrepancies between the 
eyewitnesses’ descriptions of the shooter’s height and weight 
(said to be 5′9″ or 5′10″ and 170 to 180 pounds) and Dennis’s 
actual size (5′5″ and 125 to 135 pounds). The reliability of the 
eyewitness identifications is irrelevant to the legal question 
we must decide—which is whether the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court unreasonably applied Brady and its progeny. Neverthe-
less, a few points about the identifications are worth 
mentioning. First, the visual conditions were excellent. The 
murder occurred in the afternoon and the weather was clear. 
Second, the witnesses saw the shooter at close range and had 
unobstructed views of his face. Howard was one to two feet 
away from the shooter and looked him in the face. Bertha and 
the shooter made eye contact from less than eight feet away, 
and Bertha was able to observe the expression on the 
shooter’s face. Cameron saw the face of the shooter from 
eight to ten feet away. Third, none of the identifications was 
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cross-racial. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 72 n.8 
(1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting studies showing that 
cross-racial identifications are less accurate than same-race 
identifications). And fourth, witnesses generally overestimate 
the height and weight of men who are below population 
averages, as Dennis was. Christian A. Meissner et al., Person 
Descriptions as Eyewitness Evidence 3, 8, in 2 Handbook of 
Eyewitness Psychology (Rod C.L. Lindsay et al., eds. 2007) 
(noting a tendency for witnesses to underestimate the height 
of taller targets and overestimate the height of shorter 
targets); Rhona H. Flin & John W. Shepherd, Tall Stories: 
Eyewitnesses’ Ability to Estimate Height and Weight 
Characteristics, 5 Human Learning 29, 34 (1986) (noting the 
same effect for both height and weight); see id. at 36 (citing a 
study finding that “witnesses tend to overestimate the height 
of criminals”). 
The defense vigorously cross-examined these witnesses 
and elicited some discrepancies between their testimony and 
prior statements and between estimates of the shooter’s height 
and weight and Dennis’s. Nevertheless, the jury found the 
eyewitnesses’ testimony credible. In addition to that testimony, 
the prosecution called Charles Thompson, a member of 
Dennis’s singing group, who testified that he saw Dennis with 
a small silver handgun several hours after the murder. 
Whatever one might feel about the testimony of these 
witnesses or the testimony of eyewitnesses in general, the 
evidence that convinced the jury to convict Dennis was not, 
as the district court described it, “scant evidence at best.” 
Dennis v. Wetzel, 966 F. Supp. 2d 489, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2013). 
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Dennis’s Brady claims concern three documents that he 
asserts the prosecution should have turned over to him before 
trial: a receipt from the Department of Public Welfare (DPW), 
a police activity sheet reporting a conversation with 
Williams’s aunt and uncle, and police records describing the 
investigation of a jailhouse tip. The receipt relates to a 
possible alibi witness, Latanya Cason. Dennis told police that 
he was riding a bus at the time of the murder—shortly before 
2:00 p.m.—and that he saw Cason and waved to her as he left 
the bus. Cason testified at trial that she saw Dennis at 4:00 or 
4:30 p.m., which did not support his alibi. Cason visited the 
DPW before seeing Dennis that day. Dennis asserts that the 
police had a time-stamped receipt from Cason’s DPW visit 
and that, had the receipt been turned over to the defense, 
Cason would have testified that she saw Dennis at 2:00 or 
2:30 p.m. The subject of Dennis’s second claim is a police 
activity sheet containing detectives’ notes of an interview 
with Williams’s aunt and uncle, Diane and Mannasett Pugh. 
According to the notes, the Pughs told detectives that Zahra 
Howard told them she recognized the shooter from her high 
school. This conflicts with Howard’s statements to police and 
testimony at trial that she had never seen the shooter before. 
The third Brady claim concerns police records of an 
investigation of a tip by an inmate, William Frazier, who told 
police that his friend, Tony Brown, admitted to Frazier that 
Brown shot Williams. Police never located Tony Brown, and 
Frazier later admitted that he made up the entire story.  
The district court concluded that the prosecution violated 
Brady by suppressing each of these three items and found that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determinations to the 
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contrary unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent. I disagree with the Majority’s affirmance of 
the district court and will explain my reasons in detail.  
II 
The source of my disagreement with the Majority is its 
failure to apply the deferential standard of review prescribed 
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA). When a state prisoner applies for a writ of habeas 
corpus on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 
court, a federal court may not grant the application unless the 
state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state 
court’s application of the law or determination of the facts is 
not unreasonable merely because it is—in the eyes of the 
reviewing federal court—wrong. The decision must be “so 
lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 
86, 103 (2011).  
We must give state-court decisions “the benefit of the 
doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). This 
duty to give state-court decisions deference applies even 
when a state court does not give a reasoned explanation of its 
decision. “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied 
by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be 
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met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state 
court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. In such a 
situation, the reviewing federal court must consider arguments 
and theories that “could have supported” the decision. Id. at 
102.  
The AEDPA standard is intentionally difficult to meet. 
The standard reflects state courts’ competence to resolve 
federal constitutional questions and states’ strong interest in 
controlling their criminal justice systems. Federal habeas 
corpus is designed to “‘guard against extreme malfunctions in 
the state criminal justice systems,’ not [to] substitute for 
ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102–03 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)). Among the courts of appeals, 
however, there has been some reluctance to adhere to the 
AEDPA standard as defined by the Supreme Court. In recent 
terms, the Court has issued a string of reversals, many as 
summary per curiam opinions, for failure to apply the correct 
standard of review under AEDPA. See, e.g., Woods v. 
Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149 (2016) (per curiam); Woods v. 
Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372 (2015) (per curiam); Glebe v. Frost, 
135 S. Ct. 429 (2014); Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1 (2014) 
(per curiam); Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013) 
(per curiam); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012) (per 
curiam); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010). There are many 
more. I fear that this case may join that list.  
The Majority holds that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
unreasonably applied the United States Supreme Court’s 
decisions in the line of cases discussing prosecutors’ duty to 
turn over favorable evidence to the defense. In Brady v. 
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Maryland, the Court held that “the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The Court later ruled 
that the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence applies whether 
a defendant requests it or not. United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The Court explained that a Brady 
violation has three components: evidence that is (1) favorable 
to the defendant, (2) suppressed by the prosecution, and (3) 
material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). 
Favorable evidence includes both exculpatory evidence and 
evidence that could be used to impeach prosecution 
witnesses. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 
Evidence can be suppressed even if it is only known to the 
police and not to the prosecutor—“the individual prosecutor 
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, 
including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 
(1995). Evidence is material if “there is a reasonable 
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced 
a different verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281. The materiality 
of suppressed evidence must be assessed cumulatively, “not 
item by item.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436. 
III 
A 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the Brady 
claim based on Latanya Cason’s DPW receipt (and an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his counsel’s 
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failure to investigate Cason) without providing much 
reasoning or detail. The court noted that Cason testified that 
she saw Dennis at around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. the day of the 
murder based on her recollection that she had left work to 
cash her welfare check at about 2:00 p.m. “During their 
investigation, however, the police came into possession of a 
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) receipt showing that 
Cason cashed her check at 1:03 p.m.” Commonwealth v. 
Dennis, 715 A.2d 404, 408 (Pa. 1998) (“Dennis I”). The court 
found that the receipt was not material because even if the 
defense knew of the receipt, Cason’s corrected testimony 
“would not support [Dennis’s] alibi … because the murder 
occurred at 1:50 p.m., forty minutes earlier than Cason’s 
earliest estimate.” Id. The court concluded: “Finally, it is clear 
that there clearly was no Brady violation. The DPW receipt 
was not exculpatory, because it had no bearing on [Dennis’s] 
alibi, and there is no evidence that the Commonwealth 
withheld the receipt from the defense.” Id. 
I agree with the Majority that the Cason receipt was 
favorable to Dennis and was material, but I disagree with the 
Majority’s conclusion that the receipt was suppressed. 
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s representations 
about clarity, it is not clear what the court meant by “there is 
no evidence that the Commonwealth withheld the receipt 
from the defense.” The Majority acknowledges that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “provided no explanation.” Maj. 
Op. 46. Yet the Majority assumes that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court made an unreasonable finding of fact or 
conclusion of law that the prosecution had no duty to disclose 
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the receipt because it was in possession of the police—a 
finding clearly foreclosed by Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38. 
When a state court does not give a reasoned explanation, 
we are not permitted to assume or guess what the most likely 
explanation is. “Where a state court’s decision is unaccompa-
nied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still 
must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 
state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (emphasis 
added). In other words, when there is an analytical gap in a 
state court’s reasoning, we must consider “what arguments or 
theories … could have supported … the state court’s 
decision.” Id. at 102.  
Although the state-court decision at issue in Richter was 
a summary disposition, the Supreme Court’s instruction to 
consider arguments that could have supported the state court’s 
decision is not limited to summary dispositions. In Premo v. 
Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011), which was decided the same day 
as Richter, the Supreme Court considered theories that could 
have supported a reasoned, written decision with an analytical 
gap. In state postconviction relief proceedings, Moore argued 
that his counsel had been unconstitutionally ineffective under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The state 
court rejected his Strickland argument, but, as the Supreme 
Court noted, the “state court did not specify” whether the 
ineffectiveness claim failed “because there was no deficient 
performance under Strickland or because Moore suffered no 
Strickland prejudice, or both.” Moore, 562 U.S. at 123. In 
order for a federal court to grant habeas relief, both prongs 
would need to have involved an unreasonable application of 
clearly established federal law. Id. The Supreme Court found 
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that the state court “reasonably could have concluded that 
Moore was not prejudiced by [his] counsel’s actions. Under 
AEDPA, that finding ends federal review.” Id. at 131. 
Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided no 
explanation for why it found that the receipt was not withheld 
from the defense, there is an analytical gap. This gap is more 
open-ended than the two possibilities the state court could 
have considered in Moore and narrower than a summary 
disposition, such as Richter, where the universe of possible 
theories is broad. But our obligation to consider what theories 
could have supported the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision is no less than in Richter and Moore.  
Judge Jordan, in his opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, takes the position that there is no 
gap to be filled under Richter and Moore. He believes that the 
only way to explain the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
statements that the police had the receipt but that the 
Commonwealth did not withhold the receipt is that the court 
failed to apply Kyles. Judge Jordan concludes that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court “simply found that there was no 
evidence that the prosecutor possessed the Cason receipt.” 
Concurring Op. 13. This is a reasonable explanation, but it is 
not the only explanation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
opinion lacks sufficient analysis to tell what it meant by 
“there is no evidence the Commonwealth withheld the receipt 
from the defense.” Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408. If we “take the 
state court’s decision as written,” Concurring Op. 13, rather 
than assuming that the state court made a mistake, there is an 
analytical gap. 
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The Majority also takes the position that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court violated Kyles. The Majority 
notes, however, that “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
provided no explanation for its … statement [that there was 
‘no evidence that the Commonwealth withheld the receipt 
from the defense’], and we cannot be sure whether the court 
was assessing the facts or interpreting the law.” Maj. Op. 46. 
Despite this lack of clarity, the Majority is evidently certain 
that it knows “the precise basis for the state court’s ruling.” 
Id. at 34. Unlike the Majority, I am unable to discern the 
precise basis for the state court’s ruling, and, for that reason, 
this is one of those cases in which consideration of theories 
that could have supported the state court’s decision is 
required. 
This required consideration leads to the conclusion that 
there is a viable gap-filling theory here: the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court could have meant that the receipt was not 
withheld because it was available to the defense with 
reasonable diligence. The reasonable diligence “branch of the 
Brady doctrine” is evident, albeit inconsistent, in our own 
precedents. See United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973 
(3d Cir. 1991) (“Evidence is not considered to be suppressed 
if the defendant either knew or should have known of the 
essential facts permitting him to take advantage of any 
exculpatory evidence.” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant 
with information which he already has or, with any 
reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” (quoting United 
States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
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But see Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 664 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he fact that a criminal record is a public document 
cannot absolve the prosecutor of her responsibility to provide 
that record to defense counsel.” (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
Despite this inconsistency, we reinforced the conclusion 
that Brady has a reasonable diligence component in Grant v. 
Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2013). In Grant, the 
prosecution failed to disclose that its key witness—the only 
person who testified that Grant was the shooter—was on 
parole at the time of the shooting. Grant’s postconviction 
relief counsel was able to discover that the witness was on 
parole, and his trial counsel could have looked up the 
witness’s criminal history in records kept by the clerk of 
court. We concluded that Grant’s Brady claim “lacked merit” 
because “trial counsel could have discovered [the witness’s] 
parole status had he exercised reasonable diligence.” Id. at 
230, 231. 
The Majority correctly notes that our case law on Brady 
reasonable diligence “is inconsistent and could easily 
confuse” and clarifies that reasonable diligence “plays no role 
in the Brady analysis.” Maj. Op. 54. This clarification to our 
case law is helpful, and were we reviewing this case on direct 
appeal it would be entirely appropriate. The “no reasonable 
diligence” rule may indeed represent the best interpretation of 
the Supreme Court’s Brady case law. But this rule is 
nonetheless an interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. It 
does not represent a clearly established holding of the Court, 
and it does not mean that any other interpretation is 
unreasonable. 
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The reasonableness of interpreting Brady to have a 
reasonable diligence component is supported by the decisions 
of other courts of appeals. The Majority notes with surprise 
that “several Courts of Appeals have endorsed some form of a 
due diligence requirement.” Maj. Op. 54 n.20. “Several” 
understates the matter. A majority of the courts of appeals 
have applied a reasonable diligence requirement at one time 
or another.1 The number of courts (including our court, ten 
                                              
1.  First Circuit: United States v. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d 135, 
147 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The government has no Brady 
burden when the necessary facts for impeachment are 
readily available to a diligent defender ….”). 
 Second Circuit: United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 
1208 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[E]vidence is not considered to 
have been suppressed within the meaning of the Brady 
doctrine if the defendant or his attorney either knew, or 
should have known, of the essential facts permitting him 
to take advantage of that evidence.” (internal quotation 
marks and alteration omitted)). 
 Fourth Circuit: United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 
381 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[W]here the exculpatory 
information is not only available to the defendant but also 
lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have 
looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the 
Brady doctrine.”). 
 Fifth Circuit: United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 199 
(5th Cir. 1997) (“Brady does not obligate the government 
to produce for a defendant evidence or information 
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already known to him, or that he could have obtained 
from other sources by exercising reasonable diligence.” 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); United 
States v. Prior, 546 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(“[N]umerous cases have ruled that the government is not 
obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with 
information which he already has or, with any reasonable 
diligence, he can obtain himself.”). 
 Sixth Circuit: Matthews v. Ishee, 486 F.3d 883, 891 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (“Where … the factual basis for a claim is 
reasonably available to the petitioner or his counsel from 
another source, the government is under no duty to 
supply that information to the defense.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 Seventh Circuit: Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“Evidence is suppressed for Brady purposes 
only if … the evidence was not otherwise available to the 
defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”). 
 Eighth Circuit: United States v. Zuazo, 243 F.3d 428, 
431 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The government does not suppress 
evidence in violation of Brady by failing to disclose 
evidence to which the defendant had access through other 
channels.”). 
 Ninth Circuit: Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792, 804 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“[W]here the defendant is aware of the essential 
facts enabling him to take advantage of any exculpatory 
evidence, the Government does not commit a Brady 
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out of the twelve regional courts of appeals) and decisions 
applying a reasonable diligence requirement hardly evince a 
clearly established Supreme Court rule that reasonable 
diligence plays no role in the Brady analysis. Even if the 
Majority is correct and all these decisions erroneously applied 
Brady, it is hard to conclude that the error is “well understood 
and comprehended in existing law” and “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 
103. Surely, given the number of federal circuit judges who 
have concluded that reasonable diligence is a consideration in 
the analysis of a Brady claim, “it is possible fairminded jurists 
could disagree” that reasonable diligence is inconsistent with 
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 102. 
Under the specific facts of this case, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court easily could have concluded that Latanya 
Cason’s DPW receipt was available to Dennis’s counsel had 
his counsel exercised reasonable diligence. Dennis was aware 
of Cason—the police only interviewed her after Dennis told 
                                                                                                     
violation by not bringing the evidence to the attention of 
the defense.” (quoting United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 
197, 200 (2d Cir. 1978)). 
 Eleventh Circuit: LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
421 F.3d 1237, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005) (“To establish that 
he suffered a Brady violation, the defendant must prove 
that … the defendant did not possess the evidence and 
could not have obtained it with reasonable diligence 
….”). 
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them she had seen him. Dennis’s appellate counsel obtained 
the receipt from the DPW. And Dennis argued that his trial 
counsel would have located the receipt with “minimal 
investigation.”2 (App. 1800.) It was not an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent 
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to conclude that there 
was no Brady violation where trial counsel could have 
discovered the evidence by exercising reasonable diligence 
and investigating his own client’s alibi witness. See United 
States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he 
defendants are hoisted by their own petard: without having 
obtained the Broward County file they would not have a 
Brady argument, but the ease with which they obtained their 
file defeats their claim.”). 
The Majority contends the Supreme Court did “away 
with any belief that Brady imposes a due diligence 
requirement” in Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004). Maj. 
Op. 53. But Banks, which was decided after the Pennsylvania 
                                              
2.  The Majority asserts that the DPW receipt was not 
publicly available because DPW regulations prevent 
disclosure of information about welfare recipients. Maj. 
Op. 49–50. Dennis did not argue this point below or raise 
it on appeal, and, to the extent the DPW privacy 
regulations applied to the receipt, Dennis’s admission that 
the receipt was available with minimal investigation 
makes the regulations irrelevant. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Dennis I,3 is distinguishable. In 
Banks, the prosecution withheld evidence that one 
prosecution witness had been “intensively coached” by 
prosecutors before his testimony and another witness was a 
paid police informant. 540 U.S. at 677–78. The prosecution 
failed to correct these witnesses’ testimony when the 
witnesses denied talking to anyone about their testimony or 
receiving payments from police. Id. The Supreme Court 
refused to adopt a rule allowing the prosecution to “lie and 
conceal” evidence so long as the prisoner might have been 
able to detect the “potential existence” of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Id. at 696. Unlike the DPW receipt at issue in the 
present case, the evidence in Banks of the witness coaching 
and police payments was solely in the hands of the 
prosecution. No amount of diligent investigation would have 
uncovered that evidence. Banks is not directly applicable to 
evidence that could have been discovered after “minimal 
investigation.” See Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 235 (6th Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (concluding that Banks did not call into 
question precedents applying a reasonable diligence 
requirement). 
                                              
3.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States’ … refers to the 
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions 
as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of Dennis’s Brady 
claim based on the receipt was an unreasonable application of 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 
B 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasonably determined 
that the Pugh statement was immaterial under Brady. The 
statement was found in a police activity sheet that showed 
that Chedell Williams’s aunt and uncle, Diane and Mannasett 
Pugh, told police that Zahra Howard told them that she 
recognized the shooter from school. This alleged statement is 
contrary to what Howard repeatedly told police and testified 
about at trial—that she had never seen the shooter before he 
accosted Williams and her at the SEPTA station.  
The postconviction relief court held an evidentiary 
hearing about this Brady claim. Howard testified that she 
never told Williams’s family that she had seen the shooter 
before. When confronted by the purported statement in the 
police activity sheet, she denied ever having made it. Diane 
Pugh testified that, as far as she could remember, Howard 
never said she recognized the shooter before the murder.  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the 
police activity sheet showing the Pugh statement was not 
material under Brady because there was no reasonable 
probability of a different result had the sheet been turned 
over. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 308–09 (Pa. 
2011) (“Dennis IV ”). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted 
that Howard “was extensively cross-examined at trial” about 
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her identification of Dennis, including about whether she had 
ever seen the shooter before, and she steadfastly testified that 
Dennis was the shooter and that she had never seen him 
before. Id. at 309. Two eyewitnesses other than Howard 
identified Dennis in a photo array, in a line up, and at trial, 
and these witnesses would not have been affected by any 
impeachment of Howard. Id. For these reasons, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Dennis “still received 
a fair trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. 
This conclusion was not an unreasonable interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
The Majority correctly notes that heavy impeachment of 
a witness does not render further impeachment immaterial. 
See Banks, 540 U.S. at 702. In Banks, the prosecution 
suppressed information that a key witness was a government 
informant, and the government argued this information was 
“merely cumulative” because the witness was heavily 
impeached at trial. Id. None of the testimony at trial 
concerned the witness’s status as an informant, however. The 
Court concluded this missing information was material 
because the jury was ignorant of the witness’s “true role” in 
the case. Id. 
The impeachment value of the activity sheet in this case 
was minor. Howard’s identification of Dennis was cross-
examined at trial. She credibly testified in the postconviction 
relief hearing that she never made the statements attributed to 
her in the activity sheet. The activity sheet’s double hearsay 
makes it inherently weak. This is not the kind of evidence 
considered material in Banks.  
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The Majority asserts that had the activity sheet been 
disclosed, “defense counsel could have impeached Howard in 
a manner that very well may have led her to admit she 
recognized the perpetrators from her high school.” Maj. Op. 
76. There is no basis in the record for this speculation, which 
is undercut by Howard’s consistency in all her sworn 
testimony at trial and during the postconviction relief hearing. 
Such a dramatic courtroom reversal is more likely in a 
Matlock or Perry Mason script than in reality. The unlikely 
nature of this speculation does not create a reasonable 
probability of a different result or “undermine confidence in 
the outcome,” as required for Brady materiality.4 Kyles, 473 
U.S. at 682. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s consideration of the 
strength of the other evidence against Dennis was also not 
unreasonable. The materiality of the activity sheet “must be 
evaluated in the context of the entire record.” Agurs, 427 U.S. 
at 112. And “evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be 
material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to 
sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 
                                              
4.  The Majority adopts the district court’s conclusion that 
the activity sheet would have shown that Howard either 
lied to the Pughs or lied at trial. Maj. Op. 76. Given 
Howard’s testimony at trial and the postconviction relief 
hearings, an alternative conclusion is as least as likely: in 
a crowded and grieving house immediately after the 
murder, the Pughs misunderstood or later misreported 
what Howard said. 
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627, 630 (2012). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could 
reasonably have concluded, in the context of the entire record, 
that any impeachment value of the activity sheet would not 
undermine confidence in the verdict. Bertha and Cameron 
also identified Dennis in a photo array, in a line up, and at 
trial. Impeachment of Howard would not have affected the 
weight of their testimony. 
The Majority emphasizes the importance of Howard as 
“the eyewitness with the most significant exposure to the 
shooter” and minimizes Bertha and Cameron as “located 
farther away” with “only brief glimpses of the perpetrators” 
or “paying little attention.” Maj. Op. 76. But in this case, 
“farther away” was only eight feet from the shooter for 
Bertha and ten feet from the shooter for Cameron, and each 
had an unobstructed view of the shooter’s face. To the extent 
Bertha and Cameron had not been paying attention to the 
commotion, the gunshot focused their view and spurred them 
into action. Bertha stepped into the street as the shooter ran 
past, stopped as the shooter raised his gun, and then followed 
behind him. Cameron and the shooter made eye contact. 
When the shooter fled, Cameron ran to aid Williams. The 
eyewitness testimony of Bertha and Cameron was powerful 
evidence of guilt. 
The Majority criticizes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
for applying a “sufficiency of the evidence” standard in lieu 
of the appropriate Brady materiality standard. Nowhere, 
however, did the Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulate the 
wrong standard. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized 
that Brady materiality is not a question of sufficiency of 
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evidence in Commonwealth v. Weiss, 986 A.2d 808 (Pa. 
2009), and it cited Weiss in Dennis IV.5  
The Majority nevertheless concludes that, even if the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court knew the correct standard, it 
unreasonably applied that standard to the facts of this case. 
The Majority focuses on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
statement that “disclosure of the activity sheet would have 
had no impact upon [Bertha’s and Cameron’s eyewitness] 
testimony.” Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 309. According to the 
Majority, this is evidence that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court was proceeding down a wrong “analytical path.” Maj. 
Op. 81. But there is nothing inherently wrong with this 
analytical path. The United States Supreme Court has, at 
times, made similar statements.  
For instance, in Strickler v. Greene, the prosecution 
withheld exculpatory materials that would have been 
                                              
5.  See Weiss, 986 A.2d at 816 (remanding to the 
postconviction relief court to “consider whether 
disclosure of the impeachment evidence to competent 
counsel would have made a different result reasonably 
probable,” which “will necessarily entail a review of all 
the evidence presented at trial, not for its sufficiency, but 
for the potential negative effect disclosure of the alleged 
impeachment evidence would have had thereon”); id. at 
815 (“The United States Supreme Court has made clear 
that Bagley’s materiality standard is not a sufficiency of 
the evidence test.”). 
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“devastating ammunition for impeaching” the prosecution’s 
key witness, Anne Stoltzfus. 527 U.S. 263, 296 (1999) 
(Souter, J., dissenting). At the petitioner’s capital murder trial, 
Stoltzfus testified “in vivid detail” about the abduction of the 
murder victim. Id. at 266 (majority opinion). Stoltzfus was the 
only disinterested eyewitness who testified. The exculpatory 
materials were police notes of interviews with Stoltzfus and 
letters Stoltzfus wrote to the police that cast serious doubt on 
her testimony. The Court found all the elements of Brady met 
except for materiality. Although the Court recognized the 
importance of Stoltzfus’s eyewitness testimony, that was not 
the only evidence before the jury. Other eyewitnesses placed 
the petitioner at the shopping mall where the abduction 
occurred, and “considerable forensic and other physical 
evidence” linked the petitioner to the crime. Id. at 293. The 
Court concluded that “[t]he record provides strong support for 
the conclusion that petitioner would have been convicted of 
capital murder and sentenced to death, even if Stoltzfus had 
been severely impeached.” Id. at 294. Thus, the petitioner did 
not convince the Court that there was “a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have returned a different 
verdict if her testimony had been either severely impeached 
or excluded entirely.” Id. at 296. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in this case is not appreciably different 
from the reasoning in Strickler.  
The Majority’s remaining reason for concluding that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied the facts 
is that the Majority considered the same facts and reached a 
different conclusion. This is not a proper basis for granting 
habeas relief. There is a reasonable possibility that impeach-
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ment of Howard might have produced a different result, but 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply 
the facts or law in concluding that Dennis did not establish a 
reasonable probability of a different result. See id. at 291. I 
would not grant habeas relief on this claim. 
C 
Dennis’s final Brady claim concerns documents about 
the police investigation of a lead from William Frazier. 
Frazier, an inmate at the Montgomery County Correctional 
Facility, contacted police and informed them that he knew 
who shot Chedell Williams. He told a story about a three-way 
call he received in jail with his aunt and a friend named Tony 
Brown. During the call, Tony Brown admitted that he 
accidentally shot Williams while robbing her. Tony Brown 
told Frazier that he was accompanied by his friend Ricky 
Walker, who was Frazier’s cousin, and another man, “Skeet,” 
who drove the car. 
Despite Frazier’s being a jailhouse informant who 
obviously wanted to parlay information for something in 
return (even if only a day out of jail), the police investigated 
his tip. They took Frazier on a ride-along to Tony Brown’s 
house, Ricky Walker’s house, the pawnshop where Tony 
Brown allegedly sold Williams’s earrings, Skeet’s house, and 
Frazier’s girlfriend’s house. Police interviewed Frazier’s 
landlord and Walker. Walker told police that he never heard of 
anyone named Tony Brown or “Skeet.” He explained that he 
“can’t stand” Frazier, who racked up $1,000 in charges on a 
phone calling card Walker had lent to him. Despite this 
investigation, police found no trace of a Tony Brown. This is 
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not surprising. Frazier later admitted that he concocted the 
entire story.6 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Dennis’s 
Brady claim about the Frazier lead documents because the 
documents were inadmissible hearsay. Commonwealth v. 
Dennis, 950 A.2d 945, 968 (Pa. 2008) (“Dennis III”). This 
conclusion is not an unreasonable application of clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent.  
Authority is split about whether inadmissible evidence 
can be the basis for a Brady violation. Our court, along with 
the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, has concluded that admissibility is not a prerequisite 
for a Brady claim. See, e.g., Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 
130 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]nadmissible evidence may be material 
if it could have led to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
                                              
6.  The Majority asserts that the Frazier “lead was not 
fruitless, it was simply not rigorously pursued.” Maj. Op. 
88. The police did pursue this lead, however, going so far 
as to take Frazier out of his jail cell and bring him with 
them on his tour of Philadelphia. The Majority questions 
why police did not interview more of the people involved 
in Frazier’s tale. Police can always do more investigative 
work, but they have limited resources. And simply put, 
this lead coming from a jailhouse snitch was a dead end. 
The police should not be faulted for deciding not to waste 
more time on what Frazier himself admitted was 
“bullshit.” Response to Pet. Rh’g 17 n.13. 
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The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have concluded otherwise. 
Jardine v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772, 777 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Logically, inadmissible evidence is immaterial under this 
rule.”); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.3 (4th Cir. 
1996) (“[T]hese statements may well have been inadmissible 
at trial … and therefore, as a matter of law, ‘immaterial’ for 
Brady purposes.”).  
The Majority recognizes the contrary decisions of the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits and “respectfully conclude[s] 
that they have erred.” Maj. Op. 97 n.26. But in order to grant 
habeas relief, the Majority must conclude that these courts did 
more than err—the decisions must be so clearly wrong that 
they are objectively unreasonable. Does the Majority really 
believe that our fair-minded colleagues on the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuits are that wrong? As the Supreme Court has 
noted, the courts of appeals’ “diverging approaches to [a] 
question illustrate the possibility of fairminded disagree-
ment.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 n.3 (2014). 
Circuit precedent cannot create or refine clearly established 
Supreme Court law, and lower federal courts “may not 
canvass circuit decisions to determine whether a particular 
rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits 
that it would, if presented to [the Supreme] Court, be 
accepted as correct.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 
1451 (2013) (per curiam). Although “[m]ost federal courts 
have concluded that suppressed evidence may be material for 
Brady purposes even where it is not admissible,” Maj. Op. 95, 
that does not transform such a rule into clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent. 
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The Majority does not cite any direct holding of the 
Supreme Court establishing a rule that admissibility is 
irrelevant under Brady. The Majority instead relies on “the 
Supreme Court’s repeated consideration of impeachment 
material in Brady cases.” Maj. Op. 92. The Supreme Court’s 
consideration of impeachment material does not compel the 
broad conclusion that admissibility is irrelevant. 
Because reasonable judges could—and indeed do—
disagree about whether Brady material must be admissible, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply 
clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it found 
that the inadmissibility of the Frazier lead documents 
prevented Dennis’s Brady claim.7 
IV 
The Majority asserts that the Cason receipt, Pugh 
statement, and Frazier documents “effectively gutted the 
Commonwealth’s case against Dennis” and that the failure to 
turn over these documents denied Dennis a fair trial. Maj. Op. 
4. Not true. Dennis’s inability to obtain the Cason receipt 
before trial was, as Dennis himself argued, due to his trial 
counsel’s failure to conduct even a minimal investigation. The 
                                              
7.  Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could 
reasonably have determined that the Cason receipt was 
not suppressed and reasonably determined that the Frazier 
documents were not subject to Brady, materiality was an 
issue with only the Pugh statement. Accordingly, there is 
no need to conduct a cumulative materiality analysis. 
28 
 
double hearsay Pugh statement was credibly refuted by 
Howard. Even if Howard were impeached, based on the 
eyewitness testimony of Bertha and Cameron, there was not a 
reasonable probability of a jury’s returning a different verdict. 
Frazier’s story was fabricated. It was not an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law to consider the 
inadmissibility of the Frazier documents. In granting habeas 
relief for each of these Brady claims, the Majority failed to 
correctly apply the deferential AEDPA standard. I respectfully 
dissent.  
1 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting, joined by SMITH 
and FISHER, Circuit Judges.  
 At the outset of its analysis of James Dennis’s Brady 
claims, the Majority notes that the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) “dictates” our review. 
Majority Op. 30. The opinion describes with precision 
AEDPA’s strictures. Federal courts are prohibited from 
granting habeas corpus relief unless the state-court 
adjudication (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 
of the United States,” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was 
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). These fetters on our review, 
the Majority notes, come close to “imposing a complete bar 
on federal-court relitigation of claims already rejected in 
state-court proceedings.” Id. at 32 (quoting Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).  
It is one thing to recite these demanding limits; it is 
quite another to abide by them.1 And as Judge Fisher’s 
                                              
 1 The inability of federal courts to follow AEDPA has 
reached epidemic proportions. As I pointed out in 2012, since 
2000  
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in 
ninety-four cases arising under AEDPA, forty-
six of which involved questions of federal court 
deference to decisions of state courts. Thirty-
four of those cases (approximately seventy-four 
percent) have been reversed because the court 
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of appeals failed to afford sufficient deference 
to the state court. Remarkably, twenty-two of 
those cases—almost fifty percent—were 
reversed without dissent. 
Garrus v. Sec’y of Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 694 F.3d 
394, 412–14 (3d Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Hardiman, J., 
dissenting) (collecting cases).  
 In the four short years since we decided Garrus, the 
errors have continued apace. By my count, of the nineteen 
cases arising under AEDPA in which the Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari, fourteen involved questions of federal 
court deference to state-court decisions. Thirteen of those 
cases were reversed—ten without dissent. See Kernan v. 
Hinojosa, 136 S. Ct. 1603, 1606 (2016) (per curiam) 
(reversing the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of a summary 
decision as a non-merits adjudication and noting that “the 
Ninth Circuit has already held that state-court denials of 
claims identical to [the petitioner’s] are not contrary to clearly 
established federal law”); Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 
1153 (2016) (unanimously reversing the Sixth Circuit because 
“a fairminded jurist—applying the deference due the state 
court under AEDPA—could certainly conclude that the court 
was not objectively unreasonable in deciding that appellate 
counsel was not incompetent under Strickland, when she 
determined that trial counsel was not incompetent under 
Strickland”); White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 461–62 
(2015) (unanimously reversing the Sixth Circuit’s grant of 
habeas relief because it “did not properly apply the deference 
it was required to accord the state-court ruling”); Davis v. 
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (reversing the Ninth 
Circuit’s grant of the writ on the ground that fairminded 
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jurists could disagree as to whether a state court’s exclusion 
of a defendant’s attorney from part of a Batson hearing was 
harmless error); Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377 
(2015) (unanimously reversing the Sixth Circuit’s grant of 
habeas relief because the state court’s conclusion that the 
petitioner’s counsel was not per se ineffective “was not 
contrary to any clearly established holding” of the Court); 
Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2014) (unanimously 
reversing the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the state court 
“unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by 
failing to classify the trial court’s restriction of closing 
argument as structural error” because no Supreme Court 
precedent clearly established that such mistakes rank as 
structural error); Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 5 (2014) 
(unanimously reversing the Ninth Circuit where it “had no 
basis to reject the state court’s assessment that [the petitioner] 
was adequately apprised of the possibility of conviction on an 
aiding-and-abetting theory”); White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 
1697, 1702–04 (2014) (reversing the Sixth Circuit’s grant of 
habeas relief because the state court’s determination that the 
trial court’s jury instructions did not violate clearly 
established federal law was not “objectively unreasonable”); 
Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17–18 (2013) (reversing without 
dissent the Sixth Circuit’s judgment that the state court’s 
conclusion that counsel’s performance was ineffective was 
unreasonable); Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1994 
(2013) (per curiam) (unanimously reversing the Ninth 
Circuit’s grant of habeas relief where the state court 
reasonably applied federal law in determining that the 
petitioner had not been denied the right to present a complete 
defense when he was not allowed to present certain extrinsic 
evidence); Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1792 (2013) 
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dissenting opinion cogently explains, they quickly fall by the 
wayside once the Majority turns to actually reviewing 
Dennis’s claims. I join Judge Fisher’s opinion in full, but 
write separately to note that I would reverse the District 
Court’s judgment even if there were no “analytical gap[s]” in 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision rejecting 
Dennis’s Brady claims. Fisher Dissent 9–10. Consistent with 
the text of AEDPA and the precedents of the United States 
Supreme Court, I would hold that regardless of the 
thoroughness—or even the correctness—of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s stated reasoning, its judgment may not be 
upset so long as its decision did not contravene or 
unreasonably apply clearly established federal law and did 
not rest on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 
Whatever its flaws, the state court’s decision passes this test. 
I 
                                                                                                     
(unanimously reversing the Sixth Circuit’s grant of the writ 
where Supreme Court had “never found a due process 
violation in circumstances remotely resembling [the 
petitioner’s] case”); Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 
1097 (2013) (reversing without dissent the Ninth Circuit’s 
grant of relief based on the faulty conclusion that the state 
court had overlooked a meritorious Sixth Amendment claim); 
Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696, 700 (2013) (killing two 
birds with one stone in unanimously reversing both the Sixth 
Circuit’s and Ninth Circuit’s grants of relief where the courts 
wrongly concluded that federal law provides a right to 
incompetent prisoners to suspend their federal habeas 
proceedings); but see Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 
2281 (2015) (finding the state court’s determination of the 
facts regarding a defendant with an IQ of 75 unreasonable). 
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 It is a virtue of our judicial system that courts explain 
their decisions in writing. When an explanation is not good 
enough—whether due to a legal, logical, factual, or other 
defect—the decision it supports is often reversed. AEDPA 
displaces this traditional approach to error review by 
imposing strict constraints on the writ of habeas corpus 
designed to stay the hand of federal courts over all but the 
most glaring of state-court errors. We may issue the writ only 
“where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 
disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with” the 
precedents of the Supreme Court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86, 102 (2011). For a prisoner in state custody to obtain 
habeas relief from a federal court, he must demonstrate that 
the state court’s decision on the claim presented before the 
federal court “was so lacking in justification that there was an 
error well understood and comprehended in existing law 
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 
103. “If this standard is difficult to meet,” the Supreme Court 
has explained, “that is because it was meant to be.” Id. at 102. 
A 
By its terms, AEDPA applies to federal review of 
state-court decisions—not to the specific explanations that 
support them. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This distinction might 
seem technical, but the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Harrington v. Richter rendered it critical. There, the Court 
was faced with the question of AEDPA’s application to a 
state-court decision that dismissed in a one-sentence summary 
order a habeas petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 562 U.S. at 96–97. The Court was presented with two 
issues: whether the state-court decision constituted an 
“adjudicat[ion] on the merits” under AEDPA, and if so, how 
the Court should go about determining whether the decision 
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was unreasonable under AEDPA given that the opinion 
provided no reasoning. Id. at 97–102.  
The Court’s answer to the first question rested on a 
straightforward application of AEDPA. Since the text of 
AEDPA “refers only to a ‘decision’” resulting from an 
“adjudication”—making no mention of the need for a 
“statement of reasons”—the Court held that summary 
decisions unaccompanied by an explanation usually qualify as 
merits adjudications under AEDPA. Id. at 98. Hence, even 
where the state-court decision under federal review is devoid 
of reasoning, AEDPA’s deference requirements apply. It 
followed that “the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met 
by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court 
to deny relief.” Id. (emphasis added). This rule obtains 
regardless of “whether or not the state court reveals which of 
the elements in a multipart claim it found insufficient, for § 
2254(d) applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, has 
been adjudicated.” Id.  
 The Court’s answer to the second question in 
Richter—how to assess the reasonableness of a summary 
state-court decision under AEDPA—is particularly instructive 
here. The Court held that AEDPA requires federal courts to 
consider what explanations would nevertheless support the 
decision under federal law. As the Court explained, “a habeas 
court must determine what arguments or theories supported 
or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; 
and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists 
could disagree that those arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this 
Court.” Id. at 102 (emphasis added). At a minimum, then, 
when a state-court decision is unaccompanied by an 
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explanation, Richter requires us to ascertain whether it was 
reasonable.  
 Circuit courts of appeals have divided over whether 
Richter extends beyond the precise circumstances of that 
case.2 Those courts that have chosen to cabin Richter can 
readily point to a limiting principle: single-sentence decisions 
versus multiple-sentence decisions. That distinction strikes 
me as unprincipled, however, because neither Richter’s logic 
nor AEDPA’s text limits the reason-supplying rule to cases in 
which the state-court “decision” is expressed in just one 
sentence. A decision is a decision, after all, and AEDPA does 
not distinguish among one-sentence decisions, one-paragraph 
decisions, or ten-page decisions; all of them are subject to the 
same deferential standard. Although the first portion of 
Richter focused on the fact that the state-court decision 
provided no explanation for the outcome, the reasonableness 
standard articulated in the rest of the opinion is tied to 
AEDPA’s general standard itself. “Where a state court’s 
decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 
petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no 
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Id. 
(emphasis added). In other words, regardless of how 
extensive or sparse the reasoning of a state-court opinion, the 
same AEDPA reasonableness test applies to all decisions on 
the merits.  
                                              
2 See Noam Biale, Beyond A Reasonable 
Disagreement: Judging Habeas Corpus, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1337, 1391 (2015) (“Since Richter . . . the circuits have split 
on whether the opinion’s ‘could have supported’ language for 
decisions unaccompanied by a reasoned opinion applies to 
decisions that do include a reasoned opinion.”). 
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 This approach to AEDPA’s reasonableness standard 
finds support in Premo v. Moore. There, the petitioner 
claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for 
suppression of the petitioner’s confession before advising him 
regarding a guilty plea. 562 U.S. 115, 119 (2011). The state 
court concluded that the petitioner had not established 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington, reasoning that a “motion to suppress would have 
been fruitless in light of the other admissible confession by 
[the petitioner], to which two witnesses could testify.” Id. at 
119 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even though the state 
court “did not specify whether this was because there was no 
deficient performance under Strickland or because [the 
petitioner] suffered no Strickland prejudice, or both,” the 
Supreme Court stated that for a federal habeas court to 
properly eschew AEDPA deference, it “had to conclude that 
both findings would have involved an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law.” Id. at 131 
(emphasis added).  
 Although the state court’s reasoning was quite bare 
and did not explicitly engage the Strickland prongs, the Court 
held that its decision was entitled to AEDPA deference 
because reasons existed that would have supported the 
decision. Specifically, it highlighted that counsel had 
explained in state court that his decision to discuss plea 
bargaining before challenging the petitioner’s confession was 
based on his rationale that “suppression would serve little 
purpose in light of [the petitioner’s] other full and admissible 
confession.” Id. at 123–24. “The state court,” the Supreme 
Court explained, “would not have been unreasonable to 
accept this explanation.” Id. at 124 (emphasis added). Indeed, 
the Court found it unnecessary to consider a second 
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justification that counsel had offered in the underlying 
proceedings because the first “confirms that his representation 
was adequate under Strickland, or at least that it would have 
been reasonable for the state court to reach that conclusion.” 
Id. (emphasis added). In short, presented with a state-court 
decision that was not a summary disposition but that provided 
only some vague reasoning for its decision, the Premo Court 
looked to the record to posit a rationale that would have 
supported that decision, finding it not to be an unreasonable 
application of federal law.3 We should approach Dennis’s 
case the same way.4  
                                              
 3 The Majority and Judge Jordan conclude that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper “implies a 
limit” to the reason-supplying rule announced in Richter. 
Jordan Concurrence 13. I do not read Lafler that way. 
Significantly, habeas relief in that case rested on the Supreme 
Court’s holding that Michigan Court of Appeals’ application 
of Strickland was “contrary to”—not an “unreasonable 
application of”—clearly established federal law. 132 S. Ct. 
1376, 1390 (2012). Specifically, rather than applying the 
Strickland ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard, the 
state court applied a (completely wrong) “knowing and 
voluntary” plea rejection rule. Id. Because a decision is 
categorically “contrary to” clearly established federal law if 
the state court “applies a rule that contradicts the governing 
law,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), AEDPA 
deference was inappropriate, so de novo review applied. 
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390. Consequently, the case was not 
amenable to Richter’s “could have supported” analysis to 
determine whether the state court decision was an 
unreasonable application of federal law. For these reasons, I 
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disagree with the Majority and Judge Jordan that Lafler 
instructs federal courts to “take the state court’s decision as 
written” and apply Richter only in the small subset of cases in 
which the state court left so-called “gaps” to be filled. Jordan 
Concurrence 13.  
 Nor do I read Wetzel v. Lambert to imply any limit on 
Richter. Although the opinion in that case did not include 
Richter’s “theories [that] . . . could have supported” language 
in its recitation of AEDPA’s general standard, see 132 S. Ct. 
1195, 1198 (2012), the Court did not reject that approach by 
implication. Rather, in Wetzel the reasons for upholding the 
state court’s decision under AEDPA were expressed by the 
state court. The petitioner claimed the prosecution violated 
Brady by suppressing a police activity sheet consisting of a 
photo display marked with written notations suggesting that 
“someone other than or in addition to” the petitioner had 
committed the crime. Id. at 1196–97. We granted habeas 
relief, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, 
explaining that we had “overlooked the determination of the 
state courts that the notations were . . . ‘not exculpatory or 
impeaching’ but instead ‘entirely ambiguous.’” Id. at 1198. 
The Court criticized us for “focus[ing] solely on the [state 
court’s] alternative ground that any impeachment value that 
might have been obtained from the notations would have been 
cumulative.” Id. The problem was that “[i]f the conclusion in 
the state courts about the content of the document was 
reasonable—not necessarily correct, but reasonable—
whatever those courts had to say about cumulative 
impeachment evidence would be beside the point.” Id. Hence, 
by failing to recognize—as the state courts did—the 
“‘ambiguous’ nature of the notations” and the “‘speculat[ive]’ 
nature of [the petitioner’s] reading of them,” we ran afoul of 
11 
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AEDPA. Id. Far from implying a limitation on Richter, 
Wetzel merely requires federal habeas courts to review state 
court opinions in search of a reasonable reading that would 
support the decision under federal law.    
 4 Some courts have begun to recognize Richter’s true 
reach. See, e.g, Holland v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 224, 235 (6th Cir. 
2015) (concluding that although “a state court decision 
unaccompanied by any explanation differs from a state court 
decision based on erroneous reasoning . . . Richter suggests 
that this is not a meaningful distinction” and that AEDPA 
requires a habeas petitioner to show that there was “no 
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief . . . whether 
or not the state court reveals [its reasoning]”); Trottie v. 
Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 240–41 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We review 
only the ultimate legal determination by the state court—not 
every link in its reasoning.”); Brady v. Pfister, 711 F.3d 818, 
827 (7th Cir. 2013) (Wood, J.) (“[I]t is clear that a bad reason 
does not necessarily mean that the ultimate result was an 
unreasonable application of established doctrine. . . . If a state 
court’s rationale does not pass muster . . . for Section 
2254(d)(1) cases, the only consequence is that further inquiry 
is necessary.”); Mann v. Ryan, 774 F.3d 1203, 1224–25 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting) (“I have 
misgivings about whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Richter, we are still entitled to reverse a state 
court’s reasonable decision based on what we consider to be 
its incorrect reasoning. . . . After Richter, it seems clear that 
we should assess the reasonableness of a state court’s 
decision, not its reasoning.”).  
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 My understanding of Richter is supported by notions 
of consistency and coherence as well. If we were to limit 
Richter to cases involving one-sentence decisions, the 
outcome of federal review would turn on the state court’s 
opinion-writing technique. Consider a federal court faced 
with a state-court decision that rejected a petitioner’s claim 
that his conviction was invalid because it stemmed from an 
illegal arrest. Assume the record was unclear with respect to 
whether the arresting officer had probable cause, but that 
fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether a Supreme 
Court precedent demanded the conclusion that there was no 
probable cause. If the state court rejected the petitioner’s 
claim via summary disposition, Richter requires the 
reviewing federal court to infer the supportive rationale. 
Because the record would arguably support probable cause 
for the arrest, the conviction would be affirmed. But what if 
the very same claim had been rejected in a partially reasoned 
state-court opinion with problematic gaps in the logic from 
which adverse inferences could be drawn or in an opinion that 
gave incorrect reasons to justify the decision (say, by stating 
that the arrest was valid because there was “reasonable 
suspicion”)? Absurdly, appellate courts that circumscribe 
Richter in the way the Majority has here would require the 
reviewing federal court to ignore the supportive rationale on 
de novo review (where a weak case for probable cause 
wouldn’t be enough) and grant relief.  
The asymmetry illustrated by my hypothetical makes a 
mess of the scheme established by AEDPA. How could a 
state-court decision be “reasonable” under AEDPA where the 
state court gives no reasons to explain itself but where we can 
think of one, yet be “unreasonable” under AEDPA where—
although the very same good reason to support the decision 
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exists—the decision is supported by undeveloped or incorrect 
reasons?5 See Mann, 774 F.3d at 1224–25 (Kozinski, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“A habeas petitioner is not 
entitled to any reasoning at all, so reversing a state court’s 
reasonable decision on the grounds of incorrect reasoning 
risks treating defendants inconsistently: Those who are given 
incorrect reasoning get relief while those who aren’t given 
any reasoning do not.”). To make AEDPA reasonableness 
turn on a state court’s drafting decision is inconsistent with 
AEDPA’s directive that federal courts review the 
reasonableness of decisions, not opinions. And because it 
makes AEDPA deference inversely proportional to the 
amount of information the state court provides, it creates a 
perverse incentive for state courts to earn the deference of 
federal courts by saying less.6  
                                              
 5 Such arbitrariness is all the more perplexing in light 
of the fact that AEDPA “does not require citation of 
[Supreme Court] cases—indeed, it does not even require 
awareness of [Supreme Court] cases.” Early v. Packer, 537 
U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 
6 See Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 537 n.5 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (“[If Richter is limited to summary dispositions], 
the more information the state court provides, the less 
deference we grant it. This is contrary not only to the 
language of the statute, which speaks of ‘claims’ not 
components of claims, but also contrary to the spirit of § 
2254(d), which is designed to give more deference to a state 
court judgment on the merits.”). 
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II 
To sum up, I would hold that when gaps or errors 
afflict a state court’s habeas adjudication, federal courts may 
not reverse unless the decision itself is unreasonable. In 
Dennis’s case, this principle is most pertinent to the Cason 
receipt. As Judge Fisher explains, the reasons proffered by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for rejecting Dennis’s Brady 
claims regarding the Howard police activity report and the 
Frazier documents are themselves sufficient to pass AEDPA 
review without any inference from us. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the Cason receipt, on the other 
hand, is incomplete and might ungenerously be read as 
incorrect. For the reasons explained by Judge Fisher, 
however, a rationale consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
supports the decision, and so it must stand. I would simply 
add that AEDPA would require us to supply this rationale 
even if the state court’s treatment of the Cason receipt were in 
fact wrong. After all, “[a] state court could write that it 
rejected a defendant’s claim because Tarot cards dictated that 
result, but its decision might nonetheless be a sound one.” 
Brady, 711 F.3d at 827 (Wood, J.). 
In my view, AEDPA requires federal courts to take the 
following approach to habeas review. Where the state court 
denies relief summarily, Richter requires federal courts to 
consider what arguments or theories could have supported the 
state court’s decision such that fairminded jurists could 
disagree whether those arguments or theories are inconsistent 
with the holding in a prior decision of the Supreme Court. 
Where the state court denies relief but addresses only certain 
prongs of a test or components of a claim, the reviewing 
federal court should likewise consider what reasons regarding 
an unaddressed prong or component could have supported the 
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decision. And where, as here, the state court denies relief 
through vague, ambiguous, incomplete, or even incorrect 
reasoning, AEDPA still requires the reviewing federal court 
to consider what theories could have supported the decision 
under AEDPA.7  
                                              
 7 I disagree with Judge Jordan that my understanding 
of Richter conflicts with Ylst v. Nunnemaker and Wiggins v. 
Smith. Both of those cases involved the threshold question of 
whether the petitioners’ claim had been decided on the merits. 
The Ylst Court was faced with an “unexplained” State 
supreme court order denying the petitioner’s habeas petition, 
wherein it was unclear whether the court rested its denial on a 
procedural default (the basis of the lower court’s holding) or 
on the merits of his Miranda claim. 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991). 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the decision was on the merits, explaining that, “where, 
as here, the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly 
imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later 
decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar 
and consider the merits.” Id. at 803. To the extent that Ylst 
requires us to “look through” unreasoned state court opinions 
to the last reasoned opinion, I have no quarrel with Judge 
Jordan that we ought to first consider whether the state 
court’s stated explanation is reasonable before deigning to 
supply reasons of our own under Richter. As for Wiggins, we 
have explained that the reason the Court declined to apply 
deference with respect to the prejudice prong of the 
petitioner’s Strickland claim was that the state courts had not 
decided the Strickland prejudice issue “on the merits.” 
Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 400 (3d Cir. 2010); see 
also Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (“[O]ur review is not 
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By ignoring these principles, the Majority empowers 
itself to reweigh evidence that is decades old. Like the 
District Court, the Majority takes a fresh look at the evidence 
and concludes, contrary to the consistent testimony of three 
eyewitnesses, that the alleged Brady violations “effectively 
gutted the Commonwealth’s case against Dennis.” Majority 
Op. 4 (emphasis added). AEDPA proscribes such searching 
review. Because fairminded jurists could disagree as to 
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision was 
inconsistent with federal law, we owe it our deference. I 
respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to do 
otherwise.  
                                                                                                     
circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to 
prejudice, as neither of the state courts below reached this 
prong of the Strickland analysis.”). Because AEDPA 
deference only extends to “any claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d), 
the determination whether the state-court decision under 
federal review was made on the merits is prior to the 
consideration, vel non, of whether adequate reasons exist in 
support of that decision. I do nevertheless agree with Judge 
Jordan that Wiggins is in some tension with my approach 
because it engaged in de novo review of the second prong of 
Strickland even though the state court denied relief but 
addressed only the first prong. However, Richter—decided 
after Wiggins—speaks clearly on this point. “[A] habeas 
petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no 
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief . . . . whether 
or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a 
multipart claim it found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies 
when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, has been 
adjudicated.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 
